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ii 
Abstract 
 
Banks have always been key players in the financial sector nationally and 
internationally. After the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 (GFC), many countries have 
gone through reforms of banking regulatory frameworks, especially focusing on 
mechanisms of early identification and management of banks in distress at early stages 
(structured early intervention for banks). These mechanisms aim to equip banking 
regulators with chances and resources to take corrective measures to troubled banks 
before their financial conditions continue to deteriorate. The United States adopted such 
a mechanism, Prompt Corrective Actions (PCA), during the Savings and Loans Crisis in 
1990s. The United Kingdom has reformed its bank regulatory framework and adopted a 
similar mechanism, Proactive Intervention Framework (PIF), to manage distressed banks 
before risks have been materialised, after the GFC. China has been in the process of 
designing and reforming a particular mechanism for early intervention of troubled banks. 
However, existing literature rarely provides detailed and comprehensive 
breakdowns and analyses of structured early intervention for banks as to what 
components should be considered as essential and what types of components are 
effective in the context of early intervention for banks. For China, establishing a tailored 
mechanism of structured early intervention for banks is necessary, since the stability of 
the Chinese banking sector, with a great number of banks with global significance, is not 
only important for China but also for the stability of the international banking sector. 
Therefore, this thesis provides a detailed breakdown of important components of 
structured early intervention for banks, namely triggering events and corrective actions, 
on the basis of current US, UK and Chinese practice, from a comparative law perspective. 
More importantly, this thesis analyses what types of components of structured early 
intervention for banks are effective and suitable for the Chinese banking regulatory 
framework and proposes a specific mechanism for Chinese structured early intervention 
for banks. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
I. Background 
 
Many countries have reformed or adjusted their banking regulatory frameworks in 
response to challenges identified during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009 (GFC). 
One of the key challenges is the appearance of excessive costs due to the failure to 
identify financial risks at early stages and deal with them accordingly.1 In order to monitor 
and identify these risks at early stages, one approach to reforming existing financial 
regulatory structures is to incorporate or improve structured early intervention systems or 
mechanisms for banks in a country’s banking regulatory framework. Several countries 
have identified the importance of bank early intervention mechanisms. For example, the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), as the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) prudential banking 
regulator, incorporated the proactive intervention framework (PIF) into its regulatory 
approaches.2 This mechanism enables the PRA to intervene in bank operations at earlier 
stages by imposing additional or stricter regulatory measures depending on the bank’s 
financial condition. Developing countries have come to recognise the importance of bank 
early intervention mechanisms; India, for example, has incorporated the idea of prompt 
corrective action (PCA) into its banking regulatory frameworks as an essential part in 
achieving financial stability.3 The Indian PCA is developed based on the PCA initiative of 
the United States. 
The US’s PCA and the UK’s PIF are both structured early intervention mechanisms 
for banks. These early intervention mechanisms have the following features. First, they 
consist of thresholds of bank performance. These thresholds categorise banks into 
different groups depending on bank financial conditions and act as triggering events for 
 
1 Stijn Claessens, Luc Laeven, Deniz O Igan and Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, ‘Lessons and Policy Implications 
from the Global Financial Crisis’ (IMF Working Paper 1 February 2010) 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Lessons-and-Policy-Implications-from-the-
Global-Financial-Crisis-23637> last checked 19 August 2019 
2 The Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘The PRA’s Approach to Banking Supervision’ (31 October 2018) 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2018/pra-approach-documents-2018> 
last checked 19 August 2019 
3  Viral Acharya, ‘Prompt Corrective Action: An Essential Element of Financial Stability Framework’ 
(Reserve Bank of India Bulletin November 2018) 21 
<https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/0RBIBULLETIN_F79C0C7C6BA824813B9F651BD63C211
76.PDF#page=7> last checked 19 August 2019 
2 
the following corrective measures. Second, banks are subject to a growing level of 
intervention or intensity of supervision if they fail to meet certain requirements established 
by thresholds/triggering events. The importance of structured early interventions for 
banks is threefold. First, they provide banking regulators with sufficient resources, 
including timely signals of bank financial status and appropriate corrective measures, with 
which to intervene in bank operations with and deal with troubled banks at early stages. 
Second, structured early interventions for banks set a scope for banking regulators’ 
authority and responsibilities at early stages in relation to managing troubled banks and 
require banking regulators to take corrective measures when banks fail to meet triggering 
events, thereby to some extent limiting regulatory forbearance. Third, structured early 
interventions for banks provide incentives for banks to meet regulatory requirements and 
to avoid the need for additional and more stringent interventions from banking regulators.  
In the context of the Chinese banking sector, Chinese banks have an important 
role in the financial sector and in providing financing to different types of enterprises.4 The 
Chinese banking sector also has a growing significance, especially with several global 
systemically important financial institutions. However, the Chinese banking regulatory 
framework is less comprehensive and sophisticated in comparison with the US and UK 
equivalents. Structured early interventions for banks constitute one of the aspects in the 
Chinese banking regulatory framework that requires further development and reform. 
Currently, Chinese banking regulators have limited resources in relation to dealing with 
troubled banks at early stages and the state’s intervention in managing troubled banks 
can be problematic and inefficient. 
In this thesis, the term ‘troubled banks’ refers to banks that fail to meet prudential 
regulatory requirements. Depending on their financial performance, these banks can be 
economically viable or nonviable. 
 
II. Necessities of This Thesis 
 
The necessities of this thesis are as follows. First, in relation to the Chinese 
banking regulatory framework, structured early interventions for banks that deal with 
 
4 Eswar S. Prasad, ‘Financial Sector Regulation and Reform in Emerging Markets: An Overview’ (2010) 
NBER Working Paper No.16428 <https://www.nber.org/papers/w16428.pdf> last checked 19 August 2019 
3 
troubled banks at early stages have been rarely discussed to date from the perspective 
of components of the mechanism. The literature has only touched upon this topic when 
discussing other aspects of the Chinese banking regulatory framework. In relation to the 
deposit insurance scheme in China, some existing research discusses the roles of the 
Chinese deposit insurer in early interventions for troubled banks and explains why the 
deposit insurer should be the responsible regulatory agency for bank early interventions.5 
In relation to dealing with failed banks, research has focused on discussing the structure 
and design of bank resolution regimes, which outline resolution tools, procedures, and 
regulatory agencies to resolve failed banks within a particular insolvency procedure for 
banks. 6  The regulation and supervision of troubled banks together constitute an 
increased level of supervision over normal and regular banking regulations that occurs 
before the actual resolution of troubled banks. This thesis focuses on this phase of 
managing of troubled banks from the perspective of regulatory agencies, triggering events, 
and corrective measures in China. 
Second, this thesis discusses components of structured early interventions for 
banks from a comparative perspective. This thesis incorporates US, UK, and Chinese 
structured early interventions for banks and discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of these three countries’ structured early intervention mechanisms for banks. The US, UK, 
and Chinese mechanisms provide a spectrum of the development of structured early 
interventions for banks. The structured early interventions for US banks are the most 
developed within the three countries, while the structured early interventions for US banks 
are more developed than the structured early interventions for Chinese banks, which 
remain at the beginning stage of the mechanism. Both the US and UK experiences 
provide models for structuring Chinese structured early interventions for banks. 
Third, this thesis identifies differences between the understanding of several terms 
in the Chinese literature and in the US and UK literature, respectively, thereby clarifying 
 
5 Jiliang Guo, ‘Exploration the Problem of Power of Early Correction by the Deposit Insurance Fund 
Management Institution’ (2017) 1 Zheng Fa Lun Cong 55; Yan Lin and Haifeng Ma, ‘The Scope of Deposit 
Insurance Agency’s Authority – Discussion on International Experience and Assessment of Section 7 of 
Deposit Insurance Regulation’ (2015) 11 Shanghai Finance 68 
6 Dongqin Yang, ‘On the Establishment of Commercial Bank Insolvency Legal System of China’ (UIBE 
Doctoral Thesis 2016); Xin’an Li, ‘Research on Dealing with Bank Insolvency Risks’ (2018) 2 Huabei 
Finance 48  
4 
the actual meaning in the context of discussing structured early interventions for banks. 
Two important terms in this context are ‘early intervention’ and ‘takeover’. In the Chinese 
literature, the term ‘early intervention’7 is associated with resolution tools that are applied 
within the bank resolution regime, such as bridge bank or purchase and assumption.8 
Conversely, in the US and UK literature, ‘early intervention’ refers to the supervision and 
regulation of banks before their actual resolution and represents an increased level of 
intervention by banking regulators. In this thesis, ‘early intervention’ is presented aligning 
with the understanding in the US and UK literature.  
Separately, in the Chinese literature, the term ‘takeover’ 9  in banking law 
specifically refers to administrative procedures of banking regulators that are enacted to 
temporarily manage a troubled bank.10 The term shares the same meaning in the context 
of company law. ‘Takeover’ in the US and UK literature, however, instead normally refers 
to assuming control of a corporation, which is achieved either through mergers or the 
purchase of shares, and does not have a particular meaning in banking law. 
The original contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, this thesis bridges the gap 
in relation to research of structured early interventions for banks in the Chinese banking 
regulatory framework and provides policy recommendations for designing and 
establishing structured early interventions for Chinese banks. Second, this thesis 
discusses two main components of structured early interventions for banks in-depth—
specifically, triggering events and corrective measures—and further explores the 
advantages and disadvantages of each component in the three countries. This provides 
a reference as to what types of triggering events and corrective measures can be 
considered when establishing structured early interventions for banks in a certain country. 
 
III. Research Questions 
 
This thesis covers the following four research questions.  
 
7  In Chinese, it means ‘早期干预’ (Zao Qi Gan Yu) 
8 Industry Development and Research Committee of China Banking Association, ‘Three Steps for Troubled 
Banks to Exit the Market Under Chinese Deposit Insurance Scheme’ (2016) 1 China Banking 35 
9 In Chinese, it means ‘接管’(Jie Guan) 
10 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks, s 64 
5 
• The first question is how are US, UK, and Chinese structured early interventions 
for banks designed and do the current US, UK, and Chinese mechanisms have 
advantages and disadvantages? 
• The second question is what types of triggering events of structured early 
interventions for banks are applied in the US, the UK, and China? This question 
focuses on elucidating the advantages and disadvantages of different types of 
triggering events and provides two perspectives of why triggering events are 
different. 
• The third question is what are the corrective measures of US, UK, and Chinese 
structured early interventions for banks? This question concentrates on exploring 
different corrective measures in the three countries and identifies similarities and 
differences between them. 
• The final question is what are suitable structured early interventions for banks in 
the context of Chinese banking regulatory framework? This question pushes one 
to consider the appropriate banking regulator, types of triggering events, and 
corrective measures for the Chinese structured early interventions. 
 
IV. Literature Review 
 
This section provides a brief literature review in relation to the main aspects of the 
thesis. It includes a literature review on the design of structured early interventions for 
banks; an important precondition of structured early interventions for banks; triggering 
events of structured early interventions for banks; and, finally, corrective measures of 
structured early interventions for banks. 
 
A. Design of Structured Early Interventions for Banks 
 
This section briefly reviews how to design structured early interventions for banks. 
The focus of this section is on the following two aspects: the fundamental theory 
underlying PCA in the United States and relevant factors that are worth considering when 
establishing and reforming structured early interventions for banks.  
The structured early intervention and resolution (SEIR) approach provides the 
theoretical basis for PCA in the United States. The SEIR initiative includes a set of rules 
6 
that specify when and how US banking regulators can impose additional regulatory 
requirements on banks if the bank’s capital adequacy falls below standards. 11  The 
following four relevant factors: supervisory independence and accountability, adequate 
authority, adequate resolution procedures, and accurate and timely financial information, 
that contribute to effective early interventions for banks and act as the foundation for a 
successful implementation of early interventions for banks.12 The necessity of banking 
supervisors having a comprehensive understanding of bank information, there being 
cooperation amongst several cross-border authorities within the European Union (EU), 
and there existing early preparations to achieve an optimal outcome in the context of early 
intervention in the EU are conceptualised factors which are relevant and essential to 
establishing an early intervention structure within a banking regulatory framework.13 
Structured early interventions for US and UK banks both consider many of these factors 
but focus on different elements in establishing structured early interventions for banks in 
their banking regulatory framework. 
 
B. Comprehensive Banking Regulatory and Resolution as a Precondition 
 
In this section, a focus is placed on reviewing the presence of an adequate banking 
regulatory and resolution framework as a precondition to ensure effective structured early 
interventions for banks in the context of the Chinese banking sector. Good banking 
regulatory and resolution frameworks are one of the relevant factors leading to effective 
structured early interventions for banks. In the US and UK regulatory frameworks, both 
structured early intervention regimes have taken the impact and necessity of resolution 
procedures into consideration. On the other hand, this is a missing factor in current 
Chinese early interventions for banks. Therefore, much of the Chinese literature focuses 
on discussing the importance of covering resolution authorities and procedures for 
troubled banks in the banking regulatory framework. 
 
11 George J. Benston and George Kaufman, ‘Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depository Institutions: Past 
Policies and Current Options’ (1988) 1 Monograph Series in Finance and Economics 33 
12 Maria Nieto and Larry Wall, ‘Preconditions for a Successful Implementation of Supervisors’ Prompt 
Corrective Action: Is There a Case for a Banking Standard in the EU?’ (Banco De Espana Documentos de 
Trabajo. No. 0702 2007) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965365> last checked 10 
Aug 2019 
13 David G Mayes, ‘Early Intervention and Prompt Corrective Action in Europe’  (2009) Bank of Finland 
Research Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456404> last accessed 20 Aug 2019 
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In the context of early interventions for troubled banks, the recent literature 
identified the importance of having an exit mechanism—namely, banking resolution and 
insolvency proceedings—for troubled banks. Chinese banking regulators and supervisors 
deal with troubled banks and their risks in the five following ways: liquidity assistance, 
administrative takeover, mergers and reorganisations, administrative closure, and 
bankruptcy procedures.14 These measures cover all recovery and resolution measures. 
Some of these measures are corrective in nature. The necessity of establishing a 
complete procedure, which should include steps like resolution plans, purchase and 
assumption, asset transfer, insolvency proceedings, and loss distribution, to resolve 
troubled banks when the banks are not viable is argued.15 A lack of proper arrangement 
between the Chinese deposit insurance management agency and bank liquidator in 
China has been highlighted, especially the need to establish bank insolvency proceedings 
to deal with the remaining troubled banks after intervention measures like purchase and 
assumption are enacted by the deposit insurance management agency.16 The impact of 
the market should be considered as a factor when designing exit mechanisms for troubled 
banks, including the resolution of troubled banks.17 This means that troubled banks could 
be allowed to exit the market after early intervention and corrective measures fail.18 
In the context of bank resolution and insolvency proceedings, a hybrid type of legal 
structure for insolvency proceedings to manage failed commercial banks in China has 
been proposed.19  This legal structure combines administrative authority and judicial 
power to deal with troubled banks from the perspective of rescue before insolvency, 
exiting the market, and protection after insolvency.20 Pre-insolvency arrangements for 
troubled banks as a part of special bank insolvency proceedings for banks has been 
 
14 Wenhui Ye, ‘Regulatory Framework and Practice for Dealing with Troubled Banks: Comparisons 
between US and China’ (2019) 1 Zhejiang Finance 33 
15 ibid. 
16 Yu Jin, ‘Structured Early Intervention for Banks by Deposit Insurance Agency: Theories and Practice’ 
(2018) 6 Shanghai Finance 53 
17 Yong Zhang, Wei Chen, Min Mi and Lin Lin, ‘Identificationm, Regulation and Resolution of Troubled 
Banks – International Perspectives and Practice (2016) 8 Financial Perspective Journal 28 
18 ibid. 
19 Dongqin Yang, ‘On the Establishment of Commercial Bank Insolvency Legal System of China’ (UIBE 
Doctoral Thesis 2016) 
20 ibid. 
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discussed and argued for Chinese situations.21 Another alternative arrangement is that 
the Chinese court with judicial power should play a core role in bank insolvency 
proceedings for failed commercial banks, while administrative authorities such as the 
prudential banking regulator in China should play a secondary and supplementary role.22  
To summarise, bank resolution and insolvency proceedings are necessary for the 
function of a comprehensive legal framework in the banking sector. In a general context, 
whether the combination of administrative authority and judicial power or only judicial 
power plays a major role in resolving failed banks, a legal structure for failed banks is 
needed in the Chinese banking sector. In the context of structured early interventions for 
banks, a formal legal structure with specific rules in relation to bank resolution and 
insolvency proceedings will provide a guarantee for structured early interventions as the 
last resort if a troubled bank fails. 
 
C. Triggering Events 
 
This section briefly reviews objective standards as indicators of bank financial 
performance and risks to trigger early intervention by banking regulators, from the 
perspectives of capital adequacy as triggers and noncapital triggers, respectively.  
In terms of capital ratios as triggering events of structured early interventions for 
banks, capital ratio is a reflection of a bank’s capability to deal with its own financial losses, 
and so, in theory, with higher capital adequacy, banks are more likely to recover from 
financial losses and less likely to be influenced by the possibilities of insolvency.23 From 
this perspective, if a bank’s capital adequacy falls, the bank is less likely to withstand the 
negative impact of financial losses and insolvency risk.24  In relation to Basel capital 
regulation, the following three key lessons are summarised from the evolution from the 
Basel I to Basel III: 1) requiring banks to have more capital; 2) the level of capital should 
be equivalent or compatible to the level of risks of the banks; and 3) some types of capital 
 
21 Degang Zou, ‘The Theoretical Logic of Bank Bankruptcy Law in Perspective of Law and Economics’ 
(Jilin University Doctoral Thesis 2013) 
22 Tingjun Zhao, ‘Research on the Design of Commercial Bank Insolvency Mechanics’ (China University 
of Political Science and Law Doctoral Thesis 2007) 
23 Frederic Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets (Pearson 2012) 
24 ibid. 
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are better than other types.25 The evolution of the capital regulation of banks starts from 
a vague definition to a specific definition of capital ratios and as a specific minimum 
standard of capital adequacy for regulating banks in the US to deal with Savings and Loan 
Crisis in the 1980s.26 There is also a range of empirical models that explain higher capital 
ratios or why holding additional capital is beneficial for banks, especially with helping the 
banks survive financial losses and even crises. For example, the function of capital in 
small banks is to improve their possibilities of survival and to increase their market share 
both during normal times and crises while the function of capital on medium and large 
banks is to help them survive during crises.27 Taking into consideration capital adequacy 
requirements, deposit insurance, and a bank’s franchise value, when it comes to bank 
capital structure, the additional capital held by banks is helpful to protect their franchise 
value.28 To summarise, capital ratio is an indicator of banks’ performance and can reflect 
whether a bank is in trouble. In general, a bank with a higher capital ratio is more likely to 
survive financial losses and make it through a crisis. On the other hand, capital ratio has 
disadvantages as a triggering event of early intervention, as it has been critically reviewed 
by a number of studies over the two decades. Capital ratios that are based on book values 
of banks are lagging indicators and are not true reflections of the economic values of 
banks.29 There have been doubts about the function and results of the minimum capital 
ratios at each threshold that are designed to provide timely information about and 
indications of the banks’ performance.30  
In addition to capital ratios, noncapital triggers are alternative indicators of bank 
performance and the possibilities of potential failure. Noncapital triggers are designed to 
 
25 Bruce Arnold, Claudio Borio, Luci Ellis and Fariborz Moshirian, ‘Systemic Risk, Macroprudential Policy 
Frameworks, Monitoring Financial Systems and the Evolution of Capital Adequacy’ (2012) 36 Journal of 
Banking and Finance 3125 
26  Eric Posner, ‘How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy Requirements?’ (2015) 82 
University of Chicago Law Review 1853 
27 Allen Berger and Christa Bowman ‘How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises? 
(2013) 109 Journal of Financial Economics 146 
28 John Harding, Xiaozhong Liang and Stephen Ross, ‘Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and 
Regulation’ (2013) 43 Journal of Financial Services Research 127 
29 Eliana Balla, Edward Prescott, Laurel Mazur and John Walter, ‘A Comparison of Community Bank 
Failures and FDIC Losses in the 1986-92 and 2007-13 Banking Crises’ (2019) Journal of Banking and 
Finance Forthcoming 
30 Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren, ‘The Use of Capital Ratios to Trigger Intervention in Problem Banks: Too 
Little, Too Late (1996) September/October New England Economic Review 49 
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complement the disadvantages of capital triggers with the same function of indicating 
banks’ conditions. Noncapital triggers can be categorised into single-variable triggers, 
which means that one indicator determines the financial condition and risks of a bank, 
and multivariable triggers, which involve a set of indicators that determine the initiation of 
early interventions by banking regulators. The nonperforming asset coverage ratio 
(NPACR) is an effective indicator of bank financial performance and risk levels that offers 
more benefits in predicting banks’ financial conditions than risk-based capital ratios do.31 
The effectiveness of NPACR and its function to reduce the loss of the US Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has futher been explained.32  In terms of multivariable 
triggering events, measuring the capital adequacy of banks by using two or more 
noncapital indicators to assess whether the banks are in trouble or in good operations 
can be achieved.33 
 
D. Corrective Measures 
 
This section briefly summarises corrective measures of structured early 
interventions for banks. Country-specific corrective measures are presented in either laws 
or banking regulators’ handbooks as to what corrective measures can be applied to 
troubled banks under certain circumstances that are dependent on triggering events. The 
main source of US corrective measures is 12 U.S.C. § 1831o Prompt Corrective 
Actions.34 The main source of UK corrective measures is the PRA handbook (the PRA’s 
approach to banking regulation). Sources of Chinese corrective measures include the 
Banking Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Commercial Banks, Deposit Insurance Regulation, and Notice of the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission on Issues Concerning Transitional Arrangements for the 
 
31 Lucy Chernykh and Rebel Cole, ‘How Should We Measure Bank Capital Adequacy for Triggering Prompt 
Corrective Action? A (Simple) Proposal’ (2015) 20 Journal of Financial Stability 131 
32 Paul H. Kupiec, ‘Fixing Prompt Corrective Action’ (2016) AEI Economic Policy Working Paper 2016-03 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2724120> last accessed 26 August 2019 
33 Ahlem Selma Messai and Mohamed Imen Gallali, ‘Financial Leading Indicators of Banking Distress: A 
Micro Prudential Approach - Evidence from Europe’ (2015) Asian Social Science 78; Robert DeYoung and 
Gokhan Torna, ‘Nontraditional Activities and Bank Failures during the Financial Crisis’ Journal of Financial 
Intermediation’ (2013) 22 Journal of Financial Intermediation 397; Rebel Cole and Lawrence White ‘Déjà 
Vu All over Again: The causes of U.S. Commercial Bank Failures This Time around’ (2012) 42 Journal of 
Financial Services Research 5 
34 12 U.S.C. § 1831o 
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Implementation of the Administrative Measures for the Capital of Commercial Banks (for 
Trial Implementation). A range of informal and formal corrective measures that could have 
an impact on bank shareholders, bank managers, bank directors, and the banks 
themselves are provided by the International Association of Deposit Insurers. Restoration 
plans as a tool for early intervention are argued as important and necessary.35 The 
relationship between discretion-based and rule-based early intervention regimes has 
been highlighted, especially the use of discretion-based measures which is necessary for 
banking regulators to remain flexible when dealing with troubled banks under specific 
circumstances.36 
 
V. Methodology 
 
This thesis adopts doctrinal, comparative, and historical research methods. In 
relation to the doctrinal method, this thesis was conducted by the means of selecting, 
reviewing, and evaluating materials on structured early interventions for banks; structured 
early intervention for banks’ relationships with banking regulation and bank resolution; 
triggering events; and corrective measures. These carefully chosen materials include 
primary and secondary sources in the US, the UK, and China that range from laws and 
regulations to books and journals. These materials provide the basis for the analysis of 
theories, designs, and components of structured early interventions for banks and policy 
recommendations for China.  
With regard to the comparative method, this thesis analyses and examines 
structured early interventions for US, UK, and Chinese banks in detail. This method helps 
to identify advantages and disadvantages of different triggering events and corrective 
measures in each country and identify weaknesses and potential development areas of 
structured early interventions for Chinese banks. Concerning the use of structured early 
interventions for banks as a mechanism, this method provides three national approaches 
and designs of said mechanism. Structured early interventions for US, UK, and Chinese 
 
35  Jean-Philippe Svoronos, ‘Early Intervention Regimes for Weak Banks’ Bank for International 
Settlements Financial Stability Institute Insight on Policy Implementation No.6 (April 2018) 4 
<https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights6.pdf> las accessed 26 Aug 2019 
36 Fernando Restoy, ‘Early Intervention Regimes: The Balance between Rules vs. Discretions’ (2017) FSI-
IADI Meeting on early Supervisory Intervention, Resolution and Deposit Insurance 
<https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp170912.pdf> last accessed 26 August 2018 
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banks are selected because developments of the mechanisms in the three countries 
constitute representatives of structured early interventions for banks at different stages. 
In relation to the historical method, considerations of a country’s banking regulatory 
structures, history and reforms of the banking and financial sectors, and preferences 
toward the regulation and supervision of banks are necessary and critical for suitable 
policy recommendations. Therefore, understanding US, UK, and Chinese backgrounds 
of structured early interventions for banks is helpful in making decisions about each of the 
components of structured early interventions for banks. In addition, with the 
understanding of the history and background of the Chinese banking regulatory 
framework, policy recommendations for structured early interventions for Chinese banks 
can be made more suitable and applicable.  
 
VI. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Followed by the introduction, this thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 provides a foundation and background of structured early interventions 
for banks. This chapter defines the scope of the regulation and supervision of banks by 
structured early interventions for banks and differentiates structured early interventions 
for banks from mechanisms of bank resolution. It also examines theories that are relevant 
to structured early interventions for banks. 
Chapter 2 examines current mechanisms of structured early interventions for US, 
UK, and Chinese banks. This chapter discusses how structured early interventions for 
US, UK, and Chinese banks are organised and designed and examines the advantages 
and disadvantages of each country’s structured early interventions for banks. 
Chapter 3 explores and compares triggering events of structured early 
interventions for US, UK, and Chinese banks. It discusses different types of triggering 
events and their effectiveness in the context of the US, UK, and Chinese banking sectors 
and identifies similarities and differences of each type of triggering event. 
Chapter 4 explores and compares corrective measures of structured early 
interventions for US, UK, and Chinese banks. It discusses similarities and differences of 
corrective measures that are incorporated into structured early interventions for US, UK, 
13 
and Chinese banks and provides thoughts on what types of corrective measures should 
be incorporated into such mechanisms. 
Chapter 5 discusses and provides policy recommendations of structured early 
interventions for Chinese banks from the perspective of the responsible banking regulator, 
triggering events, and corrective measures on the basis of comparisons of structured 
early interventions for US, UK, and Chinese banks as well as the history and culture of 
Chinese banking regulations. 
The final conclusion summarises the findings of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 Background of Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
Regulating banks when banks are solvent differentiates dealing with failed banks 
under bank resolution. From banking regulation to bank resolution, aims and approaches 
for dealing with banks change. Regulatory authorities may change from banking 
regulators to the court when it comes to resolving failed banks. A bank’s condition can 
change swiftly from solvent and profitable to insolvent and unstable within the banking 
sector. The changes in banks’ condition lead to a transformation from banking regulation 
by regulatory authorities to bank resolution or even bank insolvency proceedings by the 
court. Because of the importance of banks to the financial system, administration and 
insolvency rules that generally apply to non-bank firms do not necessarily apply to banks 
in some situations. 37  The rules for banks are designed to deal with their special 
characteristics.  
The pre-insolvency stage between a healthy operation and a troubled situation of 
a bank can be an important phase. Early intervention with troubled banks by banking 
regulators is necessary when banks’ financial condition continues to worsen. This chapter 
focuses on the importance of pre-insolvency arrangements for banks. A high-level 
understanding of structured early intervention for banks and its importance contributes to 
the basis of this dissertation. This chapter lays the groundwork for the chapters to follow, 
in particular, discussing definitions and core concepts associated with the pre-insolvency 
stage and relevant arrangements for troubled banks.  
This chapter has four sections. The first section explores core concepts associated 
with structured early intervention for banks and defines those arrangements at the pre-
insolvency stage. The second section discusses the most influential theory that underpins 
structured early intervention, other relevant theories or proposals to solve issues that are 
related to US deposit insurance reform in the 1990s. The third section examines 
rationales for structured early intervention for banks, especially from the perspectives of 
the special characteristics of banks compared with non-bank firms and the objectives of 
the arrangements and managing risks involved in banks’ operation. The fourth section 
 
37 Andrew Lilico, ‘How is Banking Regulation Changing, and How Could it be Better?’ (2012) 32 Economic 
Affairs 6 
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explores corrective measures associated with bank resolution, to differentiate the 
corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks at early stages. 
 
I. What Is Structured Early Intervention for Banks? 
 
This section first discusses the differences between failure of non-bank firms and 
banks to clarify some key concepts associated with bank insolvency and provide the basis 
for discussion of structured early intervention for banks. Then this section introduces the 
different stages of bank insolvency, especially early stages of bank insolvency. A 
discussion of the different stages of bank insolvency identifies the process that a bank 
undergoes from a situation with moderate but potentially severe financial problems to a 
situation in which no corrective measures can manage. This process is the foundation for 
discussing the definition and coverage of the structured early intervention for banks. On 
the basis of these different stages of bank insolvency, a clearer understanding of early 
stages of bank insolvency can be achieved, thereby leading to an accurate context for 
the definition of structured early intervention for banks. 
 
A. Non-Bank Firm Insolvency and Bank Insolvency 
 
To be clear, the term ‘insolvency’ refers to financial concepts that a business is 
cash-flow insolvent and balance sheet insolvent. Cash flow insolvency means that a firm 
cannot pay its debts when they are due, and balance sheet insolvency means that 
liabilities of a firm exceed its assets and the realisation of the firm’s assets is the only way 
to meet its liabilities.38 This means that the firm cannot make a reasonable return on its 
owners’ investment.39  The term ‘bankruptcy’ refers to the legal determination of the 
insolvent situation of a firm; the firm will be liquidated and closed after the determination 
of bankruptcy. 
A non-bank firm may experience the following stages before it reaches insolvency: 
the firm encounters losses, and its creditors may require higher interests or repayment 
because of the increased risks caused by the losses, and then the firm is unlikely to raise 
 
38 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th ed Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 114 
39 John R Walter, ‘Closing Troubled Banks: How the Process Works?’ (2004) 90 Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond Economic Quarterly 51 
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more funds and perform its obligations.40 In the end, depending on the firm’s specific 
situation, it may voluntarily or involuntarily settle the obligations with the creditors, either 
by reaching voluntary arrangement or being forced into insolvency by the creditors, and 
the firm may decide to dissolve.41 This means that the firm can close its business on its 
own or the firm can attempt recovery by seeking additional funds that is subject to its 
creditors or new investors’ willingness. 
When it comes to bank insolvency, the Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) ensures 
that insured depositors are guaranteed to receive a certain amount of their deposits.42 
This means that insured depositors have less incentives to start bank runs and therefore 
avoid disruptive impact of contagious bank run on individual banks and the banking 
system.43 From the perspective of insured depositors of banks, under the circumstance 
of insolvency, they may have less incentives require closure of banks and demand 
repayment because of the DIS compared creditors of non-bank firms. When a bank 
reaches insolvency, its owners can decide to close the bank on its own, such as 
liquidating the bank and selling its assets and liabilities to another bank. The bank can 
also attempt recovery by seeking new funds. An insolvent bank can access new funds 
more easily from its depositors than other non-bank firms from their creditors because 
insured depositors are more willing to provide additional funding to the bank when their 
losses are covered by the DIS.44  
In terms of incentives to close a bank or a non-bank firm, different reactions of 
banks’ depositors and non-bank firms’ creditors shows that with the DIS banks are more 
likely to remain open even though they are insolvent. This means that insolvent banks 
are closed later than the time that they should have been closed. Banking regulators are 
the ones who intervene in, close insolvent banks and initiate the bankruptcy proceedings 
when insured depositors are not motivated to force the banks into bankruptcy and other 
stakeholders (e.g. the banks’ shareholders and uninsured depositors) suffer losses.  
 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
42  Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Building a Stable European Deposit Insurance Scheme’ (2018) 4 Journal of 
Financial Regulation 314 
43 Deniz Anginer and Asli Demirguc-Kunt, ‘Bank Run and Moral Hazard: A Review of Deposit Insurance’ 
(2018) World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper 8589, 2 
44 Walter (n 39) 54 
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Based on the comparison between non-bank firm insolvency and bank insolvency, 
with the DIS, banks can be insolvent and open at the same time. In this thesis, a 
‘troubled/failing bank’ refers to a bank that is insolvent but is not closed by banking 
regulators. ‘financial hardships’ of a troubled banks refers to the situation that the troubled 
bank is financially insolvent and cannot perform its obligations while remain open. 
 
B. Different Stages of Bank Insolvency 
 
Moving from a bank’s situation with some minor or moderate financial problems to 
the eventual resolution/closure of the bank takes time, though the time frame can be short. 
This process involves different stages: the pre-insolvency stage, insolvency stage and 
bankruptcy stage.45 
The pre-insolvency stage is the stage where banks start to have financial problems 
in a their businesses and operations. These minor or moderate financial problems are 
likely to become severe problems or even financial hardships if they are not dealt with 
properly early on. In the pre-insolvency stage, there should be early procedures and tools 
for intervention.46 Corrective measures in the pre-insolvency stage are likely to solve 
these relatively minor problems and prevent banks from moving into the next two stages. 
Benefits of taking these corrective measures include reduced possibilities of bankruptcy, 
thereby reducing or eliminating the cost of liquidating a troubled bank. The pre-insolvency 
stage connects the healthy operation of banks with the troubled situation of banks. Banks 
are in good financial situations without these minor financial problems, and if problems 
continue to worsen, banks are likely to end up in the next two stages. The pre-insolvency 
stage is an important stage for banks with minor financial problems, and this stage can 
determine whether a bank can continue to conduct its business or whether it is likely to 
fail in the future. With triggering events and corrective measures, an early intervention 
mechanism at the pre-insolvency stage can improve the possibility of rehabilitating 
troubled banks. 
 
45 Eva Hupkes, ‘Insolvency—Why a Special Regime for Banks?’ (2002) 3 Current Development in 
Monetary and Financial Law 1 
46 Rosa M. Lastra, Cross-Border Bank Insolvency (Oxford University Press 2011) 57 
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The insolvency stage refers to the stage where a bank has been cash flow 
insolvent and balance sheet insolvent so the bank is economically insolvent. These two 
standards to determine whether a bank is insolvent are the same as the standards for 
non-bank firms. 47  Apart from the cash-flow and balance sheet tests, the regulatory 
standard for banks also determines whether the bank should stop operating as a going 
concern and be managed by regulatory authorities. Corrective measures taken in this 
stage may be less effective than the same measures taken in the pre-insolvency stage. 
Stricter measures are required in the insolvency stage before or at the initiation of 
bankruptcy proceedings. These measures reduce the possibility of a bank run by 
depositors and maintain the values of the troubled bank.48 For example, measures like 
moratorium and payment suspension can be taken in the insolvency stage. These 
measures can prevent some banks’ activities, and creditors are not allowed to claim their 
rights during moratorium and payment suspension. The difference between the 
insolvency stage and bankruptcy stage is that the bankruptcy stage is a legal 
determination of an insolvent situation of banks and the bank is legally insolvent in the 
bankruptcy stage.49 
The bankruptcy stage is the eventual resolution of the troubled bank. In this stage, 
the insolvent situation of a troubled bank has been determined legally. In other words, the 
bank is legally insolvent. The focus of the bankruptcy stage is on methods for effective 
and efficient resolution or liquidation. All measures in the previous two stages to save the 
troubled bank have been used and the troubled bank is not likely to continue its business. 
Regulatory authorities or the court will dominate the liquidation procedure of the insolvent 
bank depending on whether there are special rules designed to cover the characteristics 
of bank insolvency. If there are general insolvency rules that are applied to non-bank firms, 
then the court is responsible for the appointment of an administrator and liquidator.  
 
 
47 Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law Corporate and Personal (3rd edition Jordan Publishing 
2012) 
48 Legal Department of International Monetary Fund, ‘Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key 
Issues’ (1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/> last accessed 20 Aug 2019 
49 Lastra (n 46) 
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C. Structured Early Intervention for Banks at the Pre-Insolvency Stage 
 
In the pre-insolvency stage, banks are faced with minor or moderate financial 
problems that may lead to financial hardships. In relation to banks with minor or moderate 
financial problems, structured early intervention for banks, as a type of early intervention 
mechanism, can be applied to these banks at the pre-insolvency stage to identify 
problems and risks associated with these banks and take respective corrective measures 
to rectify these problems and risks. In this context, structured early intervention for banks 
can be regarded as a set of standards for triggering events to identify troubled banks at 
the pre-insolvency stage and relevant corrective measures to intervene in a bank’s 
operation to correct problems and reduce the risks of troubled banks’ businesses and 
operations can be put in place. These standards for triggering events assess the banks’ 
financial condition and determine whether an increased level of intervention is necessary. 
Respective corrective measures serve as specific methods to deal with problems and 
risks associated with banks’ financial performance and business operation and represent 
an increased level of intervention by stricter corrective measures.  
According to the practice in the US and the UK, capital ratio and supervisory 
assessment are two main types of triggering events that could identify problems in a 
bank’s financial condition and therefore determine whether a bank is in the pre-insolvency 
stage. The first type of triggering events is the application of capital ratio, which is the 
practice in the US. Capital ratio means that capital is over, or divided by, risk-weighted 
assets.50 When the capital ratio of a bank is below a specific standard but the bank is still 
solvent, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), a US version of structured early intervention for 
banks, can be triggered.51 Whether PCA is triggered for a particular troubled bank at pre-
insolvency stage depends on its capital ratio. Another type of triggering events is on the 
basis of supervisory assessment where banking regulators’ judgement plays a role in 
determining the bank’s financial condition. This is the case in the UK banking sector. 
Specifically, UK banking regulators determine bank performance in accordance with the 
following two standards: whether the bank is failing or likely to fail to meet threshold 
 
50 Herve Hannoun, ‘The Basel III Capital Framework: A Decisive Breakthrough’ (BoJ-BIS High Level 
Seminar on Financial Regulatory Reform: Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 22 November 2010)   
<http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101125a.pdf> last accessed 20 Aug 2019 
51 Peter G. Weinstock, ‘Prompt Corrective Action’ (2009) 126 Banking L.J. 317 
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conditions; and the other is that no measures will be taken.52 In general, the standard to 
determine whether a bank enters pre-insolvency can be that a bank fails to meet certain 
regulatory requirements and there are remaining values of the bank. This is a difference 
between the US and the UK approach of determining whether a bank enters the pre-
insolvency stage. The US approach is more objective and the UK approach is more 
subjective.  
The growing focus on the pre-insolvency stage of banks and the relevant early 
intervention mechanism are associated with the following factors. First, identifying 
problems and risks associated with banks could eventually reduce possibilities of bank 
failures. Before the formal initiation of insolvency proceedings, it is likely that an 
unidentified troubled bank will continue to operate its business and let problems that could 
potentially lead to the troubled situation evolve, thereby causing an unavoidable and 
costly bank crisis. Early intervention mechanisms allow regulatory authorities to detect 
and address problems and risks associated with troubled banks at early stages and to 
some extent prevent banking crises.  This is because in the pre-insolvency stage 
regulators can identify the problems that are likely to trigger a future banking crisis by 
assessing bank performance against relevant standards and increasing the level of 
intervention. 53  Controlling troubled banks before the initiation of formal insolvency 
proceedings has a long-lasting effect in reducing the possibility of banking crises. 
Second, regulatory authorities may be reluctant to liquidate a troubled bank 
because of the complexity and difficulties in the liquidation process. The delay of initiating 
liquidation could lead to the situation where a bank is legally solvent but economically 
insolvent bank.54 In some cases, regulatory authorities may choose to save the troubled 
bank, despite the fact that saving troubled banks may not always be an optimal choice 
and may involve and financially burden other firms and the society. Compared with 
initiating bank insolvency and liquidating troubled banks, regulatory authorities can be 
 
52  The Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s Approach to Resolution’ (2 October 2017) 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2017/the-bank-of-england-approach-to-resolution> last 
accessed 20 Aug 2019 
53 Matej Marinc and Vasja Rant, ‘A Cross Country Analysis of Bank Bankruptcy Regimes’ (2014) 13 
Journal of Financial Stability 134 
54 Rosa Lastra, ‘Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency and Cross-Border Bank Insolvency’ (2008) 9 Journal 
of Banking Regulation 165 
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more willing to take corrective measures to restructure or resolve troubled banks for two 
reason. First, as a complicated and difficult process, the initiation of bank insolvency 
procedures means that more parties will be involved in the process, such as the state, 
creditors and other counterparties of troubled banks.55 This would also involve multiple 
banking regulatory authorities, such as the prudential regulator, resolution authorities or 
even the court in some countries. Second, early intervention mechanism can be less 
complex for banking regulators to deal with troubled banks where less participants are 
involved in the process and the banking regulators can focus on managing of troubled 
banks and coordinating among different regulatory authorities. Using corrective measures 
at pre-insolvency stages can be effective because measures like moratorium can 
suspend the payments of troubled banks to their counterparties. This can reduce the 
possibility of a bank run and the consequences of losses to the counterparties of the bank 
and society.  
Third, in the banking sector, the division between illiquidity and insolvency can be 
unclear. To some extent, these two factors are correlated. In bank insolvency, the liquidity 
problem is a major factor contributing to insolvency. In the event of a bank run, illiquidity 
is likely to cause loss of confidence of its depositors. A bank run can lead to the insolvency 
of the bank. From the perspective of banks’ operations, an economically insolvent bank 
is likely to be illiquid if it is still in operation. The illiquidity of a bank may lead to insolvency 
and insolvency is likely to worsen the illiquid situation of a bank. In this way, the pre-
insolvency stage and insolvency stage may not always be clearly distinguished. Therefore, 
early intervention mechanisms that could potentially detect and identify minor bank 
problems, including financial hardships in liquidity at the pre-insolvency stage are 
essential for banking regulators to manage troubled banks. Eventually these mechanisms 
could help deal with the troubled bank before formal insolvency procedures are required 
to reduce the impact and cost of bank failures. 
 
II. Structured Early Intervention for Banks and Relevant Legal Theories 
 
In the context of the Savings and Loan Crisis in the United States in the 1980s, 
many savings and loan associations became insolvent and this led to the bankruptcy of 
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the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and huge losses to the 
FDIC.56 This demonstrated the potential costs of the DIS in the context of a crisis. The 
losses of the FDIC were regarded as a result of insufficient and inadequate supervision 
from regulators.57 The improved banking regulation and supervision can be a way to 
reduce costs of the DIS, and this requires that banking regulators are capable of and 
willing to detect banks’ problems and affect banks at an early stage to reduce potential 
costs of the DIS.58 Many proposals and legal theories were brought up to deal with 
problems involved in the DIS and insufficient supervision by reforming the DIS in that 
particular background and incentivising banking supervisors to take actions. Among these 
proposals, Structured Early Intervention and Resolution (SEIR) proposed changes to the 
US deposit insurance system and provided solutions to address problems associated with 
banking regulation and supervision, such as moral hazard and regulatory forbearance. 
Other proposals or legal theories, in the context of the deposit insurance reform in the 
early 1990s, provides methods to manage moral hazard and regulatory forbearance, such 
as adjusting risk exposure and increasing costs for banks or banks’ creditors to incentivise 
early intervention. After the GFC, many countries has reformed their banking sectors, for 
example, the United Kingdom has incorporated the ring-fencing concept into its banking 
structure. The structural reform is adopted by these countries to reduce moral hazard 
caused by bailouts of systematically important financial institutions by the government in 
the case of a failure. The UK approach of ring-fencing is relevant to structured early 
intervention for banks as both arrangements intend to reduce the implicit government 
guarantee and moral hazard issues associated with managing troubled banks. 
This section first discusses the reasons why a reform is needed in the US banking 
regulatory framework in the early 1990s. Then this section discusses SEIR as a method 
to determine banks’ financial performance and incentivise banking regulators to take 
timely measures at early stages. The next section explores other relevant proposals and 
legal theories in the context of the US deposit insurance reform. The final section 
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discusses UK ring-fencing arrangements in its structural reform after the GFC to reduce 
the impact of moral hazard in its banking sector. 
 
A. Moral Hazard and Regulatory Forbearance 
 
In the context of the US deposit insurance reform in the early 1990s, the Savings 
and Loan Crisis in the 1980s revealed problems associated with the US DIS and the 
banking regulation framework. It is argued that the US deposit insurance at that time and 
deregulation contributed to the Savings and Loan Crisis in the 1980s.59 Before the deposit 
insurance reform, the US federal deposit insurance had a flat-rate premium for banks, 
and this created the moral hazard problem that banks can take risks without bearing the 
costs of their own funds.60  
The cause of moral hazard in deposit insurance is a provision of a guarantee for 
banks’ insured depositors by the deposit insurance and thus banks are more likely to take 
on risks.61 Several evidence has shown the significance of moral hazard problem in the 
US deposit insurance in the 1980s. Based on the data of 2500 banks from the Tenth 
Federal Reserve district during the 1980s, the differences and variation in banks’ losses 
among those banks are large and deliberate bank risk taking contributes to this 
variation.62 This means that to some extent banks tended to take more risks than others 
and lend their funds even with a higher default rate under the flat-rate premium deposit 
insurance in the context of loan losses in the 1980s.63 This shows that bank deliberate 
risk taking aligns with the concept of moral hazard from the perspective of loan losses. 
During the period of 1978-1985, stockholder-controlled banks tended to take more 
risks than managerially-controlled banks and this was consistent with moral hazard 
problem associated with the deposit insurance.64 In particular, regarding stockholder-
controlled banks, stockholders’ interests are the most satisfied by increasing risks and 
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taking advantages of the FDIC.65 This shows that bank ownership has an impact on bank 
risk taking and stockholder-controlled banks could encourage the exploitation of the FDIC, 
thereby increasing moral hazard in a certain type of banks. 
An empirical research also found that the least solvent thrift institutions which had 
developed and grown much faster during 1983-1985 than other savings and loan 
associations were disposed by the FSLIC in 1988.66 This means that these least solvent 
thrift institutions tended to take more risks and have a riskier portfolio than average thrift 
institutions during the time frame.67  This shows the connection to the moral hazard 
problem, in particular, these least solvent thrift institutions were more incentivised to make 
use of and exploit flat-rate deposit insurance when approaching failure and insolvency.68 
In addition to moral hazard, during the Savings and Loan Crisis, regulators of the 
thrift institutions chose to cover the actual financial performance of the failing thrift 
institutions and provide forbearance to those institutions by relaxing regulatory 
standards.69  Banking regulators were unwilling to enforce rules and take actions to 
regulate and supervise banks effectively while they were willing to grant forbearance to 
banks in the 1980s in the US banking industry.70 Banks were declared insolvent when the 
book value of the banks exceeds the value of their insured claims and the market value 
of the banks were less than the value of their insured claims.71 Because of banking 
regulators’ tendencies not to close insolvent banks or initiate formal insolvency 
proceedings immediately, the regulators’ choices of forbearance ensured that the market 
value of insolvent banks is less than the value of their insured claims.72 This had led to 
the deposit insurance agency being the risk-bearer of insolvent financial institutions and 
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caused huge losses to the deposit insurance funds.73 It is argued that some institutions 
survived because of forbearance and improved their financial performance or attracted 
potential buyers by continuing operation and the survival rate should justify regulatory 
forbearance as a cost-minimising method.74 However, increased oversight by regulators, 
such as frequent monitoring and strict closure standards is likely to greatly reduce huge 
losses that are caused by failure.75 
Moral hazard caused by the US deposit insurance during the 1980s and regulatory 
forbearance in the US regulatory framework were the two relevant issues of the Savings 
and Loan Crisis. Changes in the deposit insurance and the banking regulatory framework 
were regarded as a method to avoid similar thrift crisis in the banking sector.76 
 
B. Structured Early Intervention and Resolution 
 
SEIR was a proposal for the deposit insurance reform in the US during the early 
1990s. This proposal was first brought up and further developed by Benston and 
Kaufman.77 The most obvious change of SEIR to the deposit insurance system and 
banking regulation was the increased incentives given to banking regulators to take 
timelier actions.78 
SEIR has two main characteristics. One characteristic is the application of capital 
ratios as standards to determine the financial situation of banks and determine whether 
banking regulators should intervene to take timely measures. The increased level of 
intervention derived is then divided into four categories depending on capital ratios of the 
bank. In essence, the lower capital ratios of a particular bank are, the stricter the level of 
banking regulation and supervision will be. SEIR proposed that capital ratios of a bank 
should be at the same level of those financial institutions that are not supported by the 
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implicit and explicit guarantee of a safety net.79 Adequately capitalised banks are banks 
with an equivalent capital ratio to non-bank financial institutions without a safety net and 
banks in this category are subject to regular banking regulation and supervision without 
any intervention.80 If a bank’s capital ratio falls below this certain standard, there are three 
different levels of increased intervention by banking regulators. Banking regulators can 
conduct frequent supervision and monitoring of a particular bank and impose certain 
restrictions on a bank’s businesses following a small fall of capital ratios.81 With further 
deterioration of a bank’s financial condition, banking regulators then can impose stricter 
restrictions such as suspension of dividends to force the bank to recapitalise itself if capital 
ratio continues to fall.82 At last, banking regulators are allowed to intervene with the bank’s 
business to resolve it by selling the bank, conducting a merger or eventually liquidation if 
the capital ratio of the bank falls below certain standards.83 
Another characteristic of SEIR is the adoption of market value to determine the 
capital of banks. SEIR proposed that the incorporation of market value would improve the 
accuracy of determining banks’ financial situations and banking regulators would have a 
more reliable source of banks’ conditions.84 The reason for the adoption of market value 
in this proposal is that banks, as depository institutions, have situations where  insufficient 
capital is reserved for absorbing loan losses and potential losses because of changes of 
interest rates, and thus the book value of banks is likely to show inaccurate information 
about their financial situation during certain times.85  
The moral hazard problem of banks and regulatory forbearance of banking 
regulators can to some extent be resolved by the proposal of SEIR without major changes 
to the former deposit insurance scheme and the banking system. Under this proposal, the 
moral hazard problem is dealt with by imposing stricter restrictions on banks’ businesses 
and limitations on their operations. The more restrictions on banks’ businesses and 
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operations, the less freedom there is in the banks’ decision making. This way, banks are 
more likely to reduce their risk-taking behaviour and activities and to maintain capital ratio 
to a standard required by banking regulators to get more control of their business with 
fewer restrictions imposed by banking regulators.  
The problem of regulatory forbearance is dealt with by requiring banking regulators 
to take mandatory actions with banks on the basis of bank capital ratios under this 
proposal. Regulators have discretion to determine the banks’ capital conditions in the 
beginning and they are also required to intervene in banks’ business if the capital 
condition of banks continues to fall below the required standards. Discretion of banking 
regulators and compulsory intervention measures could work and complement each other. 
Compared with banking regulators’ discretion, they have less discretion under this 
proposal concerning when to take measures with troubled banks and delays in taking 
measures with banking regulators can to some extent be reduced.  
Based on this proposal of structured early intervention and regulation, 
improvements were made by the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee in 1989, by 
specifying and clarifying several other requirements and characteristics of structured early 
intervention, including supervisory costs and accountability of banking regulators.86 The 
Committee outlined the impact of SEIR on banks’ management as follows: banks are 
responsible for improving their capital to meet standards; and deposit insurance is not a 
remedy for risk-taking decisions and insolvent situations of banks.87 After the adoption of 
SEIR, the Committee identified and considered the need for transition and dealing with 
losses occurred before in the outline. 
SEIR provided the theoretical basis for PCA in the FDICIA. PCA can be regarded 
as a modified version of SEIR.88 The primary differences of SEIR and PCA formulated in 
the FDICIA can be seen from the following aspects. First, capital requirements of SEIR 
are based on market value of banks and the minimum capital requirement of a bank 
includes subordinated debt as a bank’s capital. An adequately capitalised bank is defined 
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as 10% market value leverage, while PCA in the FDICIA requires at least 8% risk-based 
capital on book value for a ‘well capitalised’ bank. Second, concerning capital ratio for 
initiation of resolution, SEIR requires 3% market value while PCA requires 2% book value 
of a bank. Third, with SEIR, the expected losses for FDIC are zero in theory compared 
with less than 2% of losses of PCA with the exception of Too-Big-To-Fail. Finally, 
immediate resolution of banks that fall below requirements will be initiated under SEIR 
while there may exist some delay of initiation of resolution of PCA.  
 
C. Relevant Proposals and Legal Theories 
 
In addition to SEIR, many relevant proposals and legal theories provided methods 
to deal with problems that were caused by the US deposit insurance structure in the 1980s. 
With the background of the US deposit insurance reform in the early 1990s, these 
proposals and legal theories focused on managing problems of moral hazard and 
regulatory forbearance. These two problems are closely related to early intervention of 
troubled banks and regulatory forbearance. The following discusses these proposals and 
legal theories that aimed to resolve these two problems from the perspectives of banks’ 
depositors, banks and their stakeholders, and narrow banking. 
 
1. Increased Risk Exposure – From the Perspective of Banks’ Depositors 
 
There are proposals that aim to reduce the impact of moral hazard on deposit 
insurance by increasing the level of risk monitoring by depositors. This intends to 
encourage depositors to monitor and have an interest in the financial stability of their 
chosen banks rather than them having lowered risks with a high coverage provided by 
deposit insurance.89 Due to costs and skills needed to monitor risks of banks’ business 
by depositors, only a certain group of depositors who have the knowledge to assess the 
banks’ risks are exposed to increased risks. 90  Increased risk exposure for banks’ 
depositors leads to increased monitoring from depositors, and this would require 
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depositors to analyse banks’ overall performance from management to finances.91 Small 
depositors may have difficulties in monitoring banks’ overall performance because of their 
lacking in time and money for training to acquire professional skills.92 The DIS needs to 
balance the situations of small depositors who need some protection and the situations 
of banks which need market discipline to reduce moral hazard. 93  This subsection 
discusses two proposals, reduced maximum coverage of deposit insurance and co-
insurance that increase depositors’ risk exposure and requires depositors to monitor and 
discipline banks. 
 
a. Reduced Maximum Coverage of Deposit Insurance 
 
The DIS not only causes moral hazard for financial institutions, it also creates 
moral hazard for depositors. Depositors are less incentivised to monitor banks’ 
performance with the existence of the deposit insurance.94 The amount of maximum 
coverage of deposit insurance has an impact on the level of risk monitoring of depositors. 
Reducing the amount of maximum coverage of deposit insurance may improve the level 
of risk monitoring of depositors. Depositors are more likely to monitor banks’ risk-taking 
behaviours if there are more funds at risk that are not covered by deposit insurance. The 
maximum deposit insurance for an individual depositor has grown from $2,500 when 
deposit insurance was first introduced in 1934, to $100,000 in 1980s and to $250,000 at 
the moment in the United States. Although the increasing maximum amount of deposit 
insurance gives individual depositors more protection against bank failures, it is likely to 
increase the possibility of more risk-taking behaviours by banks and increased costs in 
dealing with bank failures. Reducing the amount of maximum deposit insurance coverage 
can reduce some risk-taking behaviours by banks, thus reducing the impact of the moral 
hazard problem and improving the level of monitoring by depositors. However, in the 
context of a very low deposit insurance coverage, depositors may have a lowered level  
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of confidence in the DIS and its credibility and this would increase the possibility of a bank 
run when having a crisis.95  This proposal of reduced maximum coverage of deposit 
insurance was considered but not adopted by the US in the deposit insurance reform in 
the early 1990s. 
 
b. Co-Insurance 
 
Co-insurance is another proposal that intends to reduce moral hazard by both 
depositors and banks, and requires both insured depositors and insuring banks to cover 
losses based on certain proportions.96 Co-insurance could potentially increase incentives 
of depositors to monitor risk-taking behaviours and business activities of banks. In the 
context of the US deposit insurance reform, co-insurance means that the coverage of the 
deposit insurance would be limited to a certain percentage of each deposit and would be 
account for full repayment for some accounts with low level deposits.97 In addition, the 
design of co-insurance is on a sliding scale which means ‘the lower the amount is 
deposited, the higher the percentage of the insurance; however, each dollar is at risk for 
some percentage’.98 The rationale for this proposal is that depositors whose deposits are 
not fully covered would monitor banks’ risk levels and would therefore demand higher 
interest rate when their banks take on more risks.99 One advantage of co-insurance is 
that it ensures a fast and prompt repayment for at least a fraction of insured deposits.100 
On the other hand, it is argued that co-insurance would have some disadvantages 
in practice, focusing on depositors’ actual abilities to monitor banks and the increased 
possibility of a bank run. The actual abilities of unsophisticated depositors is not sufficient 
to be vigilant.101 An average consumer of banks is in the position where they are less 
likely to assess and evaluate their banks’ risks and performance even given the most up-
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to-date information.102 In the sense of co-insurance, information available to depositors 
can cause confusion and even be misleading for them when they assess banks’ risks and 
financial performance. Because of depositors’ difficulties and insufficient abilities in 
monitoring banks’ risks, their methods of market discipline for banks can be very limited 
and have an adverse impact on banks, particularly withdrawal of funds.103 With depositors 
methods of market discipline, bank run on troubled banks is more likely to happen when 
depositors bear five percent risk.104 An appropriate proportion of payment should be 
negotiated between insuring banks and insured depositors when it comes to co-insurance 
in reality.105 In addition, it is argued that co-insurance is likely to increase transaction costs 
because depositors may put their deposits in different banks to ensure they get the 
maximum payment with the least cost and by doing this it may also increase difficulties in 
calculating the overall limit of the amount of funds of each depositor.106  
 
c. Disadvantages of the Proposals That Increase Depositors’ Risk Exposure 
 
Several other proposals, such as mandatory loss for uninsured depositors and 
restricted coverage of deposit insurance for certain groups of depositors, have a similar 
nature to reduced maximum coverage of deposit insurance and co-insurance. These 
proposals intend to incentivise depositors to monitor banks’ risks and financial 
performance and increase market discipline for banks. This category of increasing 
depositors’ risk exposure may not be the optimal option. The two issues associated with 
this category of proposal are the actual ability of depositors to monitor bank risk and the 
potential negative impact on the financial stability.  
Acquiring information can be very costly for financial institutions and banking 
regulators. This is even more so for individual depositors when they are trying to get 
information and monitor risk-taking behaviours and other activities of banks. Compared 
with banking institutions, individual depositors are in a more disadvantaged. Individual 
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depositors have less analytical skills and resources compared with large financial 
institutions and governmental agencies. It can be more difficult for individual depositors 
to tell the difference between healthy and troubled banks, and more difficult to analyse 
risk-taking behaviours and activities of banks based on the resources and skills of 
depositors. 
Increased risk exposure for depositors may have a negative impact on financial 
stability because depositors have limited ability to analyse the business activities of banks 
and they are more likely to make biased decisions and withdraw their deposits, and 
consequently this is more likely to cause a bank run. Under the proposals of increased 
risk exposure for depositors, depositors may need to access more information about 
banks’ operations while other professional institutions could be more efficient in analysing 
and make the best use of this kind of information by monitoring the risk-taking behaviours 
of banks.107 When considering potential costs of monitoring bank risks by increasing risk 
exposure to depositors, these proposals may not be the most efficient way to reduce risk-
taking activities of banks and achieving a balance between an effective deposit insurance 
and moral hazard, 
 
2. Increased Cost – From the Perspective of Banks and Their Stakeholders 
 
Increasing costs for banks and their shareholders is another category of proposals 
in the US deposit insurance reform in the early 1990s. These proposals intended to 
incentivise banks to manage or reduce their risk levels and focused on providing 
incentives for bank owners to control risk and risk-taking behaviours in banks. The main 
proposals of the category, increasing banks’ costs in relation to their risks, include risk-
related insurance premiums, risk-related capital requirements and increased capital 
requirements. 
 
a. Risk-Related Insurance Premiums 
 
The proposal of risk-related insurance premiums is related to methods in private 
insurance that are based on different levels of risks of insured parties. The higher the 
level of risks of a particular insured party, the higher the insurance premiums will be. As 
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a result, this proposal is likely to reduce risk-taking behaviours of bank management and 
the risk level of the bank, and therefore reduce the impact of the moral hazard.108 The 
proposal of risk-related insurance premiums is also likely to provide an effective way for 
banking regulators to supervise and monitor solvency of banks as the increasing 
insurance premiums can act as an indicator of risk level of particular banks so that 
banking regulators can take timely measures to intervene.109  
However, those who are not in favour of risk-related insurance premiums suggest 
that a flat rate premium is not the only factor that leads to risk-taking behaviour of bank 
management. Also, excessive risk exposure of banks and reform of deposit insurance to 
risk-related insurance premiums may not be the way to reduce incentives of risk-taking 
of banks.110 Other arguments of opponents of this proposal are that the risk levels of 
particular banks may be hard to measure for determining insurance premiums and it is 
more likely to cause bank failure if the bank with a higher risk level is charged a higher 
premium, as the bank with higher risks is more likely to be in trouble.111 
 
b. Risk-Related Capital Requirements  
 
Risk-based capital requirements have a similar function as risk-related insurance 
premiums, which aim to reduce the banks’ risk level by increasing the costs of the banks’ 
risk level. Risk-based capital requirements refer to a ‘different capital minimum 
percentage to be held against different categories of assets according to their perceived 
risks.’112 This proposal also requires that capital should be held against both on and off 
balance sheet activities, which is different from capital regulation of the US before the 
introduction of this proposal in the 1990s. One of the advantages of risk-based capital 
requirement is that this proposal is an improvement based on the US capital regulation at 
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that time and it does not require a significant change of capital regulation compared with 
risk-related insurance premiums.113 
Similar to risk-related insurance premiums, one of the drawbacks of risk-based 
capital requirements is the difficulty to measure the risk level of banks. Moreover, 
evidence shows that risk-based capital standards have a limited effect on risk-taking 
behaviours of banks. With risk-based capital requirements, an undercapitalised bank can 
comply with capital requirements only by improving its capital without consideration of 
reducing its portfolio risk and this shows little differences between original capital 
requirements and risk-based capital requirements because risk-taking behaviours have 
not been fully considered in this proposal.114 Another argument that is used to oppose this 
proposal is that risk-based capital requirement entails reshuffling of capital in the banking 
industry, and has little impact on reducing risks of banks and overall stability and safety 
of the financial system.115  
 
c. Increased Capital Requirements 
 
Increased capital requirements could be a more effective and direct way to curb 
the moral hazard problem because shareholders of banks put their own money at more 
risk and they are more likely to reduce risk-taking behaviours of banks. However, there is 
a limit of increased capital requirements because there could be an adverse effect on the 
economy, including insufficient market entry of new banks and lack of competition on the 
market if there is no highest limit for the capital requirement of banks.116 As a result, capital 
requirements of banks should have a balance between reducing risk-taking behaviours 
and activities of banks and maintaining healthy competition on the market to maintain the 
operation of the economy. Additionally, capital requirements should show the real capital 
situation and net worth of banks. 
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3. Narrow or ‘Fail-Safe’ Banking 
 
Narrow banking is also a category of proposals during the US deposit insurance 
reform in the 1990s. Narrow banking is generally defined as banks that conducts deposit-
taking and payment activities and are prohibited from lending.117 Narrow banks provide 
deposit accounts which is backed with currency and low risk marketable securities.118 
Assets of narrow banks derive from restructured investment with a slight chance of 
declination of value and are used to meet the needs of deposits withdrawals. 119 
Operational costs of narrow banks are covered by the interest of secure investments and 
service charges of any transactions.120  
There are several narrow banking proposals that differs slightly, depending on the 
extent of narrow banks’ investment choices. This means that the extent of services 
provided by narrow banks varies and a narrow bank can provide different deposits and 
different types of coverage of insurance.121 The first narrow banking proposal separates 
financial holding companies into two subsidiaries, bank subsidiaries and lending entities, 
where bank subsidiaries are responsible for processing transactions, managing deposits 
and investing in highly liquid and safe securities and lending entities provide lending 
services that involve in commercial paper, debenture, equity etc. 122  Another narrow 
banking proposal separate banks into two financial institutions, including one institution 
that manages bank accounts, money transfers and holds a limited extend of assets and 
another institution that can provide services for all other activities.123 This proposal has a 
clearer division of services as a depository institution and services of other financial 
activities than any other proposals and it represents the core feature of narrow or ‘fail-
safe’ banks. The next narrow banking proposal was established on the basis of the first 
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banking proposal where the extent of assets that banking subsidiaries can hold is wider, 
including some mortgage loans.124 
Because of the limited extend of safe assets, narrow banks would be low risks and 
their risks of insolvency would also be reduced, and therefore insured deposits in narrow 
banks would be affordable for taxpayers.125 By eliminating risky decisions by managers 
of federal insured deposit institutions, narrow banking would help banking regulators 
manage and supervise insured institutions and better protect depositors. One advantage 
of narrow banking is that backed assets of loans of traditional banking are replaced by 
low risk marketable assets which can meet the needs of depositors almost anytime. This 
means that the mismatch of the maturity of deposits and loans is reduced. Because a 
narrow bank is backed with ready and liquid assets, which resolves the problem of 
commercial banking by eliminating the mismatch of deposits and loans, and therefore it 
is likely to improve the confidence of depositors concerning the safety of their deposits, 
and to reduce potential costs for taxpayers in the case of bank failures. Another 
advantage of narrow banks, in relation to banking regulators and the government, is that 
narrow banks are likely to reduce the burden of banking supervision as well as the cost 
of governmental protection in the case of banking crises.126  
It is argued that narrow banking proposals addresses only consequences of 
problems related to the deposit insurance, not causes of the problems, and narrow 
banking would create some other issues.127 The first problem of narrow banking is the 
feasibility of these proposals. Firstly, as backed assets of narrow banks are investments 
of low risk securities, particularly US Treasury securities, the total amount of US Treasury 
securities with a low risk may be less than the total amount of deposits held by narrow 
banks.128 If treasury securities are all held by a narrow bank, it may be difficult for other 
financial institutions to acquire treasury securities and deal with withdrawals, thus posing 
a negative effect on the ability of other financial institutions to back their assets with low 
risk securities. Secondly, some narrow banking proposals argue for exemptions for small 
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banks to address the feasibility issue related to the narrow banking concept. Small banks 
exemption suggested by Burnham means that small banks with assets under $100 million 
would be exempted from requirements of narrow banking and banks with assets from 
$100 million to $ 500 million would be partially exempted from requirements of narrow 
banking.129 Practically, the exemption would encourage the establishment of small banks, 
especially in large urban areas where the cost savings and economies of scale can be 
achieved, and this would increase fragmentation of the US banking industry and the 
financial instability.130 Thirdly, the effectiveness of narrow banking is in doubt. Narrow 
banks may face difficulties to attract a great number of depositors because the low risk 
nature of a narrow bank means it provides return of deposits at a lower rate.131 The banks’ 
interests  that are payable to their depositors is related to the earnings on their assets, 
and low risk marketable securities cannot yield high returns to provide depositors with a 
competitive interest rate. Therefore, depositors may choose other financial institutions for 
their deposits and narrow banks may not be as effective as designed in the deposit 
insurance reform. 
 
D. Ring-Fencing – An Aspect of UK Structural Reform of the Banking Sector 
 
Ring-fencing is one of the aspects of UK banking reforms to cope with issues 
identified through the GFC which ensures financial stability and reduce the impact of ‘too-
big-to-fail’ problem on UK taxpayers and the economy.132  Ring-fencing refers to the 
separation of core retail banking functions (e.g. payments, deposits and overdrafts) used 
by UK customers from other banking activities. 133  Entities that carry out these core 
banking functions are ‘ring-fenced bodies’ (RFB)134. RFB are prohibited from doing a 
number of banking activities, such as investments.135 The purpose of ring-fencing is to 
ensure that RFB and its clients are free from risky activities that are carried out in the rest 
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of a banking group.136 This structural reform has led to changes in banking groups in the 
United Kingdom where banks have been split into retail banks and investment/wholesale 
banks. 
Under the current legislation, RFB is required to be able to make decision 
independently from other entities in the banking group,137 and carry out its activities in the 
context of insolvency of other entities in the group.138 RFB is subject to stricter regulatory 
requirements, specifically stricter capital requirements, than other banks.139 As a result of 
ring-fencing, deposit-taking institutions would be much safer than the situation before this 
structural change and risks presented to taxpayers would be massively reduced, because 
RFB is designed to separate from risky activities conducted by other entities in the rest of 
the banking group.140 
The UK approach of ring-fencing is particularly suitable in the context of UK 
banking sectors compared with approaches of structural reforms in other countries. In 
contrast to the French and German approach of restricting the scope of proprietary trading 
and investment in leveraged investment funds by deposit-taking institutions, the UK 
approach focuses on protecting deposits.141  As many global banks are based in or 
headquartered to the UK, the deposit-taking activity is a part of the whole business of 
those banks. The separation between retail banking and investment/wholesale banking 
would remove risks existed in investment banking entities from RFB, therefore removing 
the necessity of the government bailing out these too-big-to-fail institutions and to some 
extent reducing moral hazard associated with the failure of those institutions142. 
 
III. Rationales for Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
This section discusses why structured early intervention for banks at the pre-
insolvency stage is necessary from the following two perspectives: bank characteristics 
and their roles in the financial sector; and functions of structured early intervention for 
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banks. The perspective of the bank explains why banks are special and in need of early 
intervention by regulatory authorities. The perspective of functions of structured early 
intervention for banks explains why these mechanisms work compared with day-to-day 
banking regulation and bank resolution at pre-insolvency stage. 
 
A. The Perspective of Banks 
 
Compared with non-bank firms, banks play important roles in the financial system 
and are vulnerable to risks, particularly to certain risks involved in their operations, such 
as liquidity risk and credit risk. Risks involved in a bank’s operation are more likely to lead 
to systemic risk in the banking sector, which is influential and dangerous to the financial 
system and society. 
 
1. Important Roles of Banks in the Financial System 
 
The roles and functions of banks and the banking sector within the economy are 
irreplaceable.143 Banks are connected to the economy of a country and hold deposits 
from the public who may have limited knowledge about banks and their roles in the 
payment system.144 One of the banks’ characteristics is maturity transformation, which 
means that there is a mismatch of liabilities and assets of banks due to their roles in 
transferring short-term liquid deposits to long-term illiquid loans. 145  This can easily 
influence the solvency state of banks in the situation of loss of public confidence and lead 
to mass-withdrawals of funds.146 The inability of banks to provide credit and liquidity can 
cause loss of confidence among the public, and depositors can be largely influenced 
because banks hold credits for the public and liquid assets in the financial system. With 
the loss of confidence and bank runs, there is likely to be turbulence in financial stability. 
Due to the importance of the banks’ role in the payment system, a bank failure is likely to 
cause payment failure. Some of the banks’ roles can be performed by other non-bank 
 
143 Michael Schillig, ‘Bank Resolution Regimes in Europe I – Recovery and Resolution Planning, Early 
Intervention’ (25 August 2012) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136101> last accessed 20 Aug 2019 
144 Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman, ‘U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic 
Comparison and Evaluation’ (2006) Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2006-01, 
<https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/working-papers/2006/wp-01> last accessed 20 Aug 2019 
145 Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong and What to Do about It? 
(Princeton University Press 2013) 
146 Hupkes (n 45) 3 
40 
firms, but not all of them. A way to reduce the negative impact of banks on financial 
stability can be the application of pre-insolvency arrangements because such 
arrangements deal with banking problems at early stages.147 In this way, the impacts of 
bank failures can be reduced or avoided. 
 
2. Vulnerability of Banks to Risks 
 
Banks are likely to encounter market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk 
and systemic risk.148 Banks are more likely to be affected by these risks compared to non-
bank firms, especially the potential impact of these risks on banks’ solvency. These risks 
can be divided into two groups that are relevant to two different types of bank insolvency. 
Like non-bank firms, banks face two types of insolvency: cash flow insolvency and 
balance sheet insolvency. One group is liquidity risk, which is related to cash flow 
insolvency. Cash flow insolvency means that banks cannot pay their debts when they are 
due.149 Another group is credit risk, market risk and operational risk, which are more 
related to balance sheet insolvency. Balance sheet insolvency means that the liabilities 
of banks exceed their assets and they have a negative net worth on their balance 
sheets.150 Because of the interconnectedness of credit and the market via the payment 
system in the banking sector, no matter what type of the insolvency a bank is facing, it is 
likely to cause problems associated with other banks’ solvency.151 In other words, risks of 
individual banks could have an impact on the solvency of other banks  and the whole 
banking system, which is correlated with systemic risk. 
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a. Liquidity Risk and Cash Flow Insolvency 
 
Liquidity risk is the possibility that withdrawals of funds by banks’ depositors all 
happen at the same time, causing the banks to have insufficient funds.152 There are two 
categories of liquidity risks: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. Funding liquidity 
risk means that banks are not able to make payments to their counterparties by cash or 
other forms of assets when debts are due unless they begin the liquidation process.153 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) defines funding liquidity risk as ‘the 
possibility that over a specific horizon the bank will become unable to settle obligations 
with immediacy.’154 BIS states that the distinction between funding liquidity and funding 
liquidity risk is that the future funding liquidity may influence current funding liquidity 
risk.155 Market liquidity risk means that banks cannot exchange assets for cash or liquid 
assets in a short time by selling them at a fair price, which means that selling the banks' 
assets to get liquidity is disadvantageous to banks and their losses may reduce their 
equity and ability to absorb future losses.156 Moreover, market liquidity risk refers more to 
market function than the situation of banks. It can lead to funding liquidity risk in a short 
time.157 
Liquidity risk can lead to systemic risk. Banks take deposits and make loans and 
payments to each other using the payment system.158 The result is that one bank’s 
underperformance can affect other banks’ operations. Banks are likely to keep a small 
part of deposits in cash to meet the needs of depositors. If a bank is out of liquidity and 
fails to perform its obligations to its counterparties, it is likely to cause the default of other 
banks. The result of a systemic risk can be the inability of one bank to perform its 
obligation because of its liquidity risk.  
 
152 Marc Farag, Damian Harland and Dan Nixon, ‘Bank capital and liquidity’ (2013) Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin Q3 201-215 <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-
bulletin/2013/bank-capital-and-liquidity> last accessed 20 Aug 2019 
153 ibid. 
154 Mathias Drehmann and Kleopatra Nikolaou, ‘Funding Liquidity Risk and Measurement’ (2010) BIS 
Working Papers Monetary and Economic Department No.316 <https://www.bis.org/publ/work316.pdf> last 
accessed 20 Aug 2019  
155 ibid. 
156 Farag, Harland and Nixon (n 158) 
157 ibid. 
158 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Review 193 
42 
Banks can to some extent solve the problem of illiquidity by using interbank 
markets to borrow from another banks. Another way is to get liquidity from the central 
bank as the lender of the last resort. The problem of short liquidity can be solved by 
maintaining the stability of the financial system. In Basel III, a framework on bank 
regulation with the focus on capital ratio and liquidity risk and stress testing,159  there are 
liquidity coverage ratios and principles as guidance for liquidity management to keep the 
bank's cash flow solvent and to be accountable for the financial market.160 
A bank’s liquidity risk relates closely to its activities of taking deposits and lending 
money. There is a mismatch between the assets and liabilities of banks because banks 
take short-term deposits and make long-term loans. The mismatch results in the inherent 
vulnerability of banks to bank runs because there are more depositors to claim payments 
from banks and fewer borrowers to repay banks.161  Consequently, banks are easily 
influenced by withdrawals of funds by depositors.162 If a bank suffers a great loss in its 
business, it is likely to have less liquidity, and there is a possibility of a bank run. If a bank 
cannot pay its depositors when they claim their funds, the bank is experiencing cash flow 
insolvency. Liquidity risk is also connected to balance sheet insolvency. The connection 
is that the fear of the counterparties about the possibility that the bank will default, 
increases the possibility that they will withdraw their funds, which may worsen a bank's 
illiquid condition and increase the likelihood of a bank run.163 
 
b. Credit Risk, Market Risk, Operational Risk and Balance Sheet Insolvency 
 
Credit risk, market risk and operational risk have an impact on banks’ assets and 
liabilities. The occurrence of these risks is likely to lead to the balance sheet insolvency 
of a bank. Credit risk is the possibility that the bank’s debtors will not repay the bank.164 
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According to the Joint Forum of Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS), 
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), credit risk occurs when ‘a counterparty will 
fail to perform fully its financial obligations, and can arise from multiple activities across 
the sector.’165 To be more specific, parties such as borrowers and guarantors that are 
obliged to make payments to the bank and cannot perform their obligations in their 
agreements are credit risks, as is failure to perform obligations like bond and derivative 
agreements. 166  Non-repayment by borrowers affects banks’ balance sheets. The 
characteristic of credit risk is that it is involved with lending, which is the core business of 
a bank.167 Lending includes the possibility of non-repayment by the borrower.168 
Market risk is ‘the risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices.'169 Positions in the banks’ trading books to commodity and 
foreign exchange positions in the balance sheets can lead to market risk. 170  The 
increasing presence of credit risk and illiquid positions in banks’ portfolios are likely to 
cause difficulties in trading compared with traditional trading book portfolios with liquid 
positions,171 which are likely to affect banks’ balance sheets. 
BCBS defines operational risk as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events and this definition 
includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.’172 The insolvency of the 
Barings Bank because of unsupervised banking activities of its employees illustrates the 
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connection between operational risk and bank insolvency. One characteristic of 
operational risk is that it is hard to regulate and can only be found when it crystallises.173 
Credit risk, market risk and operational risk may have an impact on banks’ financial 
performance and solvency. From the perspectives of banks, several methods can be 
applied in their daily operations to reduce the possibility and impact of these risks. 
Hedging facilities can be one method for banks to manage these risks and reduce the 
impact of these risks on balance sheet insolvency. For credit risk, banks can reduce the 
risks of default by their counterparties by credit default swaps or asset-backed 
securitisation. A credit default swap contract is like insurance. The seller bank pays fees 
to the buyer bank and will get a contingent payment from the buyer bank if the borrowers 
of the seller bank are insolvent,174 thus improving the diversification of credit risk. Credit 
default swaps can change the exposure of banks from direct borrowers to more diversified 
borrowers. In this way, the credit risk of direct borrowers of the bank can be reduced. 
Another benefit for banks is that it can be less costly for them to raise funds because the 
cost of using these facilities is lower than investments with the same level of risk.175 
Whether banks are sellers or buyers of securitisations and facilities like credit default 
swaps, they benefit because buyer banks can raise funds by issuing debts secured by 
securitised assets and seller banks can reduce their credit risks from loans and credit 
card debts and keep a safer balance sheet.176 
For both credit risk and market risk, derivatives can be a method for banks to 
manage. Derivative means that ‘financial instruments whose value is derived from the 
performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, commodity, or index.’177 
By using derivatives, banks can transfer their market risk to the future’s market to risk-
takers or speculators. Banks' use of derivatives can help manage interest rate risk and 
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exchange rate risk.178 From a theoretical perspective, participating in off-balance sheet 
activities, such as derivatives, can be a way for banks to reduce risks, and banks will 
benefit from using derivatives under favourable conditions to reduce their risks.179 By 
using derivatives that mature before the time that loans mature, counterparty risks that 
derived from the credit market and friction assets (e.g. loans) and are difficult for banks 
to monitor can be reduced.180 In the context of post-GFC, it is argued that aggregate 
derivatives together with its components (i.e. interest rate and exchange rates) reduce 
risks of large and profitable banks.181 On the other hand, from the perspective of empirical 
research, even though banks can use swaps (as one type of derivatives) to transfer credit 
risks of their loans to others and reduce the possibility of default loans causing the 
financial underperformance or even insolvency in a short term, with a credit-derivatives 
market, banks’ using credit derivatives may lead to failure of loan risk-sharing in other 
markets in the long term.182 Even if banks use derivatives only for the purpose of hedging 
their credit exposure, credit derivative trading is still a potential risk to the financial 
stability.183 The dependence of derivatives on the future market is likely to increase the 
credit risk of banks’ counterparties,184 because the basis of derivatives of one party is the 
performance of obligations of another party at a future date. From an empirical research 
of banks’ derivatives usage in 18 developed countries, it is suggested that banks’ ex-ante 
derivatives use would lead to ex-post risks and this proves that generally using derivatives 
increases banks’ risks, especially aggressive usage of derivatives.185 In the context of 
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European banks, using derivatives by banks also increases these banks’ risks and 
value.186 
These methods of transferring risks on the one hand can be helpful to reduce these 
risks and improve banks’ ability to manage risks involved in their businesses and activities. 
On the other hand, these methods link banks in close relationships, which means 
contagion is likely to happen and the close relationships among banks are more likely to 
contribute to systemic risk. Contagion can begin in a simple situation of a borrower’s 
insolvency and failure to perform its obligations to its creditors. In the interbank system 
as well as payment and settlement systems, the failure of one party to perform its credit 
or liquidity obligations is likely to have a negative effect on other banks’ or financial 
institutions’ solvency.187 In particular, banks are more likely to contribute to a contagion 
compared to other non-bank firms and financial institutions. 188  With the 
interconnectedness of banks and financial institutions, the contagion effect is more likely 
to occur. In this way, it is more likely to drag the whole system down because of the default 
of a bank or financial institution. 
Banks are constantly faced with risks that can lead to cash flow insolvency and 
balance sheet insolvency. Banks’ methods to deal with these risks may increase their 
risks and increase the interconnectedness of the banking system. One way to reduce the 
possibility of balance sheet insolvency is capital regulation. Regulating the banks’ capital 
is a direct way to improve the ability of banks to absorb losses potentially caused by these 
risks.189 The regulation of a bank’s capital structure can make the bank less depressed 
on debts. The more capital a bank has, the more incentives the bank has to manage 
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these risks.190 Shareholders and managers of banks are likely to make sure the operation 
of banks involves appropriate levels of risks.191 Banks with more capital can absorb more 
losses. Even if the bank with more capital is insolvent, the cost of liquidating that bank for 
the public will be lower. Improving the capital of banks can reduce the impact of these 
risks on their balance sheets and manage these risks. Basel III includes improved 
requirements and standards for the level and quality of banks’ capital to improve the 
banks’ ability to absorb losses and maintain stability.192 Bank supervision is the direct way 
to reduce and mitigate the impact of these risks. 193  The aim of pre-insolvency 
arrangements is to make banks less susceptible to government bail-outs and the use of 
public funds to rescue failing banks.194 The design of pre-insolvency arrangements for 
banks is based on the special characteristics of banks compared with non-bank firms. 
 
B. The Perspective of Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
In addition to characteristics and importance of banks, structured early intervention 
for banks takes bank risks into consideration, thereby providing banking regulators with 
timely identification of banks’ financial condition and sufficient resources to manage 
troubled banks at early stages. Structured early intervention for banks matters because 
of its contribution to reduce costs of dealing with troubled or failed banks and its role as 
a bridge between banking regulation and bank resolution. 
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1. Contribution to Reduced Costs of Dealing with Troubled Banks 
 
Structured early intervention for banks can reduce delays of interventions by 
regulatory authorities, which is likely to reduce costs of the management of the troubled 
banks. The minimum loss of a troubled bank to the public arises when the bank’s market 
value reaches zero,195 because the shareholders of the bank suffer all the losses at this 
stage. If the market value of the troubled bank is negative, then the losses of the bank 
will be absorbed by both shareholders and other stakeholders. Reluctance in initiating 
bankruptcy is likely to cause delays in managing the troubled bank and worsen the 
situation. In other words, delay in intervention by a regulatory authority may lead to the 
loss of market value of the troubled bank. Structured early intervention by regulatory 
authorities of troubled banks is likely to reduce the losses suffered by creditors and 
taxpayers, when the market value of the troubled bank is still positive. This way, the losses 
and costs of resolution of a troubled bank can be less. Without early signals of banks’ 
deteriorating financial condition that can be intervened with by structured early 
intervention for banks, banking regulators of troubled banks may not be aware of potential 
problems and risks at early stages. This means that a heightened supervision of troubled 
banks and relevant corrective measures play an important role in achieving an effective 
and efficient banking regulation and resolution regime.196  
Regulatory authorities can intervene to take measures based on specific situations 
and problems that troubled banks face.197 Structured early intervention for banks is likely 
to avoid fire sales of a bank’s assets and corrective measures of structured early 
intervention for banks are different from the sale of banks' assets in liquidation. This is 
because structured early intervention for banks allows regulatory authorities to intervene 
before troubled banks reach balance sheet insolvency, and manage the troubled situation 
of the banks in a way that may maintain the values of the bank.198 The fire sale of assets 
can spread distress to other banks and financial institutions.199 In liquidation procedures, 
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the sale of banks' assets to pay creditors and counterparties is likely achieved by selling 
pieces rather than large parts, which may reduce potential gain from the sale. Therefore, 
structured early intervention for banks can be timely measures with lower costs compared 
with liquidation in relation to dealing with troubled banks. 
 
2.  Bridge Function between Banking Regulation and Bank Resolution 
 
The pre-insolvency stage is a phase between banking regulation and bank 
resolution where troubled banks start to be more problematic and risky. The financial 
condition of a troubled bank can deteriorate quickly. Banking regulators need to be able 
to scrutinise the bank’s financial condition and take respective measures accordingly if 
necessary during this in-between phase. Structured early intervention for banks is the 
mechanism at this stage where it can function as a bridge between bank supervision and 
bank insolvency proceedings.200 This means that structured early intervention for banks 
can to some extent determine whether a troubled bank can continue to do business with 
additional regulatory restrictions or proceed to insolvency proceedings with its financial 
condition of bank failing to meet any regulatory requirements set by structured early 
intervention for banks. In a troubled situation, structured early intervention for banks is 
needed so regulatory authorities can react in a timely manner and take corrective 
measures to reduce the negative impact caused by the troubled bank to the financial 
system. 
The importance of this function, as a bridge between banking regulation and bank 
resolution, is the consideration of the objectives of financial stability and public confidence. 
In comparison with bank resolution and bank insolvency proceedings, the primary 
objectives of general insolvency law for corporations are to achieve fair distribution of the 
debtor’s assets and to maximise the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors.201 There 
is the risk that resolving a troubled bank may cause instability to the whole financial 
system, which can to some extent be reduced by regulatory intervention.202 Intervention 
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by regulatory authority can reassure creditors that regulatory methods are able to protect 
their interests.  
 
IV. Corrective Measures That Are Not for Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
Banking regulators are entitled to take different types of measures with banks, 
depending on the bank’s financial condition and regulatory requirements. For example, 
normal regulatory measures ensure banks operate in compliance with the regulatory 
requirements to maintain safety and soundness while resolution measures ensure a 
smooth resolution of troubled banks with a minimised impact on the banking sector. This 
means that banking regulators may take different regulatory measures or actions with 
banks to deal with each bank condition at different stages. Specific measures show the 
level of regulation and supervision by banking regulators.  
Corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks represent a 
heightened level of supervision by banking regulators at the pre-insolvency stage. 
Identification of differences between corrective measures at the pre-insolvency stage and 
other regulatory measures for banking regulation and bank resolution is important. This 
narrows down the scope of corrective measures for discussion in the following chapters. 
Generally, measures for regulatory authorities to intervene in a bank’s operation range 
from less invasive to more invasive. Enforcement action, corrective measures and 
resolution measures are the primary regulatory measures for banking regulators.203  
Enforcement actions are preventive measures that work before banking problems 
arise. Enforcement action should reach the balance between cooperative-based 
compliance requirements and compulsory corrective measures that prevent banks from 
doing certain activities.204 The action represent a minor level intervention of in the bank’s 
businesses by a regulatory authority.205 The purpose of an enforcement action by a 
regulatory authority is to solve and correct minor problems when banks are in violation of 
requirements of prudential supervision in their operations.206 When the bank participates 
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in businesses that are not in accordance with safe and sound prudential regulation, the 
regulatory authority will give the bank orders emphasising stopping and not taking part in 
those businesses.207  
However, corrective measures and resolution measures have a blurred line 
between them. Without further clarifications on differences between corrective measures 
and resolution measures, discussion on corrective measures of structured early 
intervention in the following chapters can be difficult to achieve. This section first briefly 
discusses the difference between corrective measures for structured early intervention 
for banks and corrective measures that are included in the bank resolution regime. Then 
it focuses on discussing how corrective measures for bank resolution work to differentiate 
the corrective measures for structured early intervention to be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
A. A Brief Explanation of Two Different Types of Corrective Measures 
 
Corrective measures are designed to deal with problems and bring troubled banks 
back to healthy and normal operation, which could help maintain important functions of 
the troubled banks.208 In the literature, both regulatory measures that have an increased 
level of intervention with bank business operation and regulatory measures that deal with 
bank resolution to maintain economic values of troubled banks can be regarded as 
corrective measures. There is a subtle difference between these two types of corrective 
measures, though both types of corrective measures represent an increased level of 
intervention with banks by banking regulators. The first type of corrective measures 
focuses on recovery of the banks’ ability to perform and operate by enforcing stricter 
regulatory requirements and restrictions on them. The second type of corrective 
measures, however, concentrates more on resolution of the banks by stabilising their 
financial condition to restore solvency of the banks. The second type of corrective 
measures is often discussed together with, or regarded as a part of, resolution measures. 
At the pre-insolvency stage, banks are commonly faced with financial problems and 
higher risks that might have a direct impact on their solvency instead of an immediate 
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solvency problem. The following chapters in this thesis focus on discussion of the first 
type of corrective measures as an important part of structured early intervention for banks. 
In practice, with the background of the Chinese banking regulatory framework, the 
understanding of these two types of corrective measures may cause confusion. The 
Chinese equivalent of ‘corrective measures’ in fact refers to the second type of corrective 
measures with the aim of stabilising troubled banks’ financial condition and promoting a 
smooth resolution of troubled banks while the understanding of the Chinese equivalent 
could refer to either the first type or the second type of triggering events. These measures 
are similar to resolution measures that existed in the US and UK banking regulatory 
framework.  
In general, corrective measures that are related to bank resolution are applied in 
the context of failed banks where stricter regulatory measures and restrictions fail to work. 
The corrective features of these measures focus more on maintaining value of troubled 
banks rather than aiming to restore a safe and sound operation of these banks.  
 
B. How Corrective Measures for Bank Resolution Work 
 
The key feature for corrective measures associated with bank resolution is the 
stabilisation function of troubled banks to prepare for a smooth resolution and winding-up 
of particular troubled banks. These corrective measures with a focus on maintaining the 
critical functions of banks, together with measures to restructure and measures to exit, 
are the measures in bank resolution Transfers of a bank’s property, bridge banks and 
bail-in are specific corrective measures associated with bank resolution. The application 
of these corrective measures needs to satisfy both general requirements and specific 
requirements. 
 
1. Main Corrective Measures Associated with Bank Resolution 
 
Transfers of a bank’s property are a way to sell parts of or all of the shares, assets 
and liabilities to a private sector purchaser.209 The purchaser should be able to accept the 
transferred part in a short time and should be a qualified buyer appropriately authorised 
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by the regulatory authority.210 To do so, the regulatory authority needs sufficient power to 
authorise a private sector purchaser. Under troubled circumstances of a bank, the 
regulatory authority is entitled to exercise the rights of the bank's shareholders to transfer 
the bank's assets. These powers are exempt from the approval of other counterparties 
that normally need to approve transfer of the bank's assets.211 However, the power of the 
regulatory authority is limited to protecting creditors and counterparties. For example, the 
set-off and netting arrangements should all be transferred to the private sector purchaser 
or held in the troubled bank for maintaining economic value.  
There are three ways to conduct the sale of a bank’s assets. The most direct is to 
transfer the insured deposits of a troubled bank to another healthy deposit-taking 
institution.212 This can better continue the obligations of the troubled bank to its depositors 
and can be a more efficient way for the healthy bank to get new clients. A more 
complicated way is to transfer the bank's insured deposits and other assets such as cash, 
loans and portfolios. In the US, purchase and assumption is the application of transfers 
of a bank’s property. Selling these assets together with insured deposits is likely to 
generate more value than selling them separately. In the application of transferring assets 
together, a large coverage of depositor preference can be a way to improve efficiency.213  
Depositor preference means the purchaser can assume deposits and buy assets without 
separating them and damaging the interests of some unsecured creditors.214 If there is 
no depositor preference, the deposit guarantee agency has to find a way to protect the 
interests of unsecured creditors and guarantee that their interests are no worse off than 
those of depositors.215  Without deposit preference, more time is needed to achieve 
resolution. With the coverage of deposit preference the buyer institution can purchase 
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assets and assume deposits without considering these creditors so that the resolution of 
the troubled bank can be achieved with efficiency and the values of the troubled bank can 
be maintained more than the application of ‘no creditors worse off.’216 Another possible 
way is to separate the underperforming part of the troubled bank from the healthy part so 
the bank's balance sheet can be cleaned. It is easier to sell the bank if the 
underperforming part is sold first.217 
The institution of the bridge bank is one corrective measure for bank resolution. A 
bridge bank can be used when there are no private sector purchasers and the regulatory 
authority can transfer the shares, assets and liabilities to it. A bridge bank is created to 
perform part of or all functions of a troubled bank and it is owned by public authorities.218 
The purpose of a bridge bank is to gain more time for the regulatory authority to control 
the situation and conduct a proper resolution before finding an appropriate private sector 
purchaser.219  
The implementation and practice of the bridge bank differs from country to country. 
In the US, a bridge bank is a newly chartered bank by the Office of the Controller of the 
Currency (OCC). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate (FDIC) operates the bridge 
bank for two years.220 The bridge bank allows the insurer to deal with the situation of the 
troubled bank, transfer assets to purchasers, and manage its asset portfolios.221 The 
bridge bank in the US performs its obligations by accepting deposits and making loans 
with low risk to meet the needs of the public for banking services and to lessen the impact 
of the troubled bank on society.222 In the UK, a bridge bank has not been used very 
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often.223 Setting up a bridge bank in the UK means setting up a new bank.224 The new 
institution will maintain the business of the troubled bank and can accept deposits and 
conduct other banking activities. One feature of the UK bridge bank option is that the 
troubled bank cannot continue its business and a new institution is created to keep some 
of the troubled bank’s businesses going.225  
Compared with property transfer and bridge banks, bail-in is more commonly used 
in the general bankruptcy proceedings for non-bank corporations. Bail-in in bank 
resolution uses the assets and resources of a troubled bank to recapitalise itself.226 Bail-
in records a bank’s liabilities or converts them to equity. The result of the bail-in is to erase 
these liabilities from its books.227 This measure provides no additional liquidity. Bail-in can 
be unhelpful if the bank is still troubled afterwards. In some cases, bail-in can be applied 
together with other methods such as a bridge bank and the creditors of a troubled bank 
can become shareholders of the bridge bank.228  
Bail-in has several features. It cannot be applied when liabilities are backed with 
collateral, and liabilities such as deposits, interbank lending, salaries, taxes and pensions 
are excluded from bail-in.229 Another feature is that the application of the measure should 
be in accordance with the order of capital structure ranking, from shareholders first to 
creditors next.230 Regulatory authorities have discretion to decide whether a liability can 
be converted into equity or be written down. 
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The main function of these corrective measures is to maintain the market value of 
troubled banks and keep some of their functions performing. The asset separation tool 
and bank administration procedure are two additional corrective measures that deal with 
failed banks where they possess no economic value and need to be liquidated.231  
The assets separation tool is for regulatory authorities to separate good assets 
from bad assets. Via this method, the regulatory authority has the power to transfer shares, 
assets and liabilities of the troubled bank to a new institution controlled by the public 
authorities. The power of the regulatory authority can only be applied to assets that have 
a negative effect on the bank’s condition and financial market in the insolvency 
proceedings.232 Separating good assets from bad assets is a way to manage the assets 
of the troubled bank and clean the bank’s balance sheet. However, asset separation is 
likely to cause a moral hazard problem because the bank may care less about the risks 
involved in its activities and businesses. 233  Consequently, banks may rely on this 
measure and take more risks. Asset separation can be applied by the bridge bank or the 
private sector purchaser. The regulatory authority can separate the good assets of the 
bank and transfer them to the private sector purchaser.234 
Another measure used in conjunction with main corrective measures is the bank 
administration procedure, which is used to deal with the residual bank or the bad assets 
of the troubled bank that are not transferred to a private sector purchaser or a bridge bank. 
The purpose of the bank administration procedure is to keep the residual bank’s basic 
services until arrangements are made to deal with them.235 
 
2. Requirements for Initiation of Corrective Measures Associated with Bank 
Resolution 
 
As explained above, these corrective measures associated with bank resolution 
available to regulatory authorities have different aims. The application of these corrective 
measures needs to satisfy both general and specific requirements. General requirements 
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for application of corrective measures in different countries are similar. However, specific 
requirements for application of each corrective measure vary from country to country on 
the basis of nuances that exist in the rules of each country’s banking law.  
 
a. General Requirements for Corrective Measures Associated with Bank 
Resolution 
 
The regulatory authorities’ decision on whether to take corrective measures 
associated with bank resolution with a troubled bank depends on the bank's specific 
financial condition and importance in the financial sector. Regulatory authorities have 
discretion to decide which measure to take. The discretionary power allows regulatory 
authorities to take a corrective measure that fits the situation of the troubled bank best 
under bank resolution. Requirements for regulatory authorities to initiate bank resolution 
are normally general requirements for initiation of these corrective measures to a bank: 
the bank is not in accordance with regulatory requirements for a period of time; the bank 
is not viable economically; measures like enforcement actions have failed; and/or there 
are risks whose losses the bank’s capital buffer cannot cover in the process of resolution 
due to the decline of the level of capital of the bank.236 In relation to measures that may 
have a negative effect on shareholders’ rights and the application of public funds, 
additional requirements may apply. 
 
b. Specific Requirements for Corrective Measures Associated with Bank 
Resolution – Examples in the US and the UK 
 
In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) 
has formulated five categories of capital standard of banks and restrictions of activities 
on each category. FDIC is required to take action with banks based on their capital 
standards. The prudential regulator of a bank can decide whether to close it or not and 
the chartering authority will take the bank under its control when it is authorised by the 
chancellor. FDIC will be appointed the receiver of the bank.237 Thereafter, FDIC is likely 
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to take purchase and assumption measures to contract other healthy banks to sell some 
of the assets and liabilities. This measure is preferable for the regulatory authority 
because this measure does not involve any responsibilities to make payments to 
depositors of the failing bank and there is no need to go through an administrative process 
for the payment.  
The bridge bank has been used many times by FDIC, especially in effectively 
resolving large and complicated banks and it is likely to be used more in case of liquidity 
problems. In the FDICIA, banking regulators are required to take actions before a bank 
reaches balance sheet insolvency. This action by banking regulators is likely to cause 
withdrawals of funds by depositors as the public learns about the measures being taken 
with the bank by the regulator. The Federal Reserve has limited power to provide 
assistance for the troubled bank,238 which may also make the bank's liquidity problem 
worse.  
Open bank assistance is another way to solve the problems of a troubled bank by 
using financial assistance from the government to keep the bank operating. FDIC 
provides different types of assistance from cash and loans to liabilities purchase. The 
precondition for this type of assistance is that the open bank assistance will have to be 
the least costly way for dealing with troubled banks.239 This method is effective in certain 
types of troubled situations but may be less effective when regional economic problems 
are the primary reason for the troubled situation of a bank.240 Open bank assistance is 
available to both big and small failing banks, but it is used more often in resolving large 
banks. This method is used less frequently these days because some restrictions are 
imposed such as the requirement of the least cost and there are other available methods 
such as purchase and assumption and bridge banks. 
In the UK, there are more requirements for the application of measures in the 
Special Resolution Regime (SRR). Apart from the general requirements for the 
application of SRR, there are specific requirements for each measure. According to the 
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Banking Act 2009, the use of private sector purchase and bridge banks has to satisfy the 
condition of maintaining the public interest.241 To use temporary public ownership, two 
specific conditions have to be met. One is maintaining the public interest, and the other 
is for the purpose of the financial system's stability. Requirements of SRR measures in 
the Banking Act 2009 provide more specific instructions concerning the choice of 
measures for regulatory authorities. Especially for the requirement of temporary public 
ownership, ‘a serious threat of the stability of the financial system’ is a precondition for 
financial assistance from the treasury.242 This shows that the measure of temporary public 
ownership has to be the last resort, which means the private sector purchase and the 
bank’s merger should be attempted first and shareholders of the bank should not benefit 
from public ownership.243 Bank insolvency procedures formulated in the Banking Act 
2009 can be applied according to the general conditions, and regulatory authorities will 
apply these procedures based on the objectives of SRR. It can also show that liquidation 
is likely to be applied and the bank or other financial institutions cannot count on 
assistance from other SRR measures. In this way, moral hazard problems can to some 
extent be reduced. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the differences among the pre-insolvency stage, 
insolvency stage and bankruptcy stage when banks encounter financial hardships. From 
the perspective of banking regulators, in order to deal with these problems and risks 
associated with troubled banks, an early intervention mechanism for troubled banks is 
needed. Structured early intervention for banks is a type of early intervention mechanism 
to deal with troubled banks. It consists of triggering events and corrective measures, 
providing timely signals and respective regulatory actions for banking regulators to 
determine the financial condition of banks and providing resources to manage and 
intervene with troubled banks. 
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From the theoretical perspective, SEIR was the main theoretical basis for the 
actual implementation of structured early intervention with banks in practice. In the 
background the US deposit insurance scheme in the 1990s, SEIR and other proposals or 
theories were brought up to solve issues with the deposit insurance scheme, especially 
moral hazards and regulatory forbearance. 
Banks’ characteristics and importance in the financial sector and functions of 
structured early intervention for banks are the two main reasons that explain why 
structured early intervention with banks is necessary. From the perspective of banks, 
banks are important to the operation, safety and soundness of the financial system whilst 
being vulnerable to risks that have a direct impact on the solvency of them. Therefore, 
banks are special compared with non-bank firms and are in need of regulation at each 
stage of their operations. From the perspective of structured early intervention for banks, 
it considers the banks’ importance in the financial system and banks’ vulnerability to risks 
at the pre-insolvency stage. It could help reduce the costs in relation to dealing with 
troubled banks by providing banking regulators sufficient resources to intervene, 
especially at the pre-insolvency stage where an increased level of intervention is needed. 
The term ‘corrective measures’ may have two understandings: corrective 
measures that are applied in bank resolution and corrective measures that are increased 
levels of regulation and intervention. Without clarification between these two types of 
corrective measures, the scope of corrective measures of structured early intervention for 
banks is left undefined. Discussing corrective measures that are included in bank 
resolution is a way to a clearer understanding of differences between two types of 
corrective measures and a defined scope of corrective measures of structured early 
intervention for banks.  
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Chapter 2 Overviews of Structured Early Intervention for Banks in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and China 
 
The United States, the United Kingdom and China have different arrangements 
and designs in their legal frameworks for banking regulation and resolution pertaining to 
structured early intervention for banks. In addition, the development and implementation 
of structured early intervention for banks vary among these three countries. Specifically, 
structured early intervention for US banks are at a more advanced level; in comparison, 
structured early intervention for UK banks have gone through changes and developments 
after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009 (GFC) but still continue to require 
refinement, and structured early intervention for Chinese banks are at a beginning stage.  
A comparative study of structured early intervention of banks in the US and the UK 
would serve as a reference point or baseline for the development of structured early 
intervention for banks in China. The US and UK have large, sophisticated, and more 
mature banking systems and have previously made changes to their systems in response 
to the global financial crisis in 2009. Like China, these countries are headquarters for very 
large, systemically important banks. Comparing and analysing these countries’ systems 
and changes will offer insights into how to best go about developing a comprehensive 
system of structured early intervention for the banking sector in China. Moreover, 
considering the special problems and situations of the Chinese banking sector will 
contribute to a more suitable and effective intervention system for Chinese banks. 
This chapter provides an overview of structured early intervention for banks in the 
US, UK, and China. On the basis of understanding structured early intervention for banks, 
this chapter, from a comparative perspective, provides arrangements of structured early 
intervention for banks in legislation in the US, UK, and China and explores relevant 
changes and developments in reaction to said changes in the financial and banking 
worlds, respectively.  
 
I. Structured Early Intervention for Banks in the United States 
 
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) is the US version of structured early intervention 
for banks. The concept of PCA was first introduced and adopted in the Federal Deposit 
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Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991244 (the on the basis of the 
Structured Early Intervention and Resolution (SEIR) theory. This early intervention 
mechanism enables banking supervisory authorities to impose sanctions, such as 
mandatory corrective actions, on banks when bank capital ratios fall below the levels 
dictated by certain regulatory requirements. 245  PCA is the first structured early 
intervention system to be established amongst early intervention mechanisms in the US, 
UK, and China. Currently, PCA is the only early intervention mechanism that has been 
through and tested by the 2007 GFC with regard to its efficiency and effectiveness in a 
real-life crisis. This section explores the history of structured early intervention for US 
banks, discusses the current PCA, and then evaluates the US PCA approach in two 
contexts. 
 
A. History of US Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
The enactment of the FDICIA in 1991 and the establishment of PCA are both 
results of efforts to restructure the US financial system to correct weaknesses and flaws 
that existed in the US financial sector during the 1980s. Both the Federal Savings and 
Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and the FDIC experienced great losses, including 
especially the FSLIC. The reform of the US deposit insurance scheme and banking 
regulatory system thus aimed to correct the following weaknesses and flaws, which were 
also identified to be the main reasons for the Savings and Loans Crisis, thereby leading 
to the adoption of structured early intervention for banks. The four weaknesses and flaws 
included (1) excessive risk-taking encouraged by the first US deposit insurance scheme, 
especially for those depository institutions whose capital has been greatly reduced; (2) 
the inability or unwillingness on the part of regulators and supervisors to take actions in 
relation to risk level and exposure of information systems at that time; (3) the inability or 
unwillingness on the part of regulators and supervisors to take sufficient and timely 
measures to reduce losses to the deposit insurance scheme in relation to severe financial 
hardships and an inclination toward insolvency of depository institutions; and (4) the 
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occurrence of undesirable effects or results on the protection of creditors and insured 
depositors caused by intervention measures taken by banking regulators to insolvent 
depository institutions. 246  From a high-level perspective, the main theme of these 
weaknesses and flaws revealed by the Savings and Loan Crisis can be summarised as 
moral hazards caused by deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in detecting risks 
and taking timely measures.247  
On the basis of theories and proposals to deal with the Savings and Loan Crisis 
discussed in the previous chapter, SEIR was one of the theories and proposals that 
intended to resolve moral hazards and regulatory forbearance in the US financial sector 
at the time of its introduction. Other proposals, including reduced maximum coverage of 
depositors248 , coinsurance249 , risk-related insurance premiums250 , risk-related capital 
requirements251 and increased capital requirements, were also brought up to solve the 
two main problems by either improving incentives for depositors to monitor banks or by 
increasing bank risk exposure. Additionally, the idea of narrow banks, as one of the 
proposals, was also introduced as a means to restructure banks whose deposit accounts 
are backed with currency and low-risk marketable securities.252  
The problems of moral hazards and regulatory forbearance and the relationship 
with these theories and proposals provide the context for the origin and establishment of 
the concept of PCA. PCA was established and incorporated in the FDICIA in 1991 on the 
theoretical basis of SEIR for the reform of the US deposit insurance scheme.253 
 
B. Current Structured Early Intervention for Banks in the United States 
 
PCA, as the current US version of structured early intervention, provides banking 
regulators with triggering events and corrective measures by which to take timely actions 
to intervene in bank business actions and operations before these banks become 
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insolvent. PCA has been structured to have two main aspects: triggering events and 
corrective measures. This structure is a combination of the mechanisms of structured 
early intervention for banks. US triggering events are based on objective standards—
namely, capital ratios, and corrective measures that intervene in and deal with troubled 
banks’ operations depend on bank capital ratios.254  On a federal level, US banking 
regulators who are entitled to determine whether PCA is necessary vary depending on 
specific banks. 
 
1. The Related Regulators 
 
In relation to US competent banking regulators for early intervention, specific PCA 
banking regulators for troubled banks are different. This is derived from differences in 
bank chartering authorities and prudential banking regulators at the federal level of each 
individual bank. Because of the dual system of banking regulation and supervision in the 
US, the responsibilities of bank regulation and supervision are shared by multiple banking 
regulators rather than a single regulatory authority.255 Therefore, a US bank is under the 
regulation and supervision of both federal and state regulators. The chartering authority 
of a bank and the bank’s choice about whether to become a member of the Federal 
Reserve System256 determine its specific federal banking regulator. The specific federal 
banking regulator for a particular bank is entitled to conduct PCA.257 This means that 
whether the chartering authority of a bank is at a federal or state level and whether a bank 
decides to be a member of the Federal Reserve System both can have an impact on the 
bank’s specific federal regulator assigned to conduct PCA. 
The way to determine the specific federal banking regulator of each individual bank 
is related to the chartering authority of each bank. A domestic US bank can choose to be 
chartered by either a state or federal authority.258 If a domestic bank is chartered by a 
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federal authority, specifically the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), then 
the bank is regarded as a national bank.259 The OCC is responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of national banks, being their chartering authority. US federal deposit 
insurance covers all deposit-taking institutions and therefore national banks are also 
subject to the regulation of the FDIC.260 If a bank is chartered by a state authority, it is 
regarded as a state bank. This means that one of the dual banking regulators for state 
banks is the state chartering authority. A state bank can choose to be a member of the 
Federal Reserve System.261 If a state bank decides to be a member of the Federal 
Reserve System, it is regarded as a state member bank. The state chartering authority 
and Federal Reserve examiners262 are the banking regulators at the state and federal 
levels, respectively, for such banks. If a state bank chooses not to become a member of 
the Federal Reserve System, it is regarded as a state nonmember bank. In addition to 
the state chartering authority for a state nonmember bank, the FDIC acts as the banking 
regulator at the federal level.263 From the perspective of a state bank, one of its banking 
regulators is the state chartering authority and the other is either the Federal Reserve 
Board or FDIC depending on whether it is a member bank or not.  
On the basis of the discussion of federal banking regulators, potential PCA 
regulators are as follows: the OCC, Federal Reserve regulators, and the FDIC. 
Specifically, the OCC is the appropriate federal banking regulator for national banks, the 
Board of Governors or its appointed examiners of the Federal Reserve System are the 
appropriate federal banking regulators for state member banks, and the FDIC is the 
appropriate federal banking regulator for state nonmember banks.264 PCA regulators and 
the FDIC as the insurer of depository institutions are responsible for determining if and 
when PCA is initiated and corrective measures are to be applied to troubled banks.265 
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2. Triggering Events and Corrective Measures 
 
In relation to PCA triggering events, depending on bank capital ratio, US banks 
can be placed into five different categories. The five categories are ‘well-capitalised’, 
‘adequately capitalised’, ‘undercapitalised’, ‘significantly undercapitalised’ and ‘critically 
undercapitalised’.266 A ‘well-capitalised’ bank refers to a situation where the bank’s capital 
significantly exceeds the required minimum level of capital requirements. 267  More 
specifically, a ‘well-capitalised’ bank has at least a 10% risk-based capital ratio and at 
least a 5% leverage ratio.268 A ‘adequately capitalised’ bank means that the bank’s capital 
meets the required minimum level of capital with a risk based-capital ratio of 8% and a 
leverage ratio of 4%.269  An ‘undercapitalised’ bank refers to a bank that fails to meet the 
required minimum level of capital, having a less than 8% risk-based capital ratio and a 4% 
leverage ratio.270 A ‘significantly undercapitalised’ bank or a ‘critically undercapitalised’ 
bank are those that significantly fail to meet the required minimum capital standard with 
less than a 6% risk-based capital ratio and a less than a 3% leverage ratio or one that 
fails to meet any capital requirements with a leverage ratio of below 2%, respectively.271 
Banking regulators are required to classify banks into one of five categories based on 
these standards before they implement respective measures. PCA triggering events are 
based on these objective indicators of bank financial condition and risk level. 
Bank Category 
Capital Requirements 
Risk-based Capital 
Ratio 
Leverage Ratio 
Well-capitalised ≥ 10% ≥ 5% 
Adequately capitalised ≥ 8% ≥ 4% 
Undercapitalised < 8% < 4% 
Significantly undercapitalised < 6% < 3% 
Critically undercapitalised - < 2% 
 
Table 2 US Triggering Events 
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In relation to PCA corrective measures, the levels of regulation and intervention 
increase when a bank’s financial conditions worsen. This means that corrective measures 
that are relevant to PCA become stricter and more stringent when banks grow 
increasingly more and more undercapitalised. With stricter and more stringent PCA 
corrective measures, the levels of regulation and intervention applied by banking 
regulators on bank business and operation increase. US PCA corrective measures are 
composed of compulsory and discretionary measures. In general, banks with relatively 
sufficient capital and sound operation have less limitations set by corrective measures, 
while banks with insufficient capital and troubled operation are more likely to be 
addressed by corrective measures. Well-capitalised banks and adequately capitalised 
banks are only subject to compulsory measures, while undercapitalised, significantly 
undercapitalised, and critically undercapitalised banks are subject to both compulsory and 
discretionary measures.272 For example, compulsory measures that can be applied to 
adequately capitalised banks include capital distribution restrictions and management 
fees payment.273 In relation to compulsory and discretionary corrective measures for 
undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised, and critically undercapitalised banks, 
these measures have a progressive feature where the level of intervention increases in 
relation to the greater supervision in dealing with troubled bank business. Specifically, 
compulsory corrective measures for undercapitalised banks include close supervision 
and regulation, capital restoration plans, restrictions on asset growth, mandatory 
preapproval for acquisitions, branching, and the addition of new lines of business by 
regulators. 274   Compulsory measures for significantly undercapitalised banks include 
recapitalisation, restricted transactions with affiliates, restricted interest rates payment, 
restricted asset growth and activities, improved management, prohibited deposits from 
correspondence banks, required divestitures, required preapproval for capital distribution 
of bank holding companies, and any other necessary actions.275 In addition to these 
specific actions, restrictions on compensation for senior executives often apply to 
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significantly undercapitalised banks. 276  Compulsory measures for critically 
undercapitalised banks include restricted activities, prohibited payments on subordinated 
debt and mandatory conservatorship, receivership or other actions. 277  In addition, 
critically undercapitalised banks are required to get preapproval by regulators for a 
number of activities, including entering any material transactions, extending credit for 
highly leveraged transactions, amending charters, making material changes in 
accounting rules, making covered transactions,278 paying excessive compensation and 
bonuses, and paying interest rates on new liabilities with higher rates.279 
Bank Category Corrective Measures 
Well-capitalised Compulsory measures 
Adequately capitalised Compulsory measures 
Undercapitalised Compulsory and discretionary measures 
Significantly undercapitalised Compulsory and discretionary measures 
Critically undercapitalised Compulsory and discretionary measures 
 
Table 3 US Corrective Measures 
C. Evaluation of US Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
PCA, as the means for structured early intervention for US banks, has been 
adopted as a mechanism by which to manage and deal with troubled banks before they 
reach insolvency. The use of PCA has been ongoing for more than two decades and has 
the longest history in relation to structured early intervention for banks in the US, UK, and 
China. This subsection evaluates advantages and disadvantages of PCA during two 
periods of time: the first decade after the adoption of PCA and during the GFC.  
 
1. Assessment of PCA in the First Decade 
 
This subsection discusses the advantages and immediate effects of the 
introduction of PCA after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, including the direct impact 
on banks, the performance of banking regulators, and the effect on the recovery of the 
US banking industry in the 1990s. This subsection also discusses an advantage of the 
enactment of FDICIA in a wider context, which contributes to achieving the goal of PCA 
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of reducing losses to deposit insurance funds. Next, this subsection identifies 
weaknesses and shortcomings of the PCA approach. 
Concerning the results of PCA after the enactment of the 1991 FDICIA, the PCA 
initiative has since improved the safety and soundness of the US banking industry in 
comparison with during the 1990s. On the one hand, with the introduction of PCA, banks 
were recapitalised and banking regulators had more incentives and mandatory 
requirements to take corrective actions to troubled banks in the early stages. On the other 
hand, specific standards concerning the numerical value of capital ratios and existing 
conflicts between the need for discretion and the need to reduce forbearance as well as 
the impact of the interest rate risk on bank capital may to some extent have contributed 
to a degree of ineffectiveness following the implementation of PCA.  
 
a. Identified Advantages of PCA in the First Decade 
 
In relation to advantages of PCA in the first decade, the two main advantages of 
PCA are as follows: incentives for banking regulators to take corrective measures in a 
timely way and incentives for banks to raise additional capital to satisfy PCA requirements. 
First, after the establishment of PCA in the 1991 FDICIA, PCA was believed to 
have improved the performance of banking regulators in taking measures early and 
therefore reducing risk-taking behaviours of banks, which was evidenced by changes in 
the banking industry of the US.280 Banking regulators perceive that they are provided with 
incentives and resources to reduce reluctance by taking timely measures and are 
encouraged to intervene in the business operations of the banks categorised as 
undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised, or critically undercapitalised. 281  The 
changes in the banking sector, for example, included a steady decline in the number of 
bank failures from 1991 to 1996 and a decline in the number of banks categorised as 
undercapitalised banks.282 Bank management staff members have been encouraged to 
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pursue identifying and controlling risks in a more effective way after the establishment of 
PCA.283 These changes reveal PCA’s direct impact on the US banking sector, though 
PCA as a practical mechanism has less strict capital requirements as triggering events in 
comparison with the original SEIR theory. 
Second, PCA encouraged banks to increase funds and raise additional capital to 
satisfy capital requirements, in relation to its effectiveness in the recovery of the US 
banking sector in the 1990s. Requiring banks to raise additional capital enabled them to 
reduce risk-taking behaviours and operate in a safer way.284 This means that, with an 
increased amount of capital and funds, banks can better absorb losses that may be 
results of risky decisions made by bank management. This additional capital would 
absorb the losses of banks in the first place before FDIC comes in to compensate by 
using deposit insurance funds. On this basis, banks are less likely to be involved in risky 
business processes than before. Even if banks tend to hold less capital than other 
nonbank firms, an increased capital level contributes to better safety of bank operations. 
In a wider context, the FDIC tended to provide less protection to uninsured depositors of 
failed banks in order to reduce losses caused by failed banks to deposit insurance 
funds.285 This means that the FDIC started to leave uninsured depositors of failed banks 
behind and let these depositors suffer losses. Comparing the pre-FDICIA and post-
FDICIA experience of the FDIC, FDIC mostly transferred losses from itself to uninsured 
depositors, which potentially reduced losses to the FDIC and incentivised uninsured 
depositors to be careful about uninsured deposits.286 This change increased the burden 
on uninsured depositors in relation to monitoring banks and their capital adequacy. 
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b. Identified Disadvantages of PCA in the First Decade 
 
In relation to PCA during the first decade of implementation and operation, issues 
with the effectiveness of PCA capital ratios as triggering events and the effectiveness of 
PCA to reduce regulatory forbearance are identified as two main disadvantages. 
Discussions of effectiveness of PCA have focused on weaknesses and 
shortcomings of PCA after its establishment and implementation, especially including a 
concern that capital ratios are set too low to be effective and may even slow down 
responses as well as cause unwillingness on the part of banking regulators to take 
corrective measures to address troubled banks.287 The problem inherent in the capital 
ratios of PCA is the low numerical value of capital ratios that have been assigned as an 
objective standard to triggering regulatory intervention and, in comparison with 
noninsured financial institutions in the market, this is also the case.288 In terms of critically 
undercapitalised banks, the amount of capital required in the context of PCA is too low to 
absorb losses and shocks and cannot fulfil the purpose of closing a troubled bank with a 
positive market value. 289  For example, a 2% capital ratio threshold for initiating a 
resolution process could be insufficient and hardly achieve the goal of early intervention. 
Therefore, capital ratios as triggering events need further consideration with regard to the 
setting of specific numerical values as standards. 
PCA banking regulators’ discretion and PCA’s implications on regulatory 
forbearance is another weakness of the approach observed during the first decade. PCA 
regulators are entitled to apply their discretion in relation to choices of discretionary 
corrective measures, which contributes to regulatory forbearance, though the mechanism 
of PCA provides banking regulators with incentives to deal with troubled banks at early 
stages. 290  The mechanism of PCA requires banking regulators to take respective 
corrective measures to address troubled banks and reduce their inclinations to 
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forbearance when banks fall below certain capital ratios. Because the application of PCA 
measures is not entirely automatic, the discretion of PCA regulators is necessary when it 
comes to comparing and analysing capital ratios of banks and capital ratios as triggering 
events. This means that PCA regulators could be uncertain of the market value of banks 
and must take discretion to first elucidate the current financial condition of banks and then 
determine whether to apply certain measures to particular banks at certain times. The 
discretion of the PCA approach contributes to regulatory forbearance in the following two 
ways. First, when determining bank performance and financial condition, capital ratios as 
triggering events are calculated on the basis of traditional accounting data and book value, 
and this calculation provides a lagging or delayed reflection of a bank’s financial status.291 
Therefore, regulatory forbearance may happen because of the failure of capital ratios as 
triggering events to identify a troubled bank in a timely fashion. Second, PCA regulators 
are able to apply discretion to decide specific corrective measures for a particular troubled 
bank. They may choose not to impose strict restrictions on a troubled bank even when 
that measure is really necessary whilst causing regulatory forbearance. On a practical 
and implementation level, PCA may not be effective enough to determine a bank’s 
financial condition and reduce losses to the deposit insurance funds.292 There seems to 
be a conflict between preventing regulatory forbearance and providing banking regulators 
with discretion, especially when PCA regulators’ discretions are necessary in the contexts 
of triggering events and corrective measures in dealing with troubled banks, respectively. 
 
2. Assessment of PCA in the GFC  
 
In terms of PCA performance in the GFS, the efficiency and effectiveness of PCA 
were first tested under real-world conditions after its establishment in the 1991 FDICIA in 
response to the Savings and Loans Crisis in the 1980s. Unfortunately, during the GFS, 
PCA did not perform as designed. This means that improvements to PCA are needed to 
achieve the goal of enabling banking regulators to apply timely corrective measures to 
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troubled banks and reduce potential losses to the FDIC. This subsection discusses the 
outcomes of PCA in the GFS and analyses reasons that contributed to the 
underperformance of PCA during the crisis. 
 
a. PCA Performance in the GFS 
 
The implementation of PCA offered certain advantages in terms of dealing with 
troubled banks. For example, bank failures were greatly reduced in the 1990s after the 
establishment of PCA. Because of the PCA initiative, the FDIC received the authority and 
resources to deal with and manage failed banks during the 2007 GFS more effectively as 
compared with in previous crises, wherein no banking regulatory authorities had the legal 
authority and resources to intervene. However, PCA is not the only factor that led to the 
falling number of failed banks and the growth of deposit funds in the 1990s.293 The 
economic growth of the US in the 1990s was also a convincing factor that may have had 
an impact here.294 This is means that the actual outcome of PCA performance may not 
be as effective as was designed for. Additionally, though PCA has been implemented to 
manage troubled banks at early stages, the costs of resolving failing banks are higher 
than the expected outcomes on the basis of the designed implementation of PCA.295 
Losses derived from bank failures to FDIC funds remain enormous, even though, in the 
GFS, banks were subject to increased capital requirements. The following comparisons 
from the perspective of statistics show the losses of the FDIC. In terms of capital ratios 
on the basis of a failed bank’s book value, in the previous Savings and Loans Crisis, a 
failed bank had a capital ratio of around −1.5% with large losses to the FDIC, while, during 
the GFS, a failed bank had a capital ratio of around 1.5%.296 Bank capital ratios have 
increased under PCA while losses of failed banks to the FDIC have grown at the same 
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time; thus, currently, an estimated extra 3% equity capital of a failed bank may not be 
sufficient to absorb its losses.297  
 
b. Contributing Factors of PCA Underperformance during the GFS 
 
Several factors are related to PCA underperformance in the GFS, including the 
delay of PCA triggering events in identifying troubled banks, regulatory forbearance in 
relation to PCA regulators, and the economic downturn in the GFS. 
The most important factor that is related to the underperformance of PCA during 
the GFS is using capital ratio as the main triggering event to identify troubled banks. The 
main problem of using capital ratios as triggering events is the lagging nature of capital 
as an indicator of bank financial condition and risk levels.298 The lagging nature of capital 
ratios means that, before capital ratios as triggering events identify a bank as being 
troubled, in accordance with PCA capital standards, the bank has already been in the 
state of financial hardship and high risk for some period of time.299 This lagging feature 
causes a delay in identifying the accurate financial condition of a bank by using PCA 
capital ratios as triggering events, thereby failing to provide banking regulators with timely 
and accurate information concerning the financial performance and risk levels of troubled 
banks. In some cases, using capital ratios as triggering events for PCA may not be 
enough to detect problems with a bank’s financial condition early enough.300 This means 
that additional triggering events that are able to detect problems with the financial 
condition of a troubled bank in a timelier way may be necessary to complement the 
application of capital ratios.  
During the first decade of the implementation of PCA, capital ratios appear to be 
too low to be effective. In the context of the GFS, on the basis of this disadvantage, with 
the benefits of hindsight, a comprehensive understanding and further clarifications identify 
weaknesses of PCA capital ratios in the form of triggering events as being insufficient, 
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indirect, and implicit.301 These features are likely to cause unnecessary investigations for 
some banks under PCA or cause a lack of investigations for other banks that are faced 
with potential financial condition problems under PCA. 302  Therefore, the accuracy of 
capital ratios as triggering events is in doubt under current PCA protocols. To summarise, 
the timeliness and accuracy of capital ratios as triggering events of PCA are two problems 
that contribute to the underperformance of PCA to identify troubled banks. 
Another factor that contributes to the underperformance of PCA is PCA regulators’ 
inconsistency in applying corrective measures to individual troubled banks. According to 
a Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report, when the financial condition of a bank 
starts to deteriorate, some of these troubled banks are on the receiving end of 
enforcement actions to correct their management weaknesses or reduce risk-taking 
behaviours prior to entering into the PCA process, while other troubled banks are not.303 
The inconsistency in applying timely regulatory measures exists not only in pre-PCA 
enforcement actions but also in PCA corrective measures. Based on the GAO report, 
about 8% of failed banks that were reviewed by said report did not go through the PCA 
process. 304  These banks should have gone through different PCA categories and 
experienced an increased level of regulatory intervention by corrective measures in 
accordance with the PCA mechanism before being regarded as failed banks. The report 
also found that, prior reaching insolvency, failed banks were placed in the PCA process 
when they were in different capital categories based on the total 270 banks in the 
review.305 This means that corrective measures that are applied to troubled banks of a 
particular category can be less strict and sufficient to increase the level of intervention 
due to the need to address a wider range of scenarios, and this happened within several 
categories of troubled banks. 
Finally, a sharp economic downturn in the GFS is a factor that contributed to a 
faster deterioration of bank financial performance where PCA was designed to detect and 
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react, including in situations of sudden and severe liquidity problems and depletion.306 
Even though these troubled banks had been put under PCA, the outcomes of applications 
of corrective PCA measures were not satisfying. During the period from 2006 to 2010, 
most banks (295/569 reviewed by the GAO study) that went through the PCA process 
were identified and categorised as undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised, or 
critically undercapitalised banks.307 The financial conditions and performance of these 
banks were not improved and many of these banks failed eventually.308 In terms of the 
remaining banks that did not fail after the PCA process, their financial conditions and 
performance did not improve significantly and most remained in the undercapitalised 
categories, which made it harder for these banks to recover.309 This means that PCA is 
unlikely to function effectively in the context of an economic downturn with a larger 
number of bank failures happening simultaneously.  
In the GFS, the lagging nature and inaccuracy of capital ratios as triggering events, 
the inconsistency of corrective measures applied by PCA regulators to each individual 
troubled bank, and the context of an economic downturn are relevant to the 
underperformance of PCA in identifying and correcting problems shown by troubled 
banks. On the basis of the identified advantages and disadvantages of PCA in the first 
decade of its implementation and the actual testing of PCA during the 2007 GFS, the 
current PCA mechanism may require further modifications to become effective. 
 
3. PCA and Regulatory Improvements in the Dodd–Frank Act 
 
After the GFS, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(the Dodd–Frank Act) was introduced in 2010 to correct shortcomings and weaknesses 
in the US financial regulatory framework, including imposing higher capital and liquidity 
requirements for systemically important banks and nonbank financial institutions.310 As 
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part of the Dodd–Frank Act, the US Congress established the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to control and monitor risks in the financial system and required the 
FSOC to report implementations of PCA by banking regulators in relation to suggestions 
proposed in the GAO research.  
In its report on PCA, the FSOC identified one of the suggestions from the GAO 
report to develop additional ways to initiate PCA instead of depending on capital ratios as 
the only set of triggering events so as to improve the effectiveness of PCA and reduce 
delays in regulatory intervention.311 One of these additional ways suggested that, in the 
post crisis phase, with increased capital requirements in place, banks should be assessed 
in accordance with the PCA mechanism well ahead of time before new ways of initiating 
PCA are established and incorporated into the PCA mechanism.312 This was suggested 
because current PCA triggering events have been established on the basis of capital 
ratios of a bank and are a lagging indicator for reflecting changes in the financial condition 
of the bank. 
In addition to developing new triggering events for PCA, a comprehensive 
identification and assessment of bank risks by banking regulators may contribute to 
greater effectiveness of PCA. 313  According to the GAO report, in relation to the 
management practice of banks, the current CAMELs314 rating can assess and reflect risks 
of banks in a short-term period, while future risks of banks cannot be assessed accurately 
based on the CAMELs rating. 315  Therefore a forward-looking approach toward risk 
assessment has been suggested by the GAO report. Currently, based on the current 
CAMELs rating, the quality of management, as a component that influences bank 
performance as well as safe and sound operation, is assessed on the basis of capital and 
earning of banks. Even if the management of a bank has been noted to be risky according 
to other measures, CAMELs will rate the management of the particular bank as good in 
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terms of quality based on the existence of sufficient capital and earning of the bank.316 As 
a result, potential problems in management are unlikely to be detected, thereby leading 
to future problems based on the current CAMELs rating. Identifying potential problems 
and future risks of a bank may enable banking regulators to react to and deal with growing 
problems in advance. 
 
II. Structured Early Intervention for Banks in the United Kingdom 
 
The proactive intervention framework (PIF) is the UK version of structured early 
intervention for banks. Unlike PCA in the US, the PIF is an early intervention mechanism 
introduced to the UK regulatory framework after the 2007 GFS and the reform of UK 
banking regulations. Based on the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), as the UK prudential banking regulator, has the 
authority to take corrective measures to troubled banks when the banks fail to or is likely 
to fail to meet a series of requirements.317 PIF is the early intervention mechanism for the 
PRA to identify and react to emerging and future risks of banks at early stages.318 This 
section discusses the PIF from the perspectives of its related regulator, triggering events, 
and corrective measures to provide an overview of how it performs in identifying and 
managing risks of troubled banks. Then, this section assesses the PIF to explore the 
advantages and disadvantages of its mechanism. 
 
A. The PIF Regulator 
 
Before discussing the PIF regulator, providing a general overview of the UK 
banking regulatory framework can help to lay the foundation. The current UK banking 
regulatory framework is a result of changes in the Financial Services Act of 2012.319 
Under the current framework, the PRA, as an affiliation of the Bank of England, is the 
prudential banking regulator at a micro-level for systemically important institutions.320 
These systemically important institutions include banks, building societies, credit unions, 
 
316 ibid. 
317 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014, Article 27 (1) 
318 The  Prudential Regulation Authority (n 2) 
319 The Financial Services Act 2012 
320 The Prudential Regulation Authority (n 2)  
79 
insurers, and certain systemically important investment firms that have been designated 
by the PRA.321  The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), as an independent body, is 
responsible for regulating the conduct of the business of institutions and ensuring that the 
market functions well in order to protect consumers and financial markets and to promote 
competition. 322  The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee is the macro-
prudential regulator in the UK banking sector and is responsible for monitoring and taking 
relevant measures to reduce systemic risks.323 At the micro-level, from a perspective of 
a bank, the bank is dual-supervised and regulated by the PRA and the FCA for prudential 
and conduct purposes, respectively. 
For the micro-prudential regulation of banks, the PRA is the responsible regulator. 
The PRA has two primary objectives: promoting the safety and soundness of its regulated 
firms324 and regulating insurance firms to protect potential customers.325 Further, the PRA 
has a secondary objective of facilitating market competition in a ‘reasonably possible’ way 
for the services provided by its regulated firms.326 In order to fulfil its objectives, the PRA 
is entitled to ‘make rules, to prepare and issue codes, and to determine general policy 
and principles for performing particular functions’.327 Specifically, the PRA’s approaches 
to achieving its objectives are developed on the basis of forward-looking, judgement-
based, and risk-focused approaches in prudential banking regulations. Concerning the 
forward-looking feature of the PRA’s approaches, the PRA focuses on dealing with both 
current and future risks of banks.328 Regarding the judgement-based feature, the PRA 
applies its judgement on bank risks that individual banks are faced with in their business 
operations, and these judgements are made on the basis of evidence and analysis 
gathered from daily regulations.329 Third, regarding focusing on risks, the PRA constantly 
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monitors issues and banks that may pose great risks to the UK financial system and 
increases the intensity and frequency of supervision to deal with these risks where 
warranted.330 
On the basis of the PRA’s approaches to banking regulations, specifically in 
accordance with the PRA risk framework, the PRA has a structured mechanism 
constructed with four layers to assess bank risks. The first layer assesses the gross risk 
of a bank, including potential impact, external context, and business risk.331 The potential 
impact refers to the importance of a bank in the UK financial stability scheme and its 
possible adverse effects on the financial stability when the bank operates its business, is 
in a stressful situation, or fails.332 The external context refers to the environment that the 
bank is operating in, which necessitates considerations of system-wide risks.333 Finally, 
business risk refers to evaluations of bank business models in relation to bank viability 
and potential impacts on the financial system.334 In the second layer, in relation to bank 
operation, the PRA evaluates the following two aspects of a bank: (1) management and 
governance and (2) risk management and controls.335 In the third layer, in relation to the 
bank’s financial condition, the PRA considers bank capital and liquidity.336 Finally, the 
PRA evaluates the resolvability of a bank.337 
With a similar approach to assessing a bank’s proximity to failure, the PRA, on the 
basis of the PIF, forms a judgement about a bank’s likelihood to reach failure and 
identifies potential risks at early stages. When approaching the PIF, the PRA assesses 
bank risks by using the same mechanism, with exclusions made for considerations about 
a bank’s potential impact and resolvability.338 
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B. PIF Triggering Events and Corrective Measures 
 
The PIF has two objectives. One objective is to recognise and identify risks that 
may have a threat to a bank’s viability so that the PRA can take actions to avoid or reduce 
the possibility of a disorderly bank failure, while another objective of the PIF is to 
cooperate with other banking regulators to take actions to address a failing bank and 
reduce the impact of the bank failure.339  
The PIF has five stages and each stage is characterised by a different proximity to 
bank failure.340 Based on the PRA’s assessment on banks’ external context, business risk, 
management and governance, risk management and controls, capital, and liquidity, the 
PRA assesses these aspects based on relevant rules341 and then forms a judgement on 
a bank’s viability or proximity to failure.342 For example, when the PRA assess a bank’s 
regulatory capital, the PRA considers both Basel and EU risk-weighted capital 
requirements and forms a judgement on the bank’s capital status based on these capital 
requirements.343 This means that each bank will be categorised into one specific stage 
depending upon the PRA’s judgements and assessment on the abovementioned aspects. 
In addition to the PRA’s judgement on a bank’s proximity to failure as a triggering event, 
because of BRRD, the following two conditions are also triggering events of early 
intervention: ‘material changes or anomalies identified in the monitoring of key financial 
and nonfinancial indicators under Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 344 
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revealing that the conditions for early intervention are met’345 and ‘significant events 
indicating that the conditions for early intervention are met’.346 
In terms of corrective measures under PIF, based on the PRA’s judgement on bank, 
the level of intervention represented by these corrective measures varies in different 
stages. Stage one of the PIF represents a status of a bank where the bank is unlikely to 
have problems with its financial condition and there is a low level of risk to its viability.347 
No additional restrictions on any aspects of a bank’s business would be imposed at stage 
one of the PIF and the PRA would simply conduct normal banking regulation and risk 
assessments for these banks.348 Stage two of the PIF refers to the condition of a bank 
wherein the bank has vulnerabilities and deficiencies in its financial condition related to 
its risk management and governance protocols.349 Corrective measures at this stage 
include recovery measures and resolution measures. Specifically, in relation to recovery 
measures, the PRA will increase the level of supervision, with more requirements 
imposed on the bank such as additional reporting requirements, and enforce updating 
and activating of the recovery plan of the bank.350 Stage three of the PIF represents the 
condition of a bank where it is faced with material threats to its viability, safety, and 
soundness. 351  Corrective measures at this stage include recovery measures and 
resolution measures and the level of intensity of these measures increases on the basis 
of stage two corrective measures. For example, the PRA may change the management 
or board of the bank, place restrictions on the distribution of capital, or limit bank activities 
at this stage.352 Stage four of PIF refers to the condition of a bank where the bank is faced 
with a real risk of failure though, at this stage, corrective measures, including recovery 
and resolution measures, may still be able to work.353 For example, the PRA may impose 
recovery measures in relation to improving capital and liquidity and, in relation to 
resolution measures, may work with banking resolution authorities at stage four to collect 
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more information of a bank and work on possible resolution plans in the future for the 
bank.354 Stage five of the PIF denotes a scenario when the bank is no longer viable and 
the problems and risks of the bank are unlikely to be rectified.355 Resolution measures 
would be enacted for banks at stage five of the PIF. 
Most of the firms regulated by the PRA, including banks, are categorised in stages 
one and two. According to the PRA’s statistics, about 86% of firms regulated by the PRA 
are regarded to have a low or moderate level of risk to viabilities of firms, and firms in 
stages three to five consisted of 14% of all firms in 2014.356 The first two stages of PIF 
are more open to solution through recognising risks and enabling regulators to take timely 
actions. At early stages, these risks are included or are likely to be included in banks’ 
business, yet banks themselves may not be able to recognise or see these risks because 
of their management and governance system.357 Therefore, corrective actions on the part 
of the regulators may contribute to ruling out these risks at early stages. 
PIF Stage Triggering Events Corrective Measures 
Stage 1 
Supervisory judgements on a 
bank’s external context, 
business risk, management 
and governance, risk 
management and controls, 
capital and liquidity358 
Normal risk assessments; 
no additional requirements 
Stage 2 
Recovery measures and 
resolution measures 
Stage 3 
Recovery measures and 
resolution measures 
Stage 4 
Recovery measures and 
resolution measures 
Stage 5 Resolution measures 
 
Table 4 Proactive Intervention Framework 
C. PIF as the Current UK Structured Early Intervention 
 
This subsection evaluates PIF as the current UK structured early intervention by 
exploring its advantages and potential problems. Both advantages and disadvantages of 
PIF in the UK are related to the PRA’s approach in banking regulation, which relies on 
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the PRA’s judgement of bank risks to the financial system. As compared with the capital 
triggers of PCA in the US, the PRA’s judgement could provide a more comprehensive 
assessment of the financial conditions of a bank and more accurate information in relation 
to bank risk levels. On the other hand, a potential disadvantage in relation to the PIF is 
that the judgement of the PRA as a trigger could cause delays in initiating the PIF, which 
correlates with regulatory forbearance. Another potential disadvantage of the PIF in the 
UK is a lack of structured measures available to deal with troubled banks at the different 
stages. 
 
1. Advantages of PIF as a Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
In terms of PIF in the UK, triggering events of PIF can be an advantage because 
these events provide a comprehensive assessment and analysis of the financial 
conditions and risk levels of banks. Based on the judgement of the PRA, PIF triggering 
events consider multiple factors that are relevant to the financial conditions and risk levels 
of banks as deemed by the PIF regulator before the initiation of the following PIF 
corrective measures. In the case of the PIF, judgement-based triggering events share 
many similarities with supervisory judgements for normal banking regulations. Even 
though PIF judgement-based triggering events cover less aspects of banking operations 
than do supervisory judgements for normal banking regulations, PIF judgement-based 
triggering events still cover a broader range of aspects in comparison with US triggering 
events, which consider only the capital adequacy of banks. Because of a relatively 
comprehensive assessment of bank business procedures and operations, the PRA is 
more likely to detect potential problems of banks by taking advantage of signals from 
several factors instead of relying on only capital-based triggering events, thereby avoiding 
the lagging nature of capital ratios as triggering events. In a general context, when 
triggering events of structured early intervention for banks share similarities to supervisory 
judgements for normal banking regulations, a majority of aspects that are considered in 
the normal banking regulation could be assessed and rated separately on a scale from 
the worst to the best for the purpose of forming a judgment for triggering early intervention. 
On the basis of the assessment and considerations of each aspect for early intervention, 
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the responsible regulator should assign each bank a final score that determines the 
bank’s status.359  
 
2. Disadvantages of PIF as a Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
In relation to potential disadvantages of PIF, the following two problems are 
relevant to the actual implementation of early intervention: (1) the correlation between 
judgement-based triggering events and regulatory forbearance and (2) a lack of 
structured corrective measures. 
First, because of the judgement element in PIF triggering events, the PRA has 
discretion in relation to determining bank performance in accordance with the following 
aspects: external context, business risk, management and governance, risk management 
and controls, capital, and liquidity. 360  The discretion may contribute to regulatory 
forbearance in assessing and initiating early intervention for banks. Because of its ability 
to pursue discretion and judgement, the PRA has more flexibility compared with US 
capital ratios in choosing supervisory actions, and this increases the possibility of 
regulatory forbearance in cases where the PRA should have taken stricter and more 
intrusive corrective measures. In greater detail, the judgement-based regulatory 
approach provides the PRA with flexibility to tailor specific responses and corrective 
actions for banks with different proximities to failure. This means that the PRA has the 
power to take respective appropriate supervisory corrective actions to fit the specific 
conditions of an individual bank, especially when banks may have different problems and 
weaknesses in their operations. On the other hand, the discretion of the PRA can be a 
reason that contributes to regulatory forbearance in dealing with troubled banks in 
practice. In the case of dealing with a troubled bank, banking regulators are more likely 
to be reluctant to initiate intrusive measures because the banking regulators tend to find 
excuses for the poor performance on the basis of their agency.361 In addition, supervisory 
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forbearance can be an universal problem for any type of regulatory framework or 
structured early intervention, as this problem tends to be apparent with hindsight. 
Second, another potential disadvantage of the PIF is related to the supervisory 
measures and actions taken by the PRA. Corrective actions of the PIF tend to start with 
informal corrective measures such as moral suasion. 362  This is a way to convince 
managers and directors to work to correct the weaknesses and problems of a bank. 
However, these informal corrective measures may have limited functions and effects in 
relation to correcting the problems and weaknesses of troubled banks as compared with 
more intrusive corrective measures. Additionally, the PIF corrective measures are 
normally not disclosed to the public.363 This means that only a particular bank and the 
PRA have knowledge of specific corrective measures being taken, thereby causing a lack 
of transparency regarding enforcing these corrective measures.  
 
III. Structured Early Intervention for Chinese Banks 
 
Structured early intervention for US and UK banks provide two different 
arrangements: formal and regularly structured early intervention for banks. The US’ PCA 
technique is a formal structured early intervention approach for banks and provides 
specific triggers and respective corrective measures to deal with troubled banks at early 
stages.364 In comparison, the UK’s PIF is a regularly structured early intervention for 
banks and provides the UK banking regulator with the chance to apply their regular 
supervisory power to deal with troubled banks at early stages based on judgement.365 
The structured early intervention for US and UK banks both represent explicit frameworks, 
no matter what types of structured early intervention frameworks have been adopted—
that is, whether formal or regular. 
Unlike the US and UK comprehensive legal frameworks in relation to banking 
regulations, the Chinese regulatory framework for banking regulations, including 
structured early intervention for banks, is in need of more development. Since the Reform 
and Opening Up Policy was introduced, there has been a relatively short timeline and 
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development phase of Chinese banking regulations, thereby explaining why structured 
early intervention for Chinese banks are still at a beginning stage. Considering current 
Chinese legislation on banking regulations, there has not yet been an explicit regulatory 
framework enacted that enables banking regulators to intervene in bank operations when 
bank financial conditions deteriorate. However, rules in the current legislation share the 
feature of a progressive level of intervention. The intensity of intervention for troubled 
banks is initiated by a combination of capital ratios and supervisory assessment triggering 
events. 
This section is structured as follows. The first section examines the history and 
current structure of Chinese banking regulations as a background, then explores 
structured early intervention for banks implicit in the current legislation from the 
perspective of triggering events and corrective measures. Finally, this section discusses 
problems related with the current arrangements of structured early intervention for 
Chinese banks. 
 
A. Chinese Banking Regulation 
 
The Chinese banking and financial system has gone through many changes. A 
brief history of the development and changes of Chinese financial and banking 
regulations provides a background and context of the Chinese financial sector. This lays 
the foundation for further discussion about structured early intervention for Chinese banks 
and explains some differences in Chinese banking regulations. This subsection first 
briefly explores the history of the Chinese financial regulation from the establishment of 
China. Then, this subsection discusses the current regulatory structure for banking 
regulations established after the latest institutional reform in 2018. 
 
1. The History of Chinese Banking Regulations 
 
China has gone through a transformation from a planned economy to a more open 
and market-based economy since the Reform and Opening Up Policy in 1978. 366 
Because of the historical existence of a planned economy, one distinct feature of the 
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Chinese financial system in comparison with the US and UK financial systems is the 
degree of control and intervention seen from the government and the state.367 In the 
planned economy, the state was in control of every aspect of bank business and operation, 
including sizes and recipients of bank loans, and this means that there was no concept 
of financing between banks and corporate entities or banks and individuals.368 Because 
of this, there was no need to establish any legal frameworks for banking regulations given 
that the state made decisions on behalf of banks. This was the starting point of Chinese 
banking regulations. 
In the beginning stages, right after the Reform and Opening Up Policy, the Chinese 
financial system was gradually established with weak banking regulations wherein the 
Central Bank of China played a dominant role in the Chinese banking sector from 1979 
to 1984.369 The Chinese banking regulations at early stages caused many problems, 
including nonperforming loans, systemic risks, and inflation in the Chinese financial 
system.370 Following this stage with weak and loose regulations of the financial sector, 
the regulations of the financial sector became stricter from 1984 onward.371 Specifically, 
the following restrictions were imposed on banks in order to tighten the financial 
regulations: controlling entry to the market, limiting different types of businesses or 
professionals to enter the financial market by the way of strict administrative approvals, 
and controlling the deposit interest rate and loan interest rate.372 Laws and regulations 
related to the financial and banking regulations were formulated and came into effect. 
These included fundamental rules about institutional structures and regulations of the 
financial sector to replace the state or the government’s policies as the main approach to 
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financial regulation.373 On the basis of the established rules and institutional structures, 
the legal framework provided an initial design and arrangements of the Chinese financial 
regulations. 
Joining the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s led to agreements to 
impose standards, including enabling foreign market participants to enter the Chinese 
financial market and requiring China to adopt international standards and rules for the 
Chinese financial sector. This further opened up the Chinese financial market. In 
response to this, the legal regulatory framework in relation to the Chinese financial sector 
continued to develop further with the establishment of the idea of ‘one bank and three 
commissions’ in 2003. One bank referred to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which 
was responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policies and supervising 
financial risks to maintain the stability of the financial sector. Meanwhile, the three 
commissions were the China Banking Regulatory Commissions (CBRC), the China 
Securities Regulatory Commissions (CSRC), and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC), which were responsible for the regulation of the banking, securities, 
and insurance sectors, respectively, in the financial market. The main responsibilities of 
these three commissions were to ensure the stability and compliance of specific financial 
institutions in each of these sectors from the perspective of micro-prudential 
regulations.374 In addition, the reform in the Chinese financial sector was deepened by 
revising and reorganizing existing laws and regulations in relation to the financial 
regulations to deal with inconsistencies and overlaps in power in the legislation.375  
 
2. Current Regulatory Framework of the Chinese Financial and Banking Sector 
 
From 2003 to 2018, the Chinese financial regulations were produced on the basis 
of the regulation of different types of financial institutions—specifically, banks, insurers, 
and securities firms—and financial regulators were appointed to the institutions on the 
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basis of the institutions (e.g., banking, insurance, and securities regulators).376 In April 
2018, according to the Plan for the Institutional Restructuring by the State Council, the 
CBRC and the CIRC formally combined and formed a new regulatory agency, the China 
Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC).377 The CBIRC became the 
regulator for banks and insurance institutions and is responsible for supervising these 
firms in the banking and insurance sectors. The PBOC has since been given additional 
responsibilities and functions in relation to formulating banking and insurance laws and 
regulations as well as continuing their prudential oversight of the banking and insurance 
sectors.378 The new regulatory structure has started to show the difference between 
prudential regulations and the regulation of business conduct of banks and insurance 
institutions from the responsibilities and authority that are given to the PBOC and CBIRC. 
This regulatory structure tends to share some similarities with the regulatory structure of 
the ‘twin peaks’ model, where the prudential regulation of the banking sector is separate 
from the regulation of the conduct and consumer protection of banks.379 
Once the institutional changes of the Chinese financial regulations were made, 
three main financial regulators came to exist, including the PBOC as the central bank, the 
CBIRC, and the CSRC. Because of the redistribution of regulatory authority and 
responsibilities, the PBOC as the central bank is not only responsible for monetary 
policies and regulation of the financial sector at a macro-level but also for prudential 
oversight of the banking and insurance sectors. The CBIRC focuses on supervising banks 
and insurance institutions, especially those with systemic importance, and managing the 
conduct of the banking and insurance sectors. The CSRC is responsible for the regulation 
of the securities sector. 
On the basis of the transformation of the Chinese economy from a planned 
economy to a market-based economy, the Chinese financial system has been established 
and gradually developed. In response to these changes, the regulation of the financial 
sector went through developments and changes from the weak regulation of firms to an 
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institutional model of financial regulation. Despite the recent changes in the regulatory 
structure, specific rules dealing with the supervision and regulation of banks have not 
been changed. With this background information about the Chinese financial and banking 
regulations, problems of structured early intervention for Chinese banks in the following 
subsections can be further explored. Because of the recent nature of the changes in 
regulatory structure, there has not been a detailed and comprehensive explanation given 
as to how these banking regulators conduct supervision and regulation. Discussions on 
the structured early intervention for Chinese banks are based on rules and mechanisms 
established under the regulatory structure of an institutional model, specifically the ‘one 
bank and three commissions’ framework in China. 
 
B. Implicit Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
In the context of Chinese banking regulations, without an established and explicit 
legal framework for structured early intervention for banks, the Chinese prudential 
banking regulator for banks manages troubled banks and increases the level of 
intervention and supervision in accordance with current rules. These rules include certain 
triggering events and corrective measures. In nature, these rules have similar functions 
as a well-established framework for structured early intervention for banks. Because of 
the current implicit arrangements of structured early intervention for banks in China, it is 
not necessary to determine the type of structured early intervention for Chinese banks 
with regard to whether they are formal or regular structured early intervention for banks. 
Triggering events and corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks 
share resemblances with regular structured early intervention for banks, where both 
triggering events and corrective measures are on the basis of and related to standards of 
normal banking regulations. 
In relation to triggering events of the structured early intervention for Chinese 
banks, these triggering events are a combination of both capital ratios as triggering events 
and supervisory assessment as triggering events, which to some extent causes overlaps 
in the initiation of regulatory corrective actions. This design is different from both the US 
and UK triggering events. The first set of triggering events is related to capital ratios. 
According to the Notice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Issues 
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Concerning Transitional Arrangements for the Implementation of the Administrative 
Measures for the Capital of Commercial Banks (for Trial Implementation), a departmental 
regulatory document, Chinese banks are categorised into four groups based on capital 
adequacy ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, and core tier 1 capital ratio.380 The CBIRC can evolve 
supervisory actions from informal actions to corrective actions when bank capital ratios 
fail to meet certain requirements. Another set of triggering events of the structured early 
intervention for Chinese banks is based on the Chinese prudential banking regulator’s full 
supervisory assessment. This set of triggering events refers to an assessment of the 
following seven aspects of a bank’s operation, including capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management and governance, earnings, liquidity risk, market risk, and information and 
technology risk, respectively.381 A composite rating is eventually assigned to individual 
banks and this is calculated on the basis of each individual rating for the seven aspects 
of bank operation.382 Each rating carries different weights to the final composite rating.383 
The assessment of bank operations and business is based on the CAMELs rating system, 
with adjustments made to better conform to Chinese situations. The level of intervention 
and supervisory actions depend upon the composite rating of the bank. In relation to the 
assessment of capital adequacy, capital carries the second largest weight to the 
composite rating of a bank. This reflects that dramatic declines in capital adequacy of 
banks have a direct impact on the overall rating of the bank. Additionally, this influences 
capital ratios and therefore causes a failure to meet certain capital requirements as well 
as an increased level of intervention by the first set of triggering events. 
In relation to corrective measures of structured early intervention for Chinese 
banks, these corrective measures include both informal actions and formal corrective 
actions. 384  These corrective measures represent different levels of intervention and 
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intensity of supervision on a range of aspects of bank business and operation.385 These 
corrective measures are reviewed by the Chinese prudential banking regulator annually 
in accordance with two sets of triggering events. For example, concerning rules and 
measures in the Banking Supervision Law,386 supervisory corrective measures range 
from informal corrective measures, such as suasion and talks, to formal corrective actions 
that have direct impacts on bank business and operation, management, and governance 
as well as bank capital distribution.387 These measures have been listed in a progressive 
way, ranging from less intrusive measures to more intrusive measures to reflect a growing 
level of supervisory intensity. These supervisory corrective measures provide general 
guidance as to how the prudential banking regulator should approach troubled banks. 
Additionally, in accordance with rules and measures in the Notice,388 corrective measures 
are less discretionary and these corrective measures are assigned with banks with 
different capital ratios. Concerning the first category of banks based on their capital ratios, 
corrective measures are informal and function as early warnings to bank management.389 
Concerning the second category of banks, the level of intervention increases and 
corrective measures focus on supervising the banks so as to resolve risks and problems 
by themselves with more frequent supervision and assessment.390 Corrective measures 
for the third category of banks concentrate on placing restrictions on all aspects of 
business and operations.391 For the last category of banks with the lowest capital ratios, 
the level of intervention and the intensity of supervision increase significantly, with more 
restrictions imposed on the banks, and these banks could even be dealt with by means 
of enforcing administrative closure.392  
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In terms of the current structured early intervention for banks in China, the 
mechanism is implicit in the legislation without an established framework that contains 
systematic triggering events and corrective measures. Current rules that enable a 
banking regulator to intervene in bank business and operation share the feature of a 
growing level of intervention with the US and UK systems of structured early intervention.  
Triggering events of the current structured early intervention for Chinese banks 
combine indicators of capital ratios and supervisory assessment. The prudential banking 
regulators have a range of corrective measures, including both informal and formal 
supervisory corrective measures, to use to manage and deal with troubled banks at early 
stages. However, the current arrangement of structured early intervention for Chinese 
banks is not the perfect one and has many problems, making further improvements 
necessary. 
 
C. Problems of Structured Early Intervention for Chinese Banks 
 
Based on an understanding of the current arrangements for structured early 
intervention for banks, though the current implicit arrangements have both triggering 
events and corrective measures in place, there are several disadvantages able to be 
observed regarding the current structured early intervention for Chinese banks. This 
subsection discusses these problems from the following two perspectives: (1) the 
perspective of the relationship between normal banking regulations and structured early 
intervention for Chinese banks and (2) the perspective of examining whether the 
preconditions of structured early intervention for banks have been met by the current 
arrangements.  
From the perspective of the relationship between normal banking regulations and 
the structured early intervention for Chinese banks, the main problem is a lack of a 
specific framework that systematically increases the level of supervision in response to 
different bank financial conditions. For example, in relation to the second set of triggering 
events on the basis of supervisory assessment, corrective measures are not structured 
to be a list of logical and progressive measures to use to deal with troubled banks with 
different financial conditions. The reason for this is a lack of specified rules as to what 
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corrective measures should be applied in the relevant regulation. 393  This regulation 
provides only the legal basis for triggering events on the basis of a supervisory 
assessment regarding how banks should be rated rather than both triggering events and 
corrective measures.394  
 From the perspective of preconditions of structured early intervention for banks, 
said preconditions refer to the following four factors: independence and accountability of 
regulatory agencies, accurate and timely financial information, adequate authority,  and 
adequate resolution procedures.395 In terms of independence and accountability of the 
regulatory agency as one of the preconditions for successful structured early intervention 
for banks, the first step necessary is one to determine which banking regulatory agency 
should be responsible for structured early intervention for banks in China. Before the 
recent changes in the banking regulatory structure, both the CBRC and the deposit 
insurance funds management agency were entitled to take corrective actions to troubled 
banks at early stages to deal with potential problems and risks of the banks.396 This 
arrangement caused overlaps in the power and authority spheres of the CBRC and the 
deposit insurance funds management agency in dealing with troubled banks and could 
be a factor that prompted an inconsistency in the application of rules and corrective 
actions by the two banking regulators. Even with the more recent changes in the 
regulatory structure, the overlap of authority and power spheres still exist. Concerning the 
current Chinese situation, the primary problem being considered is which banking 
regulatory agency should be responsible for managing structured early intervention for 
banks. Subsequently, once this is determined, attention should be focused to improve 
independence and accountability. 
In terms of having timely and accurate information reflecting bank financial 
conditions and risk levels as another precondition of structured early intervention for 
Chinese banks, the combined triggering events can provide signals of bank financial 
conditions. However, this may not be an effective way to gather this data, and the reasons 
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for this statement are twofold. One reason is that supervisory assessment is conducted 
on a yearly basis. This means that signals of bank financial conditions are provided in this 
manner only once a year and so this may not be a timely reflection of bank performance. 
In addition, in the arrangement of current structured early intervention for Chinese banks, 
capital ratios as triggering events have an important role in determining bank financial 
conditions. However, capital ratios as triggering events tend to be lagging indicators of 
bank financial conditions; this is further discussed in the following chapter. Because of 
the lagging nature of capital ratios as triggering events and the importance of capital ratios 
in the structured early intervention for Chinese banks, the consideration of triggering 
events of the structured early intervention for Chinese banks may not be as effective given 
the way they are currently structured now.  
In terms of the adequate authority of banking regulators to conduct structured early 
intervention for banks, ‘adequate authority’ here refers to the banking regulators being 
able to deal with the problems and weaknesses of financially-distressed banks.397 The 
problem with the current set of corrective measures is there is a lack of early preparation 
plans and early arrangements with bank resolution authorities. Both the US’ and UK’s 
corrective measures of structured early intervention require banks to prepare plans for 
potential resolution arrangements. Additionally, banking regulators of structured early 
intervention for banks in the US and the UK cooperate with bank resolution authorities at 
early stages well before the banks fail to meet triggering events. Corrective measures of 
structured early intervention for Chinese banks include most of the corrective measures 
that are necessary for the increased intensity of supervision but lack preparations and the 
making of arrangements with resolution authorities at early stages. 
Finally, in terms of the last precondition of structured early intervention, a complete 
bank resolution regimen contributes greatly to successful structured early intervention as 
a backup plan to maintain the stability of a financial system even if a bank fails.398 Both in 
the US and the UK, an administrative-based way to deal with failed banks either via 
receiverships or a special resolution regimen for banks can to some extent guarantee the 
stability of their financial systems when resolving failed banks. However, in China, based 
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on the current legislation, the bankruptcy of banks is dealt with through the judicial 
process.399  In addition, current administrative measures to close a bank before the 
initiation of the judicial process lack specific and practical rules that can be applied in 
actual cases. There have not been formal arrangements of a special bank resolution 
regimen or receiverships of banks in the legal framework of the Chinese banking sector 
to date, which could be contributing to the ineffective operations of structured early 
intervention for banks. 
Problems of the structured early intervention for Chinese banks are related to the 
current structure and design of such. In order to make the structured early intervention 
for banks in China into a more effective system, the design and structure should be 
comprehensive or at least meet the preconditions of successful structured early 
intervention for banks wherein a clear relationship between structured early intervention 
for banks and normal banking regulations, eligible and suitable regulators, timely and 
accurate indicators, and adequate authorities as well as a complete bank resolution 
regimen need to be in place.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides overviews of structured early intervention for banks in the 
US, the UK, and China and discusses triggering events, corrective measures, and 
banking regulators for structured early intervention for banks in these three countries. 
Structured early intervention for US banks have the longest history and were tested by 
the 2007 GFS. The timeliness of capital ratios as triggering events and the discretion of 
banking regulators in applying corrective measures were identified as two main 
disadvantages of US’ PCA from an academic perspective in the first decade of the 
establishment of PCA and from the examination of the 2007 GFS. Structured early 
intervention for UK banks were established after changes in banking regulatory structures 
were made after the 2007 GFS. The UK’s PIF consists of supervisory assessments as 
triggering events and corrective measures. Similarly, judgement-based supervisory 
assessments are closely related to discretion and could cause regulatory forbearance in 
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the PIF. Additionally, a lack of structured and specific corrective measures in comparison 
with the PCA corrective measures may also be a problem seen with the PIF. 
Structured early intervention for Chinese banks are different from structured early 
intervention for either US or UK banks. In relation to the four preconditions of structured 
early intervention for banks, the current structured early intervention for Chinese banks 
require further development across all four aspects for a more successful implementation. 
Because of a tradition of intervention by the state in the Chinese banking sector and the 
occurrence of a relatively recent reform of the financial system in the 1970s, the regulatory 
structure and design of the Chinese financial and banking sectors are less sophisticated 
and complete as compared with the US and UK banking regulator structures. Chinese 
banks not only have a significant impact on the Chinese banking sector but also are 
significant to the stability of the global financial system, which suggests the necessity for 
establishing appropriate regulatory structures including structured early intervention for 
banks to deal with risks of Chinese banks at early stages. 
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Chapter 3 Comparisons of US, UK and Chinese Triggering Events of Structured 
Early Intervention for Banks  
 
With the concept of structured early intervention for banks, elements of this legal 
framework for dealing with troubled banks come next. The two main elements of 
structured early intervention for banks are triggering events and corrective measures. On 
the basis of timely and accurate triggering events and effective corrective measures, 
structured early intervention for banks is the most useful and meaningful. This chapter 
focuses on the first element: triggering events of structured early intervention for banks. 
Triggering events of structured early intervention for banks are indicators of the 
banks’ financial condition. This means that triggering events provide signals of financial 
conditions of banks, which allows banking regulators to react and take the necessary 
corrective measures. The most important functions of triggering events are timeliness and 
accuracy, because triggering events categorise banks into different groups and determine 
the level of intervention with corrective measures. These two functions require the 
capability to identify and detect changes in banks’ financial conditions and performance. 
Well-functioning triggering events are preconditions for banking regulators to respond to 
risks and problems of banks at early stages, thereby reducing the impact of distressed 
banks and potential bank failures. 
In the context of triggering events, the core of this element is the mechanism for 
detecting the financial condition of banks. More specifically, it is the mechanism that 
detects deterioration of banks’ financial conditions. A mechanism can be designed on the 
basis of capital ratios which depend solely on the financial conditions of a bank. It can be 
designed on the basis of supervisory assessment which depends on supervisors’ 
judgement of operation and the financial condition of the bank. The mechanism can also 
be designed as a mixture of both. The mechanism underlying triggering events varies 
from country to country, depending on each country’s choices and preferences. US, UK 
and Chinese triggering events have different mechanisms for detecting banks’ financial 
conditions. The United States adopts capital ratios as its method to find deterioration of 
the financial condition of a bank at an early stage. The United Kingdom adopts 
supervisory assessment. China combines these two methods. Each mechanism of 
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triggering events has advantages and disadvantages in detecting potential problems of 
banks in certain ways. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first three sections discuss US, UK, and 
Chinese triggering events of structured early intervention for banks respectively. These 
sections reveal considerations on mechanisms of structured early intervention for banks 
and assess effectiveness of triggering events in the US, the UK and China. The final 
section identifies similarities and main differences between mechanisms of triggering 
events in the three countries. These differences provide perspectives to consider what 
factor makes triggering events effective. 
 
I. Mechanism of US Triggering Events – Capital Ratios 
 
Capital ratios as triggering events means the ratios that are the determining factors 
in initiating structured early intervention for banks. If capital ratios of banks fall below 
certain thresholds, procedures for following corrective measures by bank supervisors are 
triggered. US triggering events are based on capital ratios of banks under Prompt 
Corrective Action (PCA). Capital ratios determine the categorisation of the banks, banks 
from ‘well capitalised’400 to ‘critically undercapitalised’401 at early stages and the level of 
intervention by following corrective measures. In essence, capital ratios reflect the level 
of capital adequacy of banks.  
This section first explores why capital adequacy, as is shown by capital ratios, can 
detect changes in banks’ financial conditions. Then this section discusses advantages 
and disadvantages of capital ratios as triggering events in terms of US structured early 
intervention. The final part of this section discusses a potential way to improve the 
effectiveness of capital ratios as triggering events of US structured early intervention for 
banks. 
 
A. Considerations of Capital Adequacy in Triggering Events 
 
Capital adequacy can be an indicator to detect deterioration of bank financial 
conditions, categorise banks, and trigger relevant corrective measures. Normally capital 
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ratios are calculated to show the level of a bank’s capital adequacy. Why can capital 
adequacy be an indicator of bank financial condition? A sufficient level of capital has the 
following roles and functions to maintain the operation of a bank:  
First, the adequate capital of a bank acts as a buffer to absorb risks and reduce 
unexpected losses; therefore, imposing requirements of capital adequacy on the banks 
is likely to reduce possibilities of their failures or crises.402 Imposing a higher capital 
requirement is the most direct way to improve capital adequacy and reduce debts of 
banks to maintain solvency of the banks.403 Bank capital refers to banks’ funds, including 
ordinary shares and retained earnings of the banks, and does not need to be repaid, 
which is different from borrowed assets such as deposits.404 Bank capital has a key 
function to keep the banks as a ‘going concern’ and it protects the banks from being 
insolvent, as the banks would suffer a loss in their capital when they cannot repay their 
debts rather than being balance sheet insolvent without sufficient capital in such cases405. 
Bank capital can also function to absorb risks and reduce losses in economic downturns 
when values of the banks’ assets decline as a bank with less capital is more likely to 
encounter situations of balance sheet insolvency than a bank with more capital to absorb 
losses.406  
Another role and function of capital regulation (requirements of banks to maintain 
a certain level of capital adequacy) is related to the perspective of the government’s 
involvement in the banking sector of a country, especially from the perspective of the role 
of the government as lender of the last resort and an explicit deposit insurance scheme. 
Capital regulation is likely to reduce the losses of the government as a lender of the last 
resort and it is likely to reduce the losses of the deposit insurance scheme in banks’ 
financial distress or even bank failures.407 As the lender of the last resort, the government 
has incentives to prevent banks from failing as the government could be a main creditor 
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of banks.408 In other words, the government has interests in reducing the costs of bank 
failures and preventing banks from taking too many risks, especially in the case of Too-
Big-To-Fail (TBTF). Unlike non-bank firms where creditors have incentives to monitor 
risks taken by the firms to ensure their investment, depositors of banks have fewer 
incentives to do so as they have been insured by the deposit insurance scheme explicitly 
or implicitly because of the role of banks in the payment system and in daily life.409 Both 
the government role as lender of the last resort and as an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme encourage banks to take more risks in return for higher yields; therefore they 
increase the government’s credit exposure to bank failures. This requires banks to 
maintain certain levels of capital as a way to compensate for the government’s credit 
exposure to the moral hazards created by the government’s financial safety net. 
Moreover, maintaining capital adequacy provides a way to reduce the likelihood of 
bank failures and the negative impact of externalities caused by the failures. One of the 
externalities is systemic risk caused by the failure of one bank to other banks and to the 
wider financial system. Systemic risk is caused by the interconnectedness of the banking 
and financial system by contractual relations, variations of asset prices and information 
contagion effects among banks.410 More specifically, a failing bank may require other 
healthy banks to write down contractual claims, and other banks may suffer a loss or face 
solvency issues because of the decline in value of any failing bank’s assets held by them, 
and the contagion effect that investors and creditors of other healthy banks may withdraw 
funds from the banks may result in difficulties for the operations and solvency of other 
healthy banks.411 Losses and costs as a result of the failure of a bank are borne by not 
only shareholders and creditors of the bank but also by depositors, other financial 
institutions and the government; therefore, social costs due to bank failure can be huge 
and induce more problems in the financial system. As a result, capital regulation of banks 
by the government could be a way to relate social costs of potential bank failures to 
 
408 Tarullo (n 425) 
409 Benink, Danielsson and Jonsson (n 426) 
410 Martin F. Hellwig, ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage 
Financial Crisis’ (2009) 157 De Economist 129, 182 
411 ibid. 
103 
operating costs of the banks by requiring higher capital adequacy as regulatory 
standards.412 
To summarise, requiring banks to hold a certain level of capital, as is reflected by 
capital ratios, is a way to reduce losses and costs of potential bank failures imposed on 
the government and creditors and reduce instability to the financial system by requiring 
banks to absorb more losses themselves. Because of these roles and functions, capital 
adequacy can reflect the ability of a bank to absorb its losses and the potential impact of 
the bank on the banking sector to some extent, thereby reflecting if the bank operates 
well and is in good financial condition. Capital ratios are calculated to determine the 
capital adequacy of a bank. If capital ratios of a bank fall below certain levels, banking 
regulators are able to identify problems and take measures with the bank when economic 
value and capital remain.413  Capital ratios as indicators have the function to reflect 
financial situations of the bank and to alert banking regulators to deal with the bank’s 
problems at early stages, to avoid potentially costly and expensive bank failures and 
crises.414 However, higher capital ratios are not always the effective way to reveal the 
financial condition of a bank. Only within a certain scope, the higher the capital ratios are, 
the less likely the banks can be in trouble. Imposing a strict capital requirement that 
requires banks to reach a certain level of capital adequacy may not directly improve the 
capital ratios of the banks.415 In addition, constant requirements on capital adequacy may 
lead to reducing the credit supply by banks whilst not necessarily reducing risks of the 
banks.416 The aim of improving safety and soundness of bank operations and the banking 
sector may not always be achieved by only implementing higher capital ratios.417 
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Capital ratio embedded PCAs in the United States are practical examples of 
assessing banks’ operations and financial conditions. The five thresholds are in the form 
of capital ratios to categorise different levels of operation and financial condition of a bank, 
thereby indicating the need for different levels of intervention by enabling banking 
supervisors to take the relevant corrective measures. Capital ratios are the only indicator 
incorporated into US PCA for banking regulators to determine the financial condition of a 
bank. 
 
B. Analysis of Capital Ratios as Triggering Events in the United States 
 
Requirements on capital adequacy ensure banks have adequate capital to absorb 
losses and reduce costs due to bank failures. Capital ratios can reflect banks’ capital 
adequacy and assess their financial conditions and potential problems; however, capital 
ratios may not be the best way to provide a timely and accurate review of capital 
adequacies, financial conditions and problems of banks, thereby causing delays in taking 
corrective measures by the banking regulators. 
In the context of US PCA, triggering events depend on capital ratios. These capital 
ratios include the total risk-based capital ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, common 
equity tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and leverage ratio.418 A capital ratio consists of a 
numerator and a denominator. The numerator reflects a bank’s capital and shows its 
ability to absorb losses.419 The more capital a bank has, the less likely bank failure is. The 
denominator of the capital ratio shows the bank’s assets.420 The scale of assets of a bank 
is related to the size of the bank: the more assets a bank holds, the larger the size of the 
bank. Variations in either bank capital or assets can be captured by capital ratios to 
assess the bank’s financial condition and risks. For example, capital ratio reflects that a 
bank of a larger size or with riskier assets needs more capital to absorb losses than a 
bank of a smaller size or with less risky assets.421  
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In the context of PCA, one function of capital ratios is to set a benchmark for the 
bank category, which indicates the banks’ financial conditions and performance and 
determines the level of intervention that is to follow. In a simpler version, categorising 
banks by capital ratios allows banking regulators to impose corrective measures 
depending on their capital adequacy and risks, before economic value and capital of the 
troubled banks reach zero, and mandatory closure of the banks is unavoidable. The 
benchmark by capital ratios not only determines corrective measures but also whether 
banks have more freedom to make decisions on their own. The more capital a bank has, 
the more likely it can manage losses and risky assets. To the contrary, the less capital a 
bank has, the more restrictive its business gets as the bank cannot afford risky decisions 
and costs, and mandatory closure of the bank will apply once capital declines to certain 
levels.422 The benefit of capital ratio as a benchmark to trigger early intervention is a direct 
and straightforward review of the level of capital adequacy of a bank. Therefore, banking 
regulators can determine whether economic value and capital adequacy of banks are 
positive or negative at early stages, which provides information for them to take respective 
corrective measures either to restore capital adequacy of the banks or to enforce 
mandatory closure or receivership of the banks. The benchmark for each category of 
banks normally is set at a positive capital ratio to ensure banking regulators’ early stage 
actions before bank failure. 
Capital ratios as PCA triggering events are designed to deal with regulatory 
forbearance and to some extent to limit the discretion of banking regulators. PCA has 
adopted capital ratios as triggers to correct problems when insolvent banks remained in 
operation after their capital had become negative in the crisis during the 1980s.423 PCA 
capital ratios require banking regulators to close troubled banks promptly and prevent 
keeping insolvent banks open. 424  It has been a step forward to reduce regulatory 
forbearance. PCA has made some progress in terms of reducing forbearance and limiting 
regulators’ discretions, especially by enforcing compulsory measures on the basis of bank 
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capital ratios. PCA mandatory measures have the feature of an automatic application. 
Once a bank’s capital ratios are assessed against benchmark capital ratios, the bank is 
categorised in a group with certain compulsory measures in place. The bank has to 
comply with those measures and no discretion or decision from banking regulators is 
needed; therefore, possibilities of regulatory forbearance and delays in taking regulatory 
measures can to some extent be reduced. 425  In details, compulsory measures are 
enforced with no exception and are applied immediately without banking regulators’ 
actions.426  Certain compulsory measures are applicable to all banks, which impose 
restrictions on capital distribution and management fees.427 Normally banks within the 
same category, no matter what the specific capital ratios are, share the same set of 
compulsory measures. Compared with mandatory measures of PCA, discretionary 
measures do not limit discretion of banking regulators and do little to prevent regulatory 
forbearance. 
From the perspective of capital ratios’ functions, capital ratios act as benchmarks 
to categorise banks into five groups with varying levels of performance and problems, 
which enables banking regulators to determine financial conditions and risks accordingly 
on the basis of their capital adequacy. Moreover, the link between capital ratios as a 
benchmark and compulsory measures for a particular bank category has a positive effect 
on reducing discretion and decision making for banking regulators. The whole process is 
related to capital ratios for banks and banking regulators. A bank’s capital ratios are 
assessed in accordance with PCA capital ratio benchmarks. Then the bank is categorised 
into a group where banking regulators are required to enforce compulsory measures on 
the bank, and to take early actions and prevent the bank from operating if the bank’s 
capital ratio is unsatisfying. Ideally, the whole process could work to identify troubled 
banks at early stages and manage their risks accordingly before the materialisation of 
problems. However, in reality, PCA is not a panacea for dealing with troubled banks and 
bank failure. Both functions of capital ratios as triggering events of structured early 
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intervention for banks are flawed and need further considerations in design and 
development. 
The main problem with capital ratios as triggering events is the lagging feature of 
capital ratios. This means that capital ratios are not able to reflect the true and real-time 
capital adequacy and financial conditions of banks, thereby leading to untimely and 
inaccurate information for banking regulators. PCA categories of banks and the 
consequential corrective actions solely depend on capital ratios in order to identify the 
banks in need of early intervention. This is ineffective because capital ratios alone may 
not be able to identify problems or risks of banks before they emerge. Declines or 
reductions in capital ratios such as leverage ratios, that reflect deteriorations of capital 
adequacy and financial health of troubled banks, come later than identifications of 
troubled banks and their problems by a comprehensive bank supervisory assessment.428 
Reasons for the lagging feature of capital ratios as triggering events of structured 
early intervention for banks are twofold. First, practical techniques of banks to solve 
existing problems, such as resolving loan losses, can cause deficiencies in reflecting the 
actual capital adequacy whilst maintaining satisfactory capital ratios for supervisory 
assessment. Banks are more likely to first deal with operational or financial problems that 
have already existed instead of making preparations for potential losses in advance. For 
example, banks add to loan loss reserves after there has been a problem of loan loss by 
using their capital and they are likely to be slower in preparing for loan losses in 
advance.429 In reality, banks tend to use their capital to compensate for loan loss and 
increase their loan loss reserve, which leads to drops and reductions in their capital ratios 
after a full supervisory assessment.430 As a result, capital ratios of banks may not be a 
timely way to show current capital levels and financial situations of the banks. In terms of 
timing of PCA triggers, capital ratios lag behind fluctuations of true levels of capital 
adequacy of the banks. The accuracy of capital ratios as triggering events may overstate 
the financial situations of the banks. 
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In addition to these practical techniques by banks to mask the actual capital 
adequacy, the basis of calculations of capital adequacy is a factor for the lagging feature 
of capital ratios. Calculations of bank capital ratios are based on book value of the banks’ 
capital. However, the book value of the banks’ capital does not reflect the economic value 
of the capital adequacy and financial condition of the banks in an active or timely way 
because the book value capital of a bank tends to change less even if the economic value 
of a bank changes dramatically.431 Capital ratios as triggering events are based on book 
value capital of banks which tend to remain flat in reflecting the economic value of the 
banks; therefore, capital ratios as triggering events can be lagging to show the real capital 
adequacy and financial conditions of banks. Moreover, calculations of banks’ capital 
ratios are based on book value of the banks, which does not provide updated information 
of the economic value of the banks. As a result, depending only on capital ratios as 
triggering events is rarely a timely way to reflect the economic value and real capital 
adequacy of banks. 
Another problem in relation to capital ratios as triggering events is its limitation on 
reducing regulatory forbearance. Based on previous studies, PCA categorisation of banks 
based on capital ratios has failed to treat a number of banks as undercapitalised or 
significantly undercapitalised, or critically undercapitalised banks and take respective 
corrective measures, especially mandatory measures, to deal with the troubled banks.432 
This first shows the lagging feature of capital ratios in identifying troubled banks as 
mentioned above. This also reveals the deficiency of capital ratios to reduce the impact 
of regulatory forbearance. Banks that should have been categorised as undercapitalised, 
significantly undercapitalised, and critically undercapitalised remain in capitalised 
categories with less mandatory and discretionary measures from banking regulators, 
which gives the regulators more discretion on whether to take discretionary measures 
and their decision on the level of intervention. As banks categorised as well capitalised 
and adequately capitalised are subject to less mandatory measures than banks that are 
categorised as undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised, and critically 
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undercapitalised, those troubled banks that should have been categorised into the latter 
three categories could be subject to less mandatory measures. As a result, the banking 
regulators have more discretion to deal with the troubled banks and are unlikely to take 
intrusive measures with the banks. 
In addition to provide accurate and timely reflection of banks’ financial conditions, 
capital ratios as triggering events incentivise banks to reach higher capital ratios and meet 
the relevant benchmark. In this context, capital ratios may not be effective in requiring 
troubled banks to increase capital and meet capital requirements. Based on the whole 
PCA process, requirements on capital adequacy and categorisation of banks determine 
the following corrective actions for banks by banking regulators. PCA capital ratio 
benchmarks and unwillingness of banks to follow corrective actions are incentives for 
banks to improve and maintain certain levels of capital adequacy. The actual result of 
increasing capital for banks in accordance with capital requirement may not happen 
exactly as designed because capital regulation can be vaguer and weaker than civil or 
criminal penalties that require banks to increase capital ratios to meet certain standards 
or to be categorised into certain capital zones.433 In other words, troubled banks can be 
less reluctant to increase capital and improve capital adequacy to meet capital 
requirements or to be categorised into capital zones with less regulatory measures even 
if the banks do not meet capital requirements. 
To summarise, capital ratios as PCA triggering events mainly function as 
benchmarks to categorise banks and as ways to limit the discretion of banking regulators. 
This is progress in terms of detecting early signs of potential problems in troubled banks 
in the US banking sector after the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980s. The actual 
application of PCA triggering events reveals the following problems with capital ratios. 
First, PCA capital ratios can be lagging in nature to reflect the actual financial conditions 
of a bank. Second, because of the lagging feature, banks may not be upgraded or 
downgraded to the appropriate capital categorisation, which gives banking regulators 
more discretion to take corrective measures rather than imposing mandatory measures 
on troubled banks in the relevant capital zones. Finally, capital ratios and bank 
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categorisation based on capital adequacy do not serve as strong incentives for troubled 
banks to improve capital adequacy to meet capital requirements. 
 
C. Non-Performing Assets Coverage Ratio as Alternative Triggering Events 
 
The thinking underpinning early intervention for banks is  correctly implemented 
while the triggering mechanism within FDICIA is problematic due to the lagging feature 
and manipulation of capital adequacy by banks.434 Because of the key role of triggering 
events, a timely and accurate reflection of the actual financial condition and economic 
value of a bank not only sends the prompt signals to banking regulators but also 
determines the right level of intervention by the following corrective measures. In order to 
improve the effectiveness of objective standards as triggering events, core features of 
models or ratios to complement or replace capital ratios as objective standards to trigger 
structured early intervention for banks should be predictive, timely and accurate in terms 
of the actual economic value of banks.  
Models or ratios that are based on different mechanisms detect financial problems 
and provide early warning information, which performs better than capital ratios alone, as 
in the current PCA system in assessing the exact financial conditions of banks. 435 
Imposing additional regulatory requirements on banks could be a way to modify current 
flaws and improve the effectiveness of PCA.436 Other models to predict potential failures 
or complement capital ratios as additional requirements can be either multiple variables 
or single variable models based on their specific different mechanisms. Among all these 
models or ratios as objective standards to trigger early intervention with banks, a single 
variable model, the Non-Performing Asset Coverage Ratio (NPACR), could be 
incorporated in systems of structured early intervention for banks to improve accuracy 
and effectiveness of early warning, either on its own or to supplement capital ratios. 
NPACR is directly related to non-performing assets of banks. Non-performing 
assets are relevant to the banks’ financial conditions in the following way. First, non-
performing assets are one of the factors that are closely linked to a banking crisis, which 
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is a decline in value of banks’ assets due to the aim for yield.437 Banks will reach a point 
where the only way to achieve asset growth is to compromise asset quality.438 This means 
that on the basis of collateral, the value of loans decreases when the value of the 
underlying security declines. 439  The growth of non-performing assets represents 
deterioration of bank assets’ quality, thereby causing financial instability of that bank. 
Second, non-performing loan ratio is able to signal for systemic problems. 440  Non-
repayment of loans causes credit risk for banks, which negatively influences the financial 
condition and overall stability of the bank, especially when non-performing assets have 
been a key factor for the bank’s failures and crisis.441 
NPACR is an indicator of banks’ financial conditions associated with 
nonperforming assets, which determines whether there has been a material change in 
the financial conditions of a bank, and whether this could have been signalled to banking 
regulators earlier, to take corrective actions and close troubled banks promptly if 
necessary.442 The numerator of the NPACR is the total amount of a bank’s equity capital, 
plus loan loss reserve, minus nonperforming assets.443 The denominator of NPACR is the 
total amount of the bank’s assets.444 Nonperforming assets are ‘calculated as the sum of 
20% of loans past due 30-89 days, 50% of loans past due 90-180 days and 100% of 
nonaccrual loans and real estate owned assets’445. The assumption of NPACR is based 
on fluctuations of non-performing assets. When a bank has past due and non-performing 
assets or the assets increase, the bank normally will not increase loan loss reserves 
accordingly in a timely way.446 In this scenario, NPACR will decrease and this reflects 
weakness in asset quality; however, capital ratios remain the same as the banks’ capital 
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will not be used immediately to compensate for losses in nonperforming assets, causing 
a decline in capital ratios.447 As a result, NPACR is likely to show possible problems and 
financial situations of banks earlier than current capital ratios.  
One function of NPACR is its ability to provide an accurate reflection of banks’ 
financial conditions. It has a function to reduce incentives of banks to take advantage of 
the calculation of capital ratios to cover the true capital adequacy and financial conditions 
of themselves. One of the problems of capital ratios as triggering events is that banks can 
delay in making up insufficient loan loss reserve by using certain amounts of capital and 
maintaining their statuses in certain capital categories at the same time, which causes 
the lagging feature of capital ratios as triggers. Because of the calculation of NPACR, 
banks do not have the chance to cover loan losses and maintain the ratio at certain levels, 
which can provide more accurate information of banks’ financial conditions.448 NPACR 
also considers two bank risks, credit and capital risks, in one ratio.449 Compared with 
capital ratios, NPACR is likely to provide more information about banks and possible 
results of bank failures because both credit and capital risks have a determining impact 
on solvency of the banks. 
Second, in relation to timeliness of triggering events, NPACR outperforms capital 
ratios. Calculations of NPACR are much easier than risk-based capital ratios even if 
banks have gone through recent loan loss, which allows banking regulators to determine 
the actual financial conditions in a timely and direct way.450 NPACR is predictive. In the 
recent financial crisis, if NPACR were applied with the closure rule of less than 2% of 
NPACR, troubled banks would have been identified and closed six quarters earlier than 
PCA capital ratios with reduced losses to FDIC. 451  Concerning the appropriate 
percentage of NPACR in determining closure of troubled banks, 2% of NPACR could be 
a minimum requirement for closing a troubled bank, which could lead to earlier 
identification and intervention with troubled banks. Additionally, compared with capital 
ratios, including tier 1 ratio, total capital ratio and leverage ratio, with consideration of 
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regulatory forbearance NPACR not only provides timelier information on possible 
problems of bank financial conditions for three categories of undercapitalised banks, it 
also can identify possible failures of well capitalised banks after two years of the financial 
crisis in 2007-09.452 
Finally, NPACR is adaptable and compatible to different countries’ banking sectors. 
This means that NPACR is able to predict potential failures of banks during various time 
periods in the context of different countries’ banking sectors, thereby making NPACR a 
feasible and reliable indicator of structured early intervention for banks without limitations 
on specific countries or time periods.453  
To summarise, on the basis of comparisons between NPACR and capital ratios as 
triggering events, NPACR is able to perform better than capital ratios in terms of accuracy, 
timeliness and the ability to be predictive. Timely and accurate reflection of bank financial 
conditions provides the basis for the predictive function of NPACR to reveal material 
changes in the economic value of a bank. These functions compensate for shortcomings 
of capital ratios as triggering events of structured early intervention for banks.  
 
II. Mechanism of UK Triggering Events – Supervisory Assessment  
 
Supervisory assessment as triggering events refers to the determining function of 
banking regulators’ judgement-based opinions in triggering early intervention, which 
means banking regulators’ supervisory assessments on bank operation and financial 
condition determine the level of intervention and the corrective measures that follow. 
Compared with capital ratios as triggering events, supervisory assessment is more 
subjective, which could be more flexible and comprehensive than reflections of the bank’s 
financial condition by using a completely objective perspective. UK Proactive Intervention 
Framework (PIF) is based on judgement-based supervisory assessment by the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA), the prudential banking regulator, to trigger the following 
corrective measures and Special Banking Resolution Regime (SRR). Standards of 
supervisory assessment of the UK prudential banking regulator are the key factor to 
results of supervisory assessment. 
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This section is structured as follows. It first outlines specific focus and supervisory 
standards of structured early intervention for banks in the UK. Then this section discusses 
advantages and disadvantages of supervisory assessment as triggering events to 
determine bank performance and detect potential problems. Finally, this section 
specifically discusses whether UK PIF’s supervisory assessment works in triggering 
events of structured early intervention for banks. 
 
A. Details of UK Supervisory Assessment as Triggering Events 
 
Each set of supervisory assessment has its own standards which focus on and 
examine different aspects of bank performance. If standards of two sets of supervisory 
assessment have differences, banking regulators are likely to get different results on bank 
performance and therefore categorise the same banks into different groups. Standards 
of supervisory assessment on banks for banking regulation and those for structured early 
intervention with banks can be slightly different. In the context of UK banking regulation, 
standards of supervisory assessment focus on assessing risks of bank operations and 
financial conditions. Standards of supervisory assessment as triggering events of early 
intervention are similar to those of banking regulation. 
 
1. Functions 
 
In the context of banking regulation and supervision, supervisory assessment is 
one of the tools of banking regulators to conduct supervision of individual banks. It 
normally consists of assessing the asset quality, capital, liquidity, management and 
control of banks and is used to monitor the operations and the health of banks,454 while 
supervisory assessment in the context of structured early intervention for banks is used 
to identify potential problems that may have a negative impact on banks’ financial 
condition and operation. On the basis of judgement-based supervision, as is perceived 
as an active and intrusive approach,455 UK supervisors change the focus of supervision 
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of banks to an increased level of regulation of banks by reducing dependence on rules.456 
This mechanism therefore requires banking regulators to have the capabilities to identify 
risks posed by supervised banks to their objectives and have the decisiveness to take 
actions against such banks.457 In the context of UK structured early intervention for banks, 
based on the judgement of the prudential banking regulator, supervisory assessment 
examines risks involved in banks’ business and their abilities to manage these risks, 
including ‘external context, business risk, management and governance, risk 
management and control, capital and liquidity’. 458  The function of PIF supervisory 
assessment as triggering events focuses on examinations of banks’ risks, which aims to 
identify and respond to emerging risks at early stages and to take respective actions in 
time.459 Supervisory assessment as triggering events assesses risks of each individual 
bank at micro supervision level, because these standards tend to deal with risks incurred 
by individual institutions.460 In this way, deterioration and accumulation of these risks can 
be identified and managed at early stages, thereby avoiding the fact that these risks 
continue to develop and negatively influence other banks and the whole system.461 
 
2. How Does Supervisory Assessment Work as PIF Triggering Events? 
 
The way supervisory assessment works as triggering events is closely related to 
the structure of PIF and the way that PRA conducts normal banking regulation and 
supervision. PIF is structured to have five stages. Each stage represents the banks’ 
different ‘proximity to failure’462, meaning the likelihood of the banks to fail. In the five 
stages, stage one and stage five represent the two ends of the spectrum that indicates 
the level of intervention by the banking regulator, starting from normal banking regulation 
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to resolution of banks. In the intermediate stages from stage two to four, supervisory 
assessment as triggering events has a key role.  
Concerning these three intermediate stages, the role of a prudential banking 
regulator is to identify potential risks from a moderate to an imminent level, based on 
PRA’s judgement. Supervisory assessment as triggering events is the most relevant to 
banks, as the level of intervention directly related to ‘proximity to failure’ is determined by 
supervisory assessment.463 Functions of judgement-based supervisory assessment of 
early identification and response to emerging risks are most obvious and important in the 
intermediate stages, while supervisory assessment is less important in the last stage.. 
Emerging risks have been materialised and caused negative impact on the operations 
and health of the banks; therefore, banks have been wound up and the SRR has been in 
process. 
In terms of the relationship between supervisory assessment as triggering events 
of early intervention and supervisory assessment as a regulatory tool of banking 
regulation, supervisory assessment as triggering events is based on regular banking 
regulation. Supervisory assessment as triggering events shares the mechanism of 
supervisory assessment of banking regulation and supervision where both assess 
different aspects of bank business and financial condition. In particular, supervisory 
assessment as triggering events assesses and identifies risks that could potentially exist 
in these aspects. 
Supervisory assessment as triggering events has a more focused approach in 
assessing risks associated with different aspects of bank operation and financial condition 
than banking regulation and supervision. Normal banking regulation and supervision 
conducted by PRA examines the following: potential risks to PRA’s regulatory objectives, 
and aspects of the banks’ business that are essential to the operations and health of 
those banks. Within regulation and supervision of potential risks to PRA’s objectives, PRA 
examines further in details about the potential impact, external context and business risk 
of banks.464 Within regulation and supervision of several aspects of the banks’ business, 
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PRA focuses on safety and soundness of the banks by examining management and 
governance, risk management and controls, capital, liquidity and resolvability of the 
banks.465 While in PIF, as the triggering events of early intervention, PRA supervisory 
assessment examines external context and business risk categorised in potential risks to 
PRA’s objectives and examines management and governance, risk management and 
controls, capital and liquidity of safety and soundness of banks.466 When PRA conducts 
PIF supervisory assessment to identify risks, the PRA does not consider potential impact 
and resolvability of banks.  
Concerning supervisory assessment as triggering events of PIF, PRA identifies 
potential risks by assessing the abovementioned aspects of banks’ business and then 
categorises banks into a particular proximity to failure with a different level of intervention. 
PRA’s specific approach to assess and form a judgement on the banks’ external context 
considers the system-wide risks, including interest rate, credit growth and sectoral risks 
and considers the external context that banks operate in together with views and actions 
of other banking regulators, such as Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). 467  PRA’s specific approach to form a judgement-based 
assessment of the business risk of banks consists of business model analysis, peer 
analysis and an assessment of PRA’s ability to supervise banks’ activities.468 These are 
specific approaches of PRA in identifying risks of banks in PIF concerning potential risks 
to PRA’s objectives. 
In terms of identifying risks in the banks’ business, PRA has different approaches 
to form its judgement on each aspect. Concerning management and governance, banks 
are required to comply with extensive laws and regulations. Not only rules enforced by 
PRA but also other areas of laws to be ‘fit and proper’ in managing their business and 
activities. PRA assesses culture and behaviour, competence, and structures of banks to 
form judgements on whether the banks have complied with rules, and satisfy ‘prudent 
conduct’, ‘suitability’ and ‘effective supervision’ threshold conditions.469 Concerning risk 
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management and controls, PRA assesses the banks’ approaches to managing risks, their 
risk control framework and their risk control and management functions.470 Concerning 
capital, PRA assesses whether banks have met the minimum capital requirement of the 
Capital Requirement Regulation and other relevant PRA rules.471 Concerning liquidity, 
PRA assesses whether banks hold a sufficient level of liquidity and whether banks are 
resilient under liquidity stress.472 
To summarise, PRA uses the same mechanism as normal banking regulation to 
form judgement-based supervisory opinions on assessment of individual banks on the 
mentioned aspects of the banks’ business to categorise the banks in a particular PIF 
stage.473 The PIF stage of ‘proximity to failure’ assigned to each individual bank is not 
publicly disclosed by the PRA, especially in times of stress and potential failure.474 The 
PIF stage of individual banks is assessed at least once a year to examine if there have 
been material changes in potential risks to PRA’s objectives and safety and soundness 
of the banks’ business. Judgement-based supervisory assessment as triggering events 
provides a basis for a layered structure for corrective measures with different levels of 
intervention. 
 
B. Analysis of Supervisory Assessment as Triggering Events 
 
In the case of structured early intervention for banks in the UK, PIF has been 
established to provide a framework with structured measures for the prudential banking 
regulators to identify emerging risks at early stages. The current PIF has made some 
progress in terms of identifying and dealing with emerging risks; however, PIF is not the 
perfect framework and it shares similar weaknesses with other supervisory assessments 
in detecting early signals of problems with bank operations and financial conditions. PIF 
has not been implemented and tested in real life bank crises. Therefore, analysis of 
supervisory assessment as triggering events is based not only on discussions of the 
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supervisory assessment of PIF, but also on other types of supervisory assessment in 
predicting bank problems and failures such as the CAMELS rating system. 
In terms of supervisory assessment as triggering events of structured early 
intervention for banks, the following are two main advantages. Supervisory assessment 
tends to have a full and comprehensive examination of several aspects of banks’ 
business and health before categorising the banks into a regulatory category. Triggering 
events of UK structured early intervention for banks is an example of this. PIF supervisory 
assessment shares many similarities with normal banking regulation with only two 
aspects of banks’ business left unexamined. Compared with capital ratios as triggering 
events, supervisory assessment examines not only capital adequacy but also several 
other aspects of the banks’ business and management to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of current operations and financial situations of the banks. Moreover, 
supervisory assessment is more likely to detect potential problems and risks of banks 
before capital ratios indicate troubles because of the lagging feature of capital ratios 
discussed in the previous part of US triggering events. Because of the 
comprehensiveness of supervisory assessment, the accuracy of supervisory assessment 
as triggering events could be improved more than capital ratios; therefore, categorisation 
of banks could be more accurate based on the supervisory assessment. 
Supervisory assessment as triggering events has another advantage. Supervisory 
assessment as triggering events could be constructive in assessing and determining the 
overall safety and soundness of banks’ operations and health, thereby enabling banking 
regulators to gauge whether banks are likely to fail. Whether PIF supervisory assessment 
can work effectively and successfully remains to be seen because effectiveness of PIF 
supervisory assessment has not been tested in reality. Other types of supervisory 
assessment have been tested and proved to have advantages in determining safety and 
soundness of banks’ business and operations, such as the CAMELS rating system, which 
can be regarded as a reference in discussing the function of PIF in determining the safety 
and soundness of banks. 
The CAMELS rating system allows banking regulators to have a full and 
comprehensive examination of banks’ operations and health by assessing the ‘capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risks 
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of banks.475 The CAMELS rating system is an internal regulatory assessment of banking 
regulators to identify potential problems of banks and to determine whether the banks are 
in need of additional supervisory actions.476 CAMELS rating for individual banks is based 
on both qualitative and quantitative information of banks.477  In terms of predicting a 
potential failure or crisis in banks, the CAMELS rating system has sustainably provided 
accurate and reliable predictions. 478  Based on empirical studies that tested the 
effectiveness of the CAMELS rating system in financial crises, in both the Savings and 
Loan crisis in the 1990s in the United States and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09, 
the CAMELS rating system as an early warning system has worked in determining safety 
and soundness or potential failures of banks.479 In order to maintain the accuracy of the 
CAMELS rating, the result of CAMELS ratings assigned to individual banks can become 
out-dated if the banks have not been examined in two quarters, which means CAMELS’ 
rating for individual banks is more accurate in less than two quarters’ time at the time of 
the assessment of operations and health or potential failure of the banks.480 
Considering advantages of supervisory assessment as triggering events, 
comprehensiveness of supervisory assessment as triggering events provides the basis 
for accurate reflections of banks’ business and health compared with functions of capital 
ratios in structured early intervention for banks. However, there are problems and 
shortcomings of supervisory assessment as triggering events of structured early 
intervention.  
 
475 Rebel A. Cole and Jeffery W. Gunther, ‘Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of ON- and Off- Site 
Monitoring System’ (1998) 13 Journal of Financial Services Research 103 
476  Schiff Hardin, ‘CAMELS Ratings: What They Mean and Why They Matter?’ (2016) 
<https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/publications/2016/camels-ratings-what-they-mean-and-why-they-
matter> last accessed 26 August 2019 
477  Parvesh Kumar Aspal and Sanjeev Dhawan, ‘Camels Rating Model for Evaluating Financial 
Performance of Banking Sector: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2016) 1 International Journal of System 
Modelling and Simulation 10 
478 David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel. ‘The Effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Measures in Predicting 
Bank Distress’ (November 2012) <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-
/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Seminars%20and%20workshops/dec2012/session3-mayes-
162502.pdf?la=en> last accessed 26 August 2019 
479 Rebel A. Cole and Lawrence J. White, ‘Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Causes of US Commercial Bank 
Failures This Time Around’ (2012) 42 Journal of Financial Services Research 5 
480 Rebel A. Cole and Jeffery W. Gunther, ‘A CAMEL Rating’s Shelf Life’ (1995) SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46445047_A_CAMEL_rating's_shelf_life> last accessed 26 
August 2019 
121 
One shortcoming of supervisory assessment as triggering events is related to the 
question whether supervisory assessment predicts future trouble and risks of banks. 
Supervisory assessment tends to provide a full and comprehensive assessment of banks’ 
operations and health as a reference point at the time of the assessment or within a 
certain timeframe and the result of the supervisory assessment of the banks may not be 
regarded as predictive because the assessment is normally based on previous data and 
information of banks.481 Supervisory assessment plays a more important role in indicating 
the current operations and health of banks than in predicting potential problems and 
failures of the banks. For example, if a bank has already been in financial trouble or under 
stress, supervisory assessment can be very functional in assessing the overall operations 
and health and the results of the supervisory assessment can be accurate in terms of the 
bank’s distressed situation. Moreover, the accuracy of the results of supervisory 
assessment may not last for a long time. Whatever the type of supervisory assessment 
is, the assessment is more likely to be based on the current information and situation of 
the bank. However, financial situations and operations of banks can change quickly, 
especially for troubled banks whose financial situations can deteriorate very fast. As a 
result, the result of supervisory assessments of banks can gradually become inaccurate 
beyond certain timeframes. Both the CAMELS rating system and the PIF supervisory 
assessment are not conducted on a regular basis within a short period. The PIF 
supervisory assessment is normally conducted on a yearly basis. A CAMELS rating of 
banks is given during on-site examination of banking regulators, and based on the FDICIA 
on-site examination this is conducted every 12-18 months. 482  The results of the 
assessment become more inaccurate when approaching the next year’s assessment. In 
other words, supervisory assessment can indicate the true financial situation and health 
of banks at the time of the assessment while supervisory assessment as triggering events 
may not be effective in reflecting changes in financial situations and the health of banks. 
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More specifically, supervisory assessment may not be as effective as other types of 
triggering events concerning predicting whether banks are failing or are likely to fail. 
Another shortcoming of supervisory assessments as triggering events is the 
infrequency and high cost of the assessments. The infrequency and higher cost are more 
evident shortcomings when compared with other types of triggering events such as capital 
ratios and prediction models that are used in off-site examinations. Supervisory 
assessment is normally conducted on a yearly basis rather than in a more regular way 
while results of capital ratios and other prediction models of off-site examination can be 
updated more frequently to indicate potential problems in current operations and health 
of banks. 483  Because of the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the results of 
supervisory assessments, the process of the supervisory assessments tends to be more 
time consuming and effort intensive, which requires banking regulators to invest in more 
resources to conduct an assessment. The feature of time-consumption and effort 
intensiveness of supervisory assessments contributes to the relatively long intervals 
between two assessments. The comparison between supervisory assessments and other 
types of triggering events, including capital ratios and predictions models, reveals the 
difference between supervisory assessments. The advantages of capital ratios and 
prediction models of more frequent and less costly updates of the banks’ financial 
situation and health demonstrate some shortcomings of supervisory assessment as 
triggering events. 
To summarise, in terms of supervisory assessment as triggering events of 
structured early intervention for banks, it has two main advantages: full and 
comprehensive assessments of the banks’ operations and health; and accuracy in 
reflecting the actual financial situations and business operations of banks. Concerning 
disadvantages, supervisory assessment is ineffective in reflecting changes in banks and 
unable to provide timely updates of banks’ financial situations. Moreover, supervisory 
assessment is not likely to repeat in short intervals because the features of the 
supervisory assessment are resource intensive and time-consuming.  
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C. Does the Judgement-Based Supervisory Assessment of PIF Triggering 
Events Work in the UK context? 
 
Whether judgement-based supervisory assessment as PIF triggering events works 
can be explored in the following two perspectives. One perspective is whether supervisory 
assessment has any advantages and disadvantages in relation to identifying bank 
problems at early stages. Another perspective is whether triggering events can be based 
solely on the banking regulators’ discretion. The first perspective, on the basis of the 
abovementioned analysis, provides that the PIF judgement-based supervisory 
assessment has the features of comprehensiveness and accuracy of a bank’s operation 
and financial condition as well as untimeliness in reflecting changes within a bank 
between two assessments. That is to say PIF supervisory assessment shares the same 
features with other types of supervisory assessment where they provide comprehensive 
information by taking a longer time, which is not timely enough compared with other types 
of triggering events. Because structured early intervention for banks needs to be able to 
detect changes in a bank’s operations and health and reflect those changes in a timely 
and accurate way, supervisory assessment may not be able to provide timely signals of 
bank financial conditions for banking regulators to act pre-emptively.  
From the perspective of rules and discretion, the question is where the line 
between rules and discretion in triggering structured early intervention for banks should 
be drawn. In the context of banking regulation and supervision, the emphasis is placed 
on either rules or discretion at different stages of regulation and supervision. The entry to 
the banking business is the first stage where licensing, authorising and chartering are 
based on rules, the supervision stage including crisis management is based on a mixture 
of rules and discretion-based supervision, and the sanctioning stage where penalties for 
the institution or persons are imposed  is based on rules.484 In terms of early intervention 
and supervision of banks, triggering events and corrective measures should be based on 
both rules and discretion.  
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In the context of early intervention, rules are necessary to guarantee that regulation 
and supervision are properly enforced. 485  Without rules, banking regulators take 
corrective measures or enforce strict actions on the basis of discretion. With sole 
discretion on this, human judgement has limits and is likely to cause biases and 
overconfidence in dealing with banks’ stressed situations.486 This shows the importance 
of rules in dealing with stressed banks. The financial regulation is not what is most needed 
right after a crisis when banks are more aware of risks and their impact.487 This is the 
case with structured early intervention for banks in the context of financial regulation. The 
right time of early intervention is when risks start to grow and are about to materialise in 
the financial sector, and normally at this point business and operations of the banks still 
seem to be stable. Under these circumstances, banking regulators tend to rely more on 
their discretion and may not be likely to take strict actions to deal with risks when the 
economy is booming.488 Most banking regulators are likely to be afraid to take timely 
corrective measures and actions to deal with the risks when asset prices of banks are 
rising. However, based on rules, banking regulators are more likely to initiate early 
intervention and take actual corrective actions. Pre-set rules act as a way to reduce 
excessive discretion of bank regulators and to some extent curb regulatory forbearance. 
The function of rules in early intervention and supervision of banks enables banking 
regulators to take more timely actions when certain aspects of banks’ operations 
encounter problems even if the overall health and business of the banks are stable. 
Discretion of banking regulators also plays an important role in the early 
intervention and supervision of banks. As discussed in the shortcomings of capital ratios 
as triggering events, supervisory assessments based on banking regulators’ discretion 
tend to have a full assessment of banks and reveal problems and risks involved in banks’ 
business before capital ratios indicate them. In other words, in practice, supervisory 
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assessment contributes more to comprehensive identifications of problems of banks and 
applications of measures to deal with the problems.489 Discretion of banking regulators in 
initiations of early intervention and supervision of banks can be more effective in some 
sense because supervisory assessments are normally confidential which causes little 
negative effect on the public confidence. 490  Compared with initiations of corrective 
measures by capital ratios and the rule-based formal early intervention system, disclosure 
of information to the public may have an adverse effect on maintaining financial stability. 
Moreover, banking regulators’ discretion allows the regulators to deal with problems and 
issues of distressed banks on a case-by-case basis and to use more tailored and 
appropriate measures to deal with particular issues of the banks.491 If one particular case 
is exceptional, prudential regulators have the chance to discuss or pass up this case to 
macro-prudential regulators if necessary, from the perspective of organisational 
economics.492 This provides flexibility and information-sharing between micro and macro 
prudential banking regulators. 
In the context of early intervention and supervision of banks, rules and discretion 
are both needed. Supervisory assessment based on discretion should be used to 
examine operations and health of banks, to identify weaknesses of the banks before bank 
stress and problems reflected by objective ratios, and to address the weaknesses and 
problems.493Rule-based triggering events could be used as complimentary triggers of 
judgement-based supervisory assessment to deal with excessive discretion and 
regulatory forbearance in early intervention of banks.494 
In the UK context, supervisory assessment as triggering events within PIF is based 
more on banking regulators’ discretion than rules such as pre-set capital ratios, which 
means banking regulators have discretion in determining the stages of the banks and 
whether to take gentle or intrusive measures to deal with them. Banking regulators’ 
discretion under PIF supervisory assessment can be seen from the following two aspects. 
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One aspect is discretion in determining the stages of the banks and another aspect is 
discretion in determining specific corrective measures as there have been limited rules 
specifying what stages and respective measures should be taken.495 The relationship 
between rules and discretion seems to be unbalanced. PIF supervisory assessment 
emphasises more on discretion, which could cause uncertainty for banks. Based on rule-
based regulation, regulatory agencies have to comply with rules in dealing with each 
individual case, which is likely to improve the efficiency of banking regulators, as they can 
deal with the same issue once by using the same rules and it is also likely to improve 
accountability as firms can predict and plan ahead with their business.496 With a high level 
of discretion by PRA in PIF supervisory assessments, current provisions of PIF are 
unclear and likely to negatively influence accountability and predictably of regulatory 
decisions and corrective measures from the perspective of banks, especially in relation 
to corrective measures by discretion of PRA. For example, in stage two and four of PIF, 
‘the intensity of supervision will increase’ and ‘PRA will most likely increase the scale of 
recovery measures needed’ respectively. 497  In both stages, there have not been 
additional explanations as to how PRA will improve the level of intervention, which reflects 
a high level of discretion of PRA with limited rules. Banks can be more likely to cast doubt 
on accountability and predictability of PRA measures. Given the level of discretion, the 
key to PRA supervisory assessment’s success to trigger early intervention is the ability of 
PRA to really take actions and make decisions to assess banks and intervene in banks’ 
operations in the economy’s boom. This way, the demonstration of the GFS on ‘how 
damaging a laissez-faire mind-set on the part of regulators can be to any form of 
regulation, including principles-based regulation’ 498  can be avoided. Otherwise, the 
tendency for a market-based, hands-off style of regulation would remerge.499 
To summarise, from both perspectives PIF supervisory assessment as triggering 
events could work in the aspect of providing comprehensive and accurate information of 
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bank financial condition while timeliness and accountability of sole discretion-based 
supervisory assessment could cause a problem in detecting and predicting potential bank 
problems. Incorporating rule-based triggering events when assessing banks can be a 
potential way to improve the overall performance of supervisory assessment and increase 
the timeliness in identifying early problems. UK PIF is structured on the basis of the 
mechanism of banking regulation, which can be regarded as an integral part of regular 
banking regulation. This means that triggering events of PIF have no fundamental 
differences compared with the requirements of banking regulation to assess banks’ safety 
and soundness, except for a focus on risks. As a result, PIF triggering events lacks a 
sense of timeliness and no other ways can compensate this shortcoming in this aspect. 
The incorporation of a supplementary rule-based triggering event into PIF supervisory 
assessment could be a way to reflect financial situations and operations of the banks in 
a timelier way. As a result, in terms of a timely response to changes in financial situations 
and operations of the banks, PIF triggering events may identify problems and react to 
changes at earlier stages and compensate the current problem to improve the overall 
performance of PIF triggering events. 
 
III. Mechanism of Chinese Triggering Events –  A Combined Method 
 
Combined triggering events refer to the method where both capital ratio and 
supervisory assessment are standards for a banking regulator to assess and determine 
bank financial condition and categorise banks into relevant groups on the basis of results 
of the dual standards. This means that banking regulators consider bank capital ratio and 
their examinations on the operation and performance of the bank as standards to assess 
the bank’s financial condition before taking actual corrective actions with those banks. 
Combined triggering events share advantages and disadvantages with capital ratios as 
triggering events and supervisory assessment as triggering events. The Chinese 
combined triggering events are the way they are because two pieces of currently-effective 
legislation have rules on dealing with troubled banks with different mechanisms than a 
carefully chosen design of combined triggering events. In the context of Chinese banking 
regulation, with combined triggering events, capital ratios have an important role in 
determining the financial condition of a bank. Not only do capital ratios influence results 
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of supervisory assessment but they also have a direct impact on determining the bank 
category and respective corrective measures. 
This section is structured as follows. It first discusses details of Chinese combined 
triggering events and how they work to assess the banks’ financial condition as well as 
determining the category of each bank. Then this section discusses whether Chinese 
combined triggering events of structured early intervention for banks works in identifying 
and dealing with troubled banks. 
 
A. Detail of the Chinese Combined Triggering Events 
 
In the context of combined triggering events, banking regulators have to consider 
the results of supervisory assessment and capital ratios before taking the next steps. 
Concerning standards of supervisory assessment, Chinese supervisory assessment is 
structured on the basis of the CAMELS rating system with modifications. The supervisory 
assessment includes assessments of capital adequacy, asset quality, management, 
earnings, liquidity, sensitivity to market risk and information and technology risk, and each 
aspect contributes 15%, 15%, 20%, 10%, 20%, 10%, 10% respectively to the final results 
of the banks.500  The mechanism of the Chinese supervisory assessment is a yearly 
assessment of the abovementioned aspects of banks by CBIRC, the prudential banking 
regulator, on the basis of information collected from on-site and off-site examinations, 
special reports from authority of conduct regulation, internal and external audit reports, 
public disclosure information, annual operation plans, other regulatory information, and 
the results of banks from domestic and international rating authorities.501  The results of 
the yearly supervisory assessment are confidential to banks.502 
The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) then 
categorises the banks into six groups in accordance with their final results.503The first 
category of banks has scored over 90% in the annual supervisory assessment; the 
second category of banks has scored from 75% to 90% in the annual supervisory 
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assessment;  the third category of banks has scored from 60% to 75% in the annual 
supervisory assessment; the fourth category of banks has scored from 45% to 60% in the 
annual supervisory assessment;; the fifth category of banks has scored from 30% to 45% 
in the annual supervisory assessment;; the sixth category of banks has scored below 30% 
in the annual supervisory assessment 504 Concerning banks in the first two categories, 
the prudential banking regulator regards the overall operations and health of the banks 
as satisfying and prudent, and no additional corrective regulatory measures are 
needed. 505  Concerning banks in the third category, financial condition and overall 
operation of the banks are less satisfying, and minor corrective measures will be 
imposed. 506  These measures include increased frequency of on-site and off-site 
examinations, increased level of supervision of internal and risk management, and 
restrictions on certain activities concerning entry to the market.507 Concerning banks in 
the fourth and fifth categories, the banks are considered to be troubled banks, and in 
these two categories the level of intervention will intensify, which means corrective 
measures will be imposed on every aspect of the banks’ business to improve overall 
operations and performance.508 Concerning banks in the sixth category, the regulator will 
focus on resolution of the banks and the process of exiting the market.509 
Bank Category 
Supervisory Assessment 
Result 
The Level of Intervention 
Category One ≥ 90% 
No Additional Corrective 
Measures 
Category Two 75% - 90% 
No Additional Corrective 
Measures 
Category Three 60% - 75% Minor Corrective Measures 
Category Four 45% - 60% Intense Corrective Measures 
Category Five 30% - 45% Intense Corrective Measures 
Category Six ≤ 30% Resolution 
 
Table 5 Chinese Triggering Events – Capital Ratios 
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Concerning standards of capital ratios as triggering events, depending on the 
actual capital level of individual banks, with failure to satisfy requirements of capital 
regulation, banks are subject to different levels of early intervention. The Chinese capital 
regulation for banks includes the following four aspects: the minimum capital 
requirements; reserve capital and countercyclical capital requirements; additional capital 
requirements for systemically important banks; and higher capital requirements designed 
for particular banks (second pillar requirement).510 The minimum capital requirements are 
further defined as follows: the minimum requirement for tier 1 core capital adequacy is 
5%; the minimum requirement for tier 1 capital adequacy is 6%; the minimum requirement 
for capital adequacy is 8%.511 Higher capital requirements refer to a higher capital ratio 
assigned by the prudential banking regulator to a specific bank.512 
According to the Administrative Measures for the Capital of Commercial Banks (for 
Trial Implementation), banks are classified into four categories depending on the level of 
capital adequacy.513 The first category includes banks that comply with all requirements 
of capital regulation.514 The second category includes banks that satisfy the first three 
types of capital requirements and fail to comply with higher capital requirements.515 The 
third category includes banks that satisfy the minimum capital requirements and fail to 
meet the other three types of capital requirements.516 The fourth category includes banks 
that fail to meet all requirements of capital regulation.517 The prudential banking regulator, 
currently CBIRC, is allowed to take preventive measures for banks in the first category, 
and corrective measures for banks in the latter three categories. The determining factor 
is the level of capital adequacy of banks reflected by capital ratios. 
In terms of time intervals between two capital adequacy assessments, banks are 
required to report their unconsolidated and consolidated capital ratios to the prudential 
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regulator, which the unconsolidated capital ratio is required to report on a quarterly basis 
and the consolidated capital ratio is required to report on a half-yearly basis.518 
Bank Category Capital Standards Bank Condition 
Category One 
Minimum 
Capital 
Requirements 
Tier 1 Core Capital 
Ratio ≥ 5%  
Satisfied 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio  
≥ 6% 
Satisfied  
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio  
≥ 8% 
Satisfied  
Reserve Capital and Countercyclical 
Capital Requirements 
Satisfied 
Additional Capital Requirements for 
Systemically Important Banks 
Satisfied 
Second Pillar Capital Requirement Satisfied 
Category Two 
Minimum 
Capital 
Requirements 
Tier 1 Core Capital 
Ratio ≥ 5%  
Satisfied 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio  
≥ 6% 
Satisfied 
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio  
≥ 8% 
Satisfied 
Reserve Capital and Countercyclical 
Capital Requirements 
Satisfied 
Additional Capital Requirements for 
Systemically Important Banks 
Satisfied 
Second Pillar Capital Requirement Not Satisfied 
Category Three 
Minimum 
Capital 
Requirements 
Tier 1 Core Capital 
Ratio ≥ 5%  
Satisfied 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio  
≥ 6% 
Satisfied 
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio  
≥ 8% 
Satisfied 
Reserve Capital and Countercyclical 
Capital Requirements 
Not Satisfied 
Additional Capital Requirements for 
Systemically Important Banks 
Not Satisfied 
Second Pillar Capital Requirement Not Satisfied 
Category Four 
Minimum 
Capital 
Requirements 
Tier 1 Core Capital 
Ratio ≥ 5%  
Not Satisfied 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio  
≥ 6% 
Not Satisfied 
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Capital Adequacy 
Ratio  
≥ 8% 
Not Satisfied 
Reserve Capital and Countercyclical 
Capital Requirements 
Not Satisfied 
Additional Capital Requirements for 
Systemically Important Banks 
Not Satisfied 
Second Pillar Capital Requirement Not Satisfied 
 
Table 6 Chinese Triggering Events - Supervisory Assessment 
The implication for banks in relation to combined triggering events is that banks 
have to comply with both standards and failure to comply with either of these two 
standards can lead to an increased level of intervention. Capital ratios have an essential 
role in triggering early intervention because the level of capital adequacy contributes to 
the final results of the supervisory assessment and failure to meet the capital ratio 
requirements on their own can lead to increased levels of intervention. 
 
B. Analysis of Chinese Combined Triggering Events - Does It Work? 
 
Instead of one set of standards, either capital ratios or supervisory assessment as 
triggering events, combined triggering events provide Chinese banking regulators with 
two sets of standards. Failure of a bank to comply with either one of the standards triggers 
early intervention. Combined triggering events share advantages and disadvantages of 
capital ratios and supervisory assessment to some extent. In the context of Chinese 
banking regulation, the combined triggering events may not work effectively even if dual 
standards seem stricter to banks than single standards. 
First, the combined triggering events, though they have advantages of both capital 
ratios and supervisory assessment, are not necessarily equal to a set of timely, accurate 
and predictive indicators of banks’ financial condition. On the basis of advantages of 
capital ratios and supervisory assessment, combined triggering events can provide 
benchmarks to categorise banks and to some extent limit regulators’ forbearance whilst 
providing a full and comprehensive assessment of banks’ financial condition as well as 
accurate reflections of the banks’ performance. However, these advantages of capital 
ratios and supervisory assessment do not complement each other well. This means that 
even if combined triggering events has more advantages than single standards it still 
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cannot be predictive in assessing banks’ future risks and potential problems with a bank’s 
financial condition. Both supervisory assessment and capital ratios are not predictive 
enough to detect changes in a bank’s financial condition. From the perspective of a set 
of predictive triggering events, combined triggering events are not better than capital 
ratios or supervisory assessment as triggering events. Based on this, with combined 
triggering events, an increased level of intervention by banking regulators may happen in 
similar ways compared with US and UK situations. This means that delays in taking 
corrective measures are likely to be the consequence. 
Second, because of legal hierarchy of several pieces of legislation on triggering 
events, the actual application of combined triggering events may lead to inconsistency of 
rules that are imposed on each individual bank. In relation to the legal hierarchy, three 
key pieces of legislation govern triggering events of early intervention in China. Banking 
Supervision Law of the PRC, with the highest authority among the three, provides a 
general provision in triggering early intervention and applying corrective measures, 
stating that violations of prudential regulation rules and endangering legitimate rights and 
interests of deposits and creditors are triggering events of an increased level of 
intervention.519 Then Administrative Measures for the Capital of Commercial Banks (for 
Trial Implementation)520, ranking the second in terms of its authority, provides the legal 
basis for capital ratios as triggering events. Finally, Notice of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on Issuing the Internal Guidelines for the Regulatory Rating of 
Commercial Banks521 is at the third place of authority and provides the legal basis for 
supervisory assessments as triggering events of early intervention for banks. Banking 
Supervision Law of the PRC, as a national law, provides a general guidance as to how to 
trigger early intervention for banks and can be difficult to apply in reality.522  An accurate 
interpretation of triggering events of this national law as to how early intervention is 
triggered can be difficult to achieve because of the vagueness of the rules. The former 
prudential banking regulator, CBRC, designed the rules that are the basis for both capital 
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ratios and supervisory assessment, even though these two sets of rules come with 
differences in legal hierarchy. The main difference between these two rules is that the 
rule for capital ratios in the second place are compulsory legal requirements for banks 
while the rule for supervisory assessment in the third place are actual rules for banking 
regulators instead of any obligations for banks and impose no obligations on banks.523 
The conflicts of these two rules occur because from the perspective of banking regulators, 
they need to assess banks in both ways of capital ratios and supervisory assessment 
which may lead to inconsistency in applying corrective measures.524 Because capital 
ratios and supervisory assessment as triggering events have different conditions and 
requirements to assess banks, the inconsistency of the application of rules can be hard 
to avoid. For example, banks with the same categories based on capital ratios as 
triggering events and supervisory assessment as triggering events may be subject to 
different corrective actions and because the frequency of the two types of triggering 
events is different. This situation causes inconsistency as one bank may be subject to 
corrective measures of capital ratios as triggering events first and the other bank with the 
same situation may be subject to corrective measures of supervisory assessment as 
triggering events first. Similarly, a corrective measure that is included in the consequential 
corrective measures of both capital ratios and supervisory assessment as triggering 
events may be triggered by different conditions of banks.  
Third, both capital ratios and supervisory assessment can trigger an increased 
level of intervention and therefore could cause overlaps in achieving the same results. 
Because both capital ratios and supervisory assessment can provide indicators of a 
bank’s financial condition, either one of the mechanisms can trigger the resulting 
corrective measures. The combined triggering events in China, however, are likely to 
cause confusion in triggering early intervention with banks, which may contribute to 
ineffectiveness. The triggering events of structured early intervention should be a set of 
standards to identify problems of banks at early stages, which provides clear indicators 
of banks’ financial situations and risks for banking regulators to respond to risks and 
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distressed banks.525 Based on the current Chinese rules, no explanations as to how these 
two sets of standards as triggering events complement each other in practice have been 
provided to banking regulators. As a result, a troubled bank may have the same corrective 
measures twice because both triggering events can cause the same or similar measures 
to be taken with the bank. 
To summarise, the Chinese combined triggering events consist of both capital 
ratios and supervisory assessment as triggering events and have a different design of 
rules and standards for banking regulators to follow. However, because of the need for 
predictive indicators, the combined triggering events may provide reflections of banks’ 
potential financial condition. The inconsistency of application of rules and overlaps in the 
triggering mechanisms could both contribute to ineffectiveness of the combined triggering 
events in China. 
 
IV. Comparisons of the US, UK and Chinese Triggering Events 
 
On the basis of US, UK and Chinese mechanisms of triggering events, capital 
ratios and supervisory assessment are two main indicators of a bank’s financial condition 
for banking regulators to decide whether following corrective measures and increased 
level of supervision are necessary. Mechanisms of triggering events not only show 
differences of how structured early intervention is triggered in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and China but also reveal differences in considerations of functions of 
structured early intervention for banks and functions of rules and discretion in banking 
regulation. In addition to these differences, as triggering events, US, UK and Chinese 
mechanisms share some similarities. These similarities are also features of other types 
of triggering events. 
This section first discusses common types of triggering events for early 
identification of changes in a bank’s financial condition. Second, this section focuses on 
similarities of US, UK and Chinese triggering events and the common features of these 
triggering events. Third, this section explores why US, UK and Chinese triggering events 
are different. Then, this section focuses on discussing one difference of triggering events 
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in the three countries, which is the function of structured early intervention for banks in 
the regulatory framework. Finally, this section focuses on another difference which is 
consideration for rules and discretion in structured early intervention for banks. 
 
A. Common Types of Triggering Events of Early Intervention for Banks 
 
Capital ratios and supervisory assessment are main types of triggering events on 
the basis of US, UK and Chinese triggering events for structured early intervention for 
banks. From a systematic perspective, triggering events to achieve early identification of 
changes in a bank’s financial condition include statistical models, supervisory bank rating 
systems, comprehensive bank risk assessment systems and financial ratios and peer 
group analysis systems.526 These triggering events for early intervention for banks share 
similarities. These four types of triggering events systems provide a whole picture of how 
changes in a bank’s financial condition can be identified at the early stages. 
On the basis of data and quantitative methods, statistical models are mechanisms 
that are used to analyse a bank’s financial condition and risks and therefore predict 
potential bank failures or crises in advance. These mechanisms are also known as early 
warning systems.527 Based on financial variables, statistical models or early warning 
systems are timely indicators that depend on the use of data from different aspects of 
bank business, such as liquidity, asset quality and non-performing assets and the use of 
quantitative methods to assess these aspects of banking to estimate and predict potential 
bank risks.528  A conceptual early warning system can be structured in a three-step 
sequential approach: 1) pre-modelling to identify aims and objectives; 2) modelling to 
evaluate and estimate; and 3) post modelling to determine the appropriate outputs and 
communicate relevant results.529The early warning system works as an indicator because 
bank crises to some extent share some similar patterns with the data during the period 
before the crises actually happened in the United States, the United Kingdom and some 
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other countries in 2007.530 These statistical models normally cannot reveal weakness 
supported by firm evidence but rather provide direction to the weaknesses that may need 
further investigation by banking regulators.531 The function of statistical models can be 
complemented by macro-prudential regulation and supervision of the banking sector. 
Macro-prudential regulation and supervision monitors potential risks and problems for the 
whole banking system.532 Risks and problems of the banking sector as a whole, identified 
through macro-prudential regulation, may have an impact on individual banks, and 
therefore could provide highlights and indicators for banking regulators on problems and 
risks of individual banks for a closer look.533 Statistical models, together with indicators 
from macro-prudential banking regulation and supervision, could work to identify 
problems with individual banks and assess potential risks of them.  
Supervisory bank rating systems are designed to assess performance and 
financial conditions of banks on the basis of both on-site and off-site examinations. The 
CAMEL rating system is an example of the on-site examination of a supervisory bank 
rating system, which includes assessment of Capital, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings and Liquidity of banks. It was designed by the US banking regulators and then 
widely used as a tool for banking regulators around the world to assess the safety and 
soundness of banks.534 The CAMEL system has since been developed to become the 
CAMELS rating system with an additional component of Sensitivity to risks. 535  The 
CAMELS rating is based on ratings of the six components and supervisors have 
discretion to weigh the ratings of the six components against the final CAMELS rating of 
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the banks, which further determines the level of supervision of the banks. 536  The 
supervisory bank rating system has been a supervisory tool to assess the current 
performance and financial situations of banks at the time of the examination without a 
predictive feature and accuracy of the rating tends to decline after a certain period of 
time. 537  Supervisory bank rating systems have been adopted in French banking 
regulation to work as off-site examinations and specifically within the Organisation and 
Reinforcement of Preventative Actions which is a multi-analysis supervisory system for 
the assessment of banks.538 
Comprehensive bank risk assessment systems concentrate on comprehensive 
assessment of risks for banks from business risks to internal controls on the basis of 
different standards and criteria, to form a detailed risk portfolio of individual banks.539 The 
current UK supervisory assessment is one of the comprehensive bank risk assessments, 
which not only focuses on  current risks but also on future risks of its regulated banks 
within PRA’s risk framework.540  The PRA’s risk framework specifically assesses the 
potential impact of a bank’s business risks and its failure on financial stability, the external 
context in which a bank operates and its impact on the viability of the bank, and mitigating 
factors of the bank including operational, financial and structural mitigation.541  
Financial ratios and peer group analysis systems are based on a set of consistent 
financial variables as indicating ratios to determine whether performance and financial 
situations of the banks have met regulatory standards.542 Financial ratios refer to the 
mechanism that certain increased or decreased levels of regulatory intervention will be 
followed if the regulatory ratio of a bank falls below or exceeds predetermined levels and 
causes the bank to be categorised into certain groups.543 Peer group analysis assesses 
a bank’s performance on the basis of financial ratios in comparison with other banks of 
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similar sizes and with similar business, or in a group of banks.544 Capital ratio is one of 
the financial ratios used by banking regulators; others include ratios that reflect asset 
quality and liquidity.545 Dependence on a single financial ratio may not be effective as 
only one aspect of the bank’s performance and business has been considered especially 
with banks of a large and complex nature and their operations. Financial ratios can be 
used to assess each individual bank or they can be used in a peer review scenario to 
assess individual banks’ performance with a group of other banks. 
PCA triggering events in the US are closely related to financial ratios and peer 
group analysis systems with the focus on using capital ratios. PIF triggering events is one 
of the comprehensive bank risk assessment systems. Chinese triggering events are the 
combination of both financial ratios and supervisory bank rating systems. Both 
supervisory bank rating systems and comprehensive bank risk assessment systems 
include banking regulators’ discretion and decisions towards the final results. The main 
difference between these two is the focus of the two types of supervisory assessment. 
Comprehensive bank risk assessment systems focus on bank risks and the impact of 
failures on the financial system while supervisory bank rating systems focus on the 
current performance of banks. This is the difference between triggering events of PIF and 
the supervisory assessment aspect of Chinese combined triggering events. From the 
perspective of considerations of future risks, comprehensive bank risk assessment 
systems are likely to be a preferable way to trigger early intervention compared with 
supervisory bank rating systems. 
 
B. Similarities among US, UK and Chinese Triggering Events 
 
 Though mechanisms and details vary significantly, US, UK and Chinese triggering 
events share similarities in the following three ways: classification of banks into different 
categories; consideration of bank capital regulation in triggering events; and time intervals 
between two assessments.  
First, concerning the classification of banks into different categories on the basis 
of bank financial conditions, US, UK and Chinese triggering events have several 
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benchmarks to classify banks into different categories or regulatory zones. Triggering 
events allows banking regulators to differentiate the level of intervention by corrective 
measures in accordance with the bank’s financial conditions, thereby providing a 
connection between banking regulation and bank resolution. These different bank 
categories lay the foundation for a gradually increasing level of intervention by banking 
regulators. No matter which type of triggering events has been implemented in the US, 
the UK and China, triggering events for the first category of banks are consistent with the 
requirements for normal banking regulation. Similarly, triggering events for the last 
category are closely related to requirements for initiations of a bank resolution. The three 
bank categories in-between are the main categories for structured early intervention for 
banks where triggering events reflect changes in a bank’s financial condition and provide 
banking regulators with signals to take corrective measures. The level of intervention 
increases as a bank’s financial condition deteriorates in these three categories. 
Second, US, UK and Chinese triggering events all take capital regulation into 
consideration. This means that capital regulation has an important role in the triggering 
events to assess banks’ financial situations, whether regulation of capital adequacy is 
directly related to triggering events or forms a part of supervisory assessments. In terms 
of a direct connection of capital adequacy regulation with triggering events, including US 
PCA and Chinese capital regulation for banks as one aspect of combined triggering 
events, capital ratios have the determining function in deciding on the bank category and 
its respective corrective measures, thereby having a direct impact on the level of 
intervention with banks. In terms of capital regulation as an aspect of triggering events, 
requirements for capital regulation are strict and contribute to the final results of 
supervisory assessment. UK PIF and the aspect of supervisory assessment of Chinese 
combined triggering events both regard capital adequacy as an important factor in 
determining the banks’ financial condition. Although supervisory assessment as triggering 
events only assesses several aspects of banks’ business and operations compared with 
assessments of normal banking regulation, the assessment of capital adequacy 
contributes to the results of supervisory assessment as triggering events. This shows the 
importance of capital in triggering events based on supervisory assessments. 
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The third similarity of US, UK and Chinese triggering events is the relatively low 
frequencies of assessments of banks’ financial condition. This means that time intervals 
between two assessments in the US, the UK and China to identify and test banks’ 
financial condition are relatively long. In the context of US PCA, all bank information 
disclosure derived from call reports to banking regulators to federal banking regulators 
are on a quarterly basis.546 UK PIF is conducted on a yearly basis in accordance with the 
PRA’s approach to assess banks’ performance aiming to determine the level of 
intervention for particular banks.547 Concerning the Chinese combined triggering events, 
supervisory assessment of banks based on an internal rating system is conducted on a 
yearly basis and capital triggering events are conducted on a quarterly basis to get 
information of the Chinese banks’ financial condition.548 This similar feature shared by the 
US, UK and Chinese triggering events is likely to be an issue especially when banks are 
distressed because the banks’ financial situations tend to deteriorate very quickly and fall 
into another category which requires more intrusive corrective measures. A higher 
frequency of assessments of banks’ financial situations to trigger early intervention could 
contribute to early identification of the actual condition and status of the banks, especially 
when the banks are in distress. 
Even if US, UK and Chinese legal structures in relation to structured early 
intervention and banking regulation are different, these similarities cast some light on 
general features of structured early intervention for banks. The third similarity among 
triggering events in the three countries contributes to consideration of functions and 
details of structured early intervention for banks, specifically considering whether to 
shorten the intervals between two assessments to triggering early intervention is 
necessary and helpful. 
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C. Why are the US, UK and Chinese Triggering Events Different? 
 
Before going into the details of the differences between US, UK and Chinese 
triggering events, the following four underlying factors may explain why differences 
between US, UK and Chinese triggering events exist: bank ownership structure, whether 
the banking sector of a country is concentrated, mandates of banking regulators, and 
functions of structured early intervention for banks from the perspective of policymakers. 
First, bank ownership structure is one of the factors that causes differences in 
banking regulation and mechanisms of triggering events from country to country.  
The impact of bank ownership structure on banking regulation is twofold. Bank ownership 
structure is related to whether banking regulation is strict or not, especially in relation to 
capital regulation. Capital regulation is an important part of banking regulation and 
supervision and it is crucial for triggering events in some countries where the mechanisms 
of triggering events are on the basis of capital adequacy of banks. A higher level of state 
ownership in banks tends to be associated with less strict requirements on capital 
regulation.549 A country with a higher ratio of government-owned banks would prefer a 
less stringent bank regulation and specifically the banking regulation of the country would 
concentrate on profits of government-owned banks instead of the overall stability of the 
banking system.550 In other words, the degree of state or government involvement in bank 
ownership structure and the number of government-owned banks have an impact on 
stringency of capital regulation. This could further influence standards of triggering events 
as to what standards are regarded as the starting point of early intervention for banks. 
Another impact of bank ownership structure on banking regulation is its likelihood to 
contribute to poorly developed banks and a poorly managed financial system.551 In the 
context of state-owned banks, capital regulation may not be as effective as designed 
because state-owned banks can receive assistance and subsidies from the state and 
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other channels.552 This may have an impact on determining the actual financial condition 
of state-owned banks, thereby causing triggering events to be less useful in this context.  
State-owned banks may never be in real difficulties and encounter failures with less strict 
capital requirements and financial assistance in distressed situations. That is to say that 
detection of changes and problems in state-owned banks’ financial conditions and the 
resulting corrective measures taken by banking regulators are more difficult to achieve 
and less likely to happen.553 Whether the state ownership prevails or not, bank structures 
can have an impact on capital regulation requirements of banking regulation and therefore 
contribute to differences in triggering events based on capital ratios. 
Second, whether the banking sector is concentrated or not is another factor that 
contributes to differences in banking regulation, including triggering events of early 
intervention. Concentration in the banking sector has a positive effect on stability.554 More 
specifically, a concentrated banking sector with large banks is likely to be more stable 
and contribute to the stability of the financial system as a whole.555 In those countries with 
more concentrated banking sectors, capital regulation tends to be less strict, which allows 
banks to calculate the equity capital in a more lenient way. 556  Countries with less 
concentrated banking sectors tend to have stricter banking regulation, and therefore their 
capital regulation and triggering events of early intervention can be stricter.  
Third, in relation to banking regulation and structured early intervention for banks, 
mandates of banking regulators contribute to differences in how structured early 
intervention for banks can be triggered or initiated. To begin with, the scope of power and 
authority that is assigned to banking regulators determines whether they have any 
discretion in determining if and when to start early intervention. Additionally, mandates of 
administrative power and authority have an impact on the scope of banking regulators’ 
power and authority in banking regulation and resolution. Administrative power and 
authority of banking regulators and judicial power may coexist and the division between 
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administrative and judicial power and authority varies from country to country. In some 
countries, courts may have the power and authority to limit actions taken by banking 
regulators while judicial power in other countries may have less power to reverse 
administrative decisions and actions. 557  This means that the effectiveness of 
administrative power and authority may be influenced by the scope of judicial power. 
Whatever the scope of administrative or judicial authority and power is, the independence 
of these two is essential to ensure integrity of decisions and judgements by banking 
regulators and resolution authorities.558 
Finally, functions of structured early intervention for banks from the perspective of 
policymakers have a direct impact on the mechanisms and standards of triggering events. 
Structured early intervention for banks can be regarded as a mechanism that works to 
identify problems at early stages on the basis of banking regulation. This means that 
structured early intervention for banks is an integral part of banking regulation, and a 
particular stage within the process of banking regulation and supervision. Structured early 
intervention for banks can also be regarded as a separate system that works 
independently to identify problems of banks at early stages. This means that structured 
early intervention for banks is an additional mechanism for banking regulators to reflect 
the bank’s financial condition at early stages. Different considerations on functions of 
structured early intervention for banks are likely to cause different designs or 
arrangements for triggering events.   
To summarise, there are four reasons that explain why triggering events of US, UK 
and Chinese structured early intervention for banks are different: bank ownership 
structures, whether the banking sector of a country is concentrated, mandates of banking 
regulators, and functions of structured early intervention for banks from the perspective 
of policymakers. The first three reasons are related to specific banking sectors of 
individual countries and the final reason is related to differences in designs and functions 
of structured early intervention for banks. 
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On the basis of comparisons of US, UK and Chinese triggering events, the 
following two differences are important and could work as a reference when a country 
considers how to structure triggering events in its own early intervention system. The first 
difference is whether triggering events serve as a separate set of standards or an integral 
set of standards in assessing a bank’s financial condition in relation to prudential banking 
regulatory requirements. The second difference is whether triggering events should be 
rule-based or discretion-based standards. 
 
D. Triggering Events as A Separate or an Integral Sets of Standards 
 
In relation to the first differences among US, UK and Chinese triggering events, 
the difference refers to whether standards of triggering events should be separate from 
banking regulatory requirements. This difference leads to two types of triggering events. 
The first type is a separate set of standards of triggering events which is often related to 
a formal and well-established structured early intervention for banks. The second type is 
an integral set of standards of triggering events on the basis of banking regulatory 
requirements. The difference between the two types of triggering events is a determining 
factor of whether structured early intervention for banks is a formal and well-established 
early intervention regime or a regular intervention system on the basis of normal banking 
regulations.559 A regular intervention system here refers to judgement and principles-
based structured early intervention. Whether or not triggering events of structured early 
intervention for banks are a separate set of standards correlates with the type of 
structured early intervention for banks as a formal regime or a regular banking 
intervention system.  
US PCA is a formal and well-established structured early intervention framework 
with a separate set of standards as triggering events. 560  Although capital ratios are 
standard for normal and regular banking regulation, PCA capital ratios are specified as a 
system of standards to initiate corrective measures when banks fall below certain capital 
standards. UK PIF, on the other hand, is a regular intervention system where banking 
regulators use their judgement on the basis of principles to assess whether an increased 
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level of intervention is necessary against a selection of regulatory requirements as 
standards. Triggering events of Chinese early intervention systems tend to resemble 
separate sets of standards. Both capital ratios and supervisory assessment have their 
own standards in terms of initiating the following corrective measures rather than 
depending on only banking regulatory requirements and the judgement of banking 
regulators. Whether triggering events of structured early intervention for banks are 
separate or integral sets of standards matters, because both types of triggering events 
have an impact on designs and actual operations of structured early intervention for banks.  
In relation to formal or regular early intervention systems, the designs and actual 
operations can be different in the following ways. First, the legal basis for banking 
regulators’ authority and power is different between a formal early intervention system 
and a regular early intervention system. Under a regular early intervention system, the 
legal basis for regulatory power to deal with troubled banks at an early stage is from the 
Banking Act and regulators’ power and authority to maintain a safe and sound banking 
system.561 However, under a formal early intervention system, the legal basis tends to go 
beyond banking regulators’ regular power and authority of ensuring safety and soundness 
of the banking sector. The legal basis is provided by a particular piece of legislation. For 
example, FDICIA provides the legal basis for US PCA where triggering events and 
corrective measures are statutory-based.562 Although the legal basis for a formal and a 
regular early intervention system is different, the power and authority of banking 
regulators between a formal intervention system and a regular intervention system can 
overlap. For example, PCA triggering events and regulatory requirements of US banking 
regulation overlap in certain situations. A bank can be regarded as a problem bank under 
supervisory requirements of US banking regulation because one or more aspects of its 
business do not meet regulatory requirements to be safe and sound, such as 
unsatisfactory asset quality, and therefore the bank is subject to discretionary measures 
of the regulators. In the meantime, capital ratios of the bank may drop to a lower category 
and may then be subject to PCA corrective measures which may require the bank to 
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improve its capital adequacy and impose restrictions on the bank’s activities. Formal and 
regular intervention systems have different legal bases for banking regulators’ power and 
authority in terms of triggering events and corrective actions. There can be overlaps 
between banking regulators’ power and authority between these two intervention systems. 
Second, designs and actual operations of a formal and regular intervention system 
can be different from the perspective of functionality. Functionality here refers to whether 
early intervention systems are deemed as the last regulatory intervention attempts with 
stringent measures in relation to dealing with and managing troubled banks before bank 
resolution. In this context, formal early intervention systems tend to be the last attempt or 
resort for banking regulators to deal with and manage troubled banks. Banking regulatory 
requirements and supervisory measures for regular banking regulation can be more 
flexible, timely and discreet for banking regulators to identify problems and issues of 
banks on the basis of principles and regulators’ judgement.563 These corrective measures 
under regular banking regulation can be less stringent because of discretion and 
regulatory forbearance. As a result, a stricter, formal, early intervention system that limits 
discretion and reduces forbearance, could eventually complement functions and 
operations of regular banking regulation and provide banking regulators with stringent 
corrective measures to deal with troubled banks’ problems that cannot be properly 
resolved through supervisory measures. A regular intervention system can be less 
compatible because triggering events of regular intervention systems are more similar to 
regulatory requirements of normal banking regulation. This could potentially lead to a lack 
of urgency in triggering early intervention for troubled banks and willingness to take 
stricter corrective measures. 
One key difference in US, UK and Chinese triggering events is whether they are a 
separate or an integral set of standards on the basis of regular banking regulatory 
requirements. This difference correlates with different types of structured early 
intervention for banks, namely a formal or a regular intervention system. These different 
types of structured early intervention for banks further determine the specific legal basis 
that is required for each type of structured early intervention and whether a type of 
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structured early intervention for banks can be treated as the regulators’ final attempts with 
stringent measures before bank resolution. 
 
E.  Rules-Based or Discretion-Based Triggering Events 
 
Whether triggering events are based on rules or regulators’ discretion and 
judgement constitutes another difference between US, UK and Chinese structured early 
intervention for banks. The difference between rules-based triggering events and 
discretion-based triggering events is the scope of regulators’ discretion in relation to 
assessing and determining a bank’s financial condition. With rules-based triggering 
events, banking regulators tend to have less discretion in terms of determining banks’ 
financial conditions and the corrective actions that follow. Discretion-based triggering 
events, on the other hand, allow banking regulators to have more discretion to decide if 
and when to start early interventions with the banks. Rule-based triggering events and 
discretion-based triggering events are similar to the two ends of the spectrum. Finding a 
suitable type of triggering events is necessary and important for an effective operation of 
structured early intervention for banks. Current US, UK, and Chinese structured early 
intervention processes for banks have shown different considerations of advantages and 
disadvantages of rules-based and discretion-based triggering events.  
In terms of advantages and disadvantages of rules-based and discretion-based 
triggering events, information, timing, banking regulators’ willingness and the costs of 
triggering structured early intervention are important factors that may have an impact on 
the actual implementation of these two types of triggering events. Information refers to 
information about financial conditions and risks of banks available to banking regulators. 
Timing refers to the timing of the initiation of triggering events. Banking regulators’ 
willingness and costs refer to whether the regulators are incentivised to initiate triggering 
events and take corrective measures when costs incur first and benefits will incur in the 
future.564  
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Concerning rules-based triggering events, information about banks’ financial 
conditions and risks is based on financial variables of banks, such as capital ratios and 
non-performing assets coverage ratios. A disadvantage of rule-based triggering events is 
insufficient information provided by one or several financial variables as triggering events, 
which may not provide a full review of banks, and contribute to false and inaccurate 
assessments of the banks’ overall financial conditions and risk levels. Although the 
current PCA capital triggers are lagging and non-performing assets coverage ratios can 
be an effective alternative, both ratios can only reflect one aspect of banks’ financial 
conditions rather than a full assessment. The timing of rule-based triggering events is less 
related to banking regulators’ discretion, which means early intervention will be 
automatically initiated to some extent when banks’ financial conditions deteriorate and fail 
to meet benchmarks of certain categories. Because of the nature of rules, banking 
regulators are required to initiate early intervention and take the following corrective 
actions when banks fail to meet the requirements. There is less discretion remaining for 
the banking regulators to weigh costs and benefits of timing of early intervention. The 
rules ensure initiations of early intervention by banking regulators at the same time for 
different cases and are consistent with the purpose of early identification and structured 
early intervention for banks. 
Concerning discretions-based triggering events, information about banks’ financial 
conditions and risk has a wider source and is based on a more comprehensive 
assessment of the banks’ business and operations. With more information available to 
banking regulators, assessment of banks can be more accurate compared with objective 
standards with financial variables, which is more likely to detect problems of the banks 
not only in aspects that can be reflected by financial variables but also in other aspects 
that needs the judgement of regulators. The timing of discretion-based triggering events 
is more likely to vary depending on particular problems of a bank instead of the 
consistency of rule-based triggering events, which results from the nature of banking 
regulators’ decisions on if and when to trigger early intervention.  
The tension between banking regulators’ willingness and the costs of dealing with 
troubled banks is more evident in discretion-based triggering events. When the regulators 
have the discretion to decide if and when to trigger early intervention, they may not be 
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willing to confirm distressed financial situations of a bank and take corrective actions 
because the costs of early intervention incur first. In hindsight, banking regulators with 
discretion should have intervened earlier to deal with troubled banks to avoid future costs 
of bank failures. Information for the regulators in discretion-based triggering events is not 
disclosed to the public because any corrective measures imposed on the banks are likely 
to cause turbulence in financial stability and public confidence, and can even lead to 
negative outcomes such as a bank run. With private information, the regulators are more 
inclined to hold back in triggering early intervention and taking corrective measures 
because of the potential negative outcome, which means banking regulators’ willingness 
to take action is limited.565 
Based on discussions of both rules-based triggering events and discretion-based 
triggering events, both types of triggering events are not perfect. Rules provide 
consistency in dealing with troubled banks and mandatory timing and requirements for 
banking regulators to act. Discretion allows a comprehensive assessment of banks’ 
financial conditions and tailors corrective measures to particular problems of the banks. 
US, UK and Chinese triggering events have placed different emphases on rules and 
discretions.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses US, UK, and Chinese triggering events of structured early 
intervention for banks, and explores similarities and differences among the three models 
of triggering events. Capital ratios is the mechanism of US triggering events of structured 
early intervention for banks. The level of capital adequacy of banks reflected by capital 
ratios is the key factor that determines on what level the US banking regulators intervene 
by implementing corrective measures. This mechanism directly takes capital regulation 
into consideration as an important factor to assess a bank’s financial condition and 
therefore conducts early intervention with the banks. In terms of structured early 
intervention for banks, capital ratios seem to be a lagging indicator in detecting changes 
 
565 Ansgar Walther and Lucy White, ‘Rules Versus Discretions in Bank Resolution’ (25 March 2016) 
<https://acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/waltherwhite.pdf> last accessed 26 
August 2019 
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in banks’ financial performance and operations, which is likely to cause inaccurate 
information and delays in reflecting the actual financial conditions of banks. Moreover, 
capital ratios as triggering events of structured early intervention for banks could foster 
regulatory forbearance, which is likely to cause insufficient intervention with troubled 
banks at the early stages. The actual effect of capital ratios to incentivise banks to 
recapitalise is limited. The way to improve the effectiveness of capital ratios can be by 
incorporating another ratio on the basis of non-performing assets of banks to identify and 
detect problems in a timelier way. 
Supervisory assessment is the mechanism of UK triggering events of structured 
early intervention for banks. The results of supervisory assessments of the UK banking 
regulator are the determining factor of the level of intervention by corrective measures. 
UK supervisory assessment as triggering events of structured early intervention is based 
on the mechanisms of supervisory assessment of regular and normal banking regulation 
and supervision. In terms of structured early intervention for banks, supervisory 
assessment tends to provide a full and comprehensive assessment of the banks’ financial 
conditions and analyse overall safety and soundness of banks, which is likely to provide 
accurate information concerning the banks’ situations. However, because of the cost and 
time intervals between two assessments, supervisory assessments as triggering events 
are unable to provide timely information of bank performance. Moreover, the discretion of 
banking regulators is likely to contribute to problems with predictability and accountability. 
Combined triggering events based on both capital ratios and supervisory 
assessment are the mechanism of the Chinese model to initiate structured early 
intervention for banks. Capital ratios can not only trigger corrective measures on its own, 
but is also related to the final results of supervisory assessments. In the context of the 
Chinese structured early intervention for banks, the combined triggering events may not 
work very effectively. Combined triggering events do not equal to a set of timely, accurate 
and predictive triggering events. Two sets of triggering events are likely to cause 
inconsistency in applying the corrective measures. Functions of capital ratios and 
supervisory assessment overlap to a large extent in assessing a bank’s financial condition 
at the early stages. 
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Comparisons of the US, UK, and Chinese triggering events reveal two primary 
differences in the designs of triggering events of structured early intervention for banks. 
One difference is that triggering events are a separate and additional set of requirements 
compared with banking regulatory requirements. This difference determines whether 
there is a formal intervention system of structured early intervention or a regular 
intervention system. Another difference is whether triggering events are based on 
prescribed rules or on the discretion of banking regulators. This difference determines the 
scope of discretion of banking regulators in structured early intervention for banks, which 
also shows the tension between rules and discretion in triggering events of structured 
early intervention for banks. The two differences should be taken into consideration when 
designing triggering events. Apart from the two main differences, the US, UK, and 
Chinese triggering events share similarities in classifications, functions of capital ratios 
and frequencies between two assessments no matter what the types of triggering events 
are. 
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Chapter 4 Comparisons of Corrective Measures of US, UK and Chinese Structured 
Early Intervention for Banks 
 
Corrective measures, together with triggering events, constitute core aspects of 
structured early intervention for banks. Triggering events act as the indicator of troubled 
bank financial condition and risk levels. Corrective measures are actual measures for 
banking regulatory agencies to deal with weakened financial performance and increased 
risk levels of troubled banks. In a wider context, corrective measures, including banking 
regulation and resolution are comprised of two categories. One category of corrective 
measures focuses on dealing with problems of troubled banks at early stages, such as 
restrictions on banks’ management, asset growth and business lines, with the purpose of 
improving banks’ viabilities. Another category of corrective measures focuses on 
transferring troubled banks’ assets with the aim of bank resolution or the winding up of 
the banks. In the context of structured early intervention for banks, the first category of 
corrective measures is the main concern. These corrective measures play the role of 
increasing the level of supervision whilst resolving supervisory issues of troubled banks 
directly, thereby achieving the aim of structured early intervention for banks by managing 
troubled banks’ problems at an early stage and minimising the potential impact of 
potential bank failure. 
This chapter is structured as follows. This first section mainly discusses and 
examines US corrective measures that aim to improve troubled banks’ financial 
performance. Corrective measures for undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised 
banks are core to early intervention by banking regulations. The second section discusses 
UK corrective measures at each stage of early intervention. The third section discusses 
Chinese corrective measures, mainly general corrective measures and stricter corrective 
measures. The final section compares similarities and differences between US, UK and 
Chinese corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks. On the basis of 
comparison, the final section examines the impact of corrective measures on discretions 
of banking regulatory agencies and discusses what may be a better way to design 
corrective measures. The final section also discusses what specific corrective measures 
should be taken into consideration when establishing or reforming structured early 
intervention for banks to achieve a better outcome. 
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I. Corrective Measures of US Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
This section discusses corrective measures of structured early intervention for 
banks in the US. Corrective measures are different from regulatory measures of regular 
banking regulation because the purposes of regulatory measures and corrective 
measures are different. The corrective measures are also more intrusive than regulatory 
measures in terms of the level of intervention by banking regulators and the effect on 
banks. US corrective measures can be mainly categorised into the following two groups: 
(1) corrective measures that aim to improve the overall financial performance of troubled 
banks and (2) corrective measures that aim to prepare for an orderly bank resolution. 
Triggering events of US structured early intervention for banks, depending on the 
capital ratios of banks, categorise the banks into five groups: well capitalised, adequately 
capitalised, undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised and critically undercapitalised 
banks. In terms of the first four groups of banks, the banking regulators of a bank could 
apply corrective measures that aim to improve their financial performance. In terms of the 
last group of banks, the banking regulators of a troubled bank could apply both groups of 
corrective measures to deal with financial difficulties and potential failure of the banks.  
This section discusses the two groups of US corrective measures respectively. 
First, this section discusses corrective measures that aim to restore banks’ financial 
performance, including both compulsory and discretionary corrective measures, and it 
discusses the effects that these corrective measures may have on troubled banks. Finally, 
this section discusses the corrective measures that aim to prepare for an orderly bank 
resolution.  
 
A. Corrective Measures for Improving Banks’ Financial Performance 
 
The category of corrective measures that aims to improve banks’ financial 
performance can be applied by banking regulators to deal with banks in all five groups. 
Some of the corrective measures are compulsory for all banks in any group while other 
compulsory corrective measures are applicable only to banks in the latter three groups, 
which have more severe financial difficulties and problems, depending on their capital 
155 
ratios. Discretionary corrective measures are also applicable to banks in the latter three 
groups. 
 
1. Compulsory Corrective Measures for All Banks 
 
Compulsory corrective measures are comprised of two specific measures to 
maintain the financial stability of banks, especially requiring the banks to maintain their 
level of capital. These two measures have an impact on the banks’ capital, which requires 
the banks to ensure a certain level of capital adequacy before making any distributions. 
The first measure restricts banks to make any capital distribution.566 No capital distribution 
is allowed for banks in any group if after the distribution the banks would become 
undercapitalised with the exception of approval by the FDIC.567 The second measure 
restricts banks to make any management fee payments, especially when the banks would 
become undercapitalised after payment to any person in control of the banks.568 
 
2. Compulsory Corrective Measure for Banks in the Latter Three Groups 
 
Compulsory corrective measures for banks in the latter three groups, which are 
undercapitalised banks, significantly undercapitalised banks and critically 
undercapitalised banks, have the progressive feature. This feature means that in addition 
to particular compulsory measures for one group of banks, they are subject to all 
compulsory measures for the previous group. For example, significantly undercapitalised 
banks are subject to both compulsory measures for undercapitalised banks and particular 
corrective measures for significantly undercapitalised banks. Therefore, compulsory 
corrective measures for undercapitalised banks act as the foundation for corrective 
measures for banks in the latter three groups. More corrective measures add on to this 
foundation and form a range of measures for significantly undercapitalised and critically 
undercapitalised banks. 
 
 
566 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (d) (1) (A) 
567 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (d) (1) (B) 
568 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (d) (2) 
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a. Compulsory Measures for Undercapitalised Banks 
 
Compulsory measures for undercapitalised banks mainly have an impact on banks’ 
businesses and activities, which consist of the following: increased level of monitoring by 
federal banking agencies, a required capital restoration plan, restricted asset growth, and 
preapproval by federal banking agencies of certain business activities. 
 
(1)  Increased Level of Monitoring 
 
An increased level of monitoring of undercapitalised banks by federal banking 
agencies refers to closely monitoring conditions of undercapitalised banks, closely 
monitoring the banks’ compliance to the capital restoration plan and periodically reviewing 
the plan and the banks’ progress.569  
Closely monitoring conditions of undercapitalised banks requires banking 
regulators to pay more attention to undercapitalised banks’ results of both on-site 
examinations and off-site analyses of regulatory information. This is different from regular 
day-to-day banking regulation and supervision by federal banking agencies and requires 
more in depth and in detail analysis by federal banking regulators.  As these results and 
regulatory information provide a basis for banking regulators’ analyses of deviations of 
banks from normal banking operations570, an increased level of supervision and attention 
by federal banking agencies could be more sensitive to react to changes of 
undercapitalised banks. As a result, whether the undercapitalised banks need further 
corrective actions or whether capital adequacy of the banks has increased can be 
detected in a timely way.  
Both closely monitoring the compliance of undercapitalised banks with the capital 
restoration plan and periodically reviewing the plan and undercapitalised banks’ progress 
have the same function of closely monitoring the  conditions of undercapitalised banks.571 
Increased levels of supervision of the capital restoration plan and its compliance enable 
banking regulators to detect problems in undercapitalised banks’ operations, so that they 
 
569 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (1) 
570 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Supervisory Guidelines on Identifying and Dealing with 
Weak Banks’ (July 2015) 24 <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d330.pdf > last accessed 26 Aug 2019 
571 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (1) (B) and (C) 
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can improve their capital adequacy, especially when the content of the plan concentrates 
on improving capital adequacy and restoring capital levels of undercapitalised banks. 
 
(2) A Required Capital Restoration Plan 
 
Another compulsory corrective measure for undercapitalised banks requires the 
banks to design a capital restoration plan and submit it to federal banking agencies.572 
The capital restoration plan embedded in US structured early intervention for banks, 
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), focuses more on the aspect of improving capital 
adequacy of undercapitalised banks. The plan requires these banks to submit capital 
restoration plans within certain timeframes and to satisfy certain requirements or meet 
standards to be accepted by federal banking agencies.573  
In general, a capital restoration plan that focuses on the aspect of improving capital 
adequacy constitutes one type of corrective action plans. Concerning corrective action 
plans, there are several types of corrective action plans with different purposes to deal 
with weaknesses of troubled banks, including plans dealing with management, and plans 
dealing with capital adequacy as well as comprehensive plans dealing with several 
aspects of weakness of troubled banks.574 Because interrelations of weaknesses and 
risks exist in troubled banks, a comprehensive corrective action plan can be necessary 
and useful.575 
The capital restoration plan of an undercapitalised bank intends to restore its 
capital and improve its capital adequacy to the level of adequately capitalised banks. The 
two main aspects of the capital restoration plan of PCA are contents of the plan and 
criteria for acceptance of the plan by the federal banking regulators. Concerning the 
contents of the plan, one aspect of the capital restoration plan focuses on steps and 
measures taken by the ‘undercapitalised’ banks to improve their capital level.576 Specific 
steps and measures vary and depend on each undercapitalised bank. Another aspect of 
the capital restoration plan relates to the amount of capital that will be attained by the 
 
572 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) 
573 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (B) and (D) 
574 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Supervisory Guidelines for Identifying and Dealing with 
Weak Banks’ (June 2014) 31 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs285.pdf> last accessed 26 Aug 2019 
575 ibid. 
576 12 U.S.C. § 1831o  (e) (2) (B) (i) (I) 
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‘undercapitalised’ bank each year after the plan has been in effect.577 The third aspect is 
that the undercapitalised bank has to come up with specific measures and steps to comply 
with restrictions and requirements by the federal banking regulators.578 The last aspect of 
the capital restoration plan requires the undercapitalised banks to state types and levels 
of activities engaged by them.579  
Concerning the criteria of acceptance of the capital restoration plan by federal 
banking agencies, the criteria impose requirements on both undercapitalised banks and 
their holding companies.580 In regard to requirements for undercapitalised banks, the 
capital restoration plans need to satisfy the requirements for the contents of the plans in 
the first place. In order to be accepted by federal banking agencies, the plans of 
undercapitalised banks also need to be based on realistic assumptions and take practical 
steps and measures which are likely to help the banks to restore their capital level to 
certain standards and to improve their financial situations.581 Another requirement of the 
criteria of acceptance requires undercapitalised banks to stabilise risk levels after 
implementations of capital restoration plans, which means risk levels, including credit risk, 
interest rate risk and other risks would not increase after the plans.582 In regard to criteria 
for bank holding companies, bank holding companies are required to provide guarantees 
and assurances to undercapitalised banks. The holding company of undercapitalised 
banks has to guarantee the banks’ compliance with the capital restoration plan, until the 
banks have become adequately capitalised during each of four consecutive calendar 
quarters. 583  Bank holding companies are also required to provide assurances of 
performance.584 
In addition to the two main aspects of a capital restoration plan, the plan for 
undercapitalised banks has other requirements. For example, concerning the end date of 
submitting the plan, undercapitalised banks have at most 45 days to design and submit 
 
577 12 U.S.C. § 1831o  (e) (2) (B) (i) (II) 
578 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (B) (i) (III) 
579 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (B) (i) (IV) 
580 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (C) (ii) 
581 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (C) (i) (II) 
582 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (C) (i) (III) 
583 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (C) (ii) (I) 
584 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (C) (ii) (II) 
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their capital restoration plans from becoming undercapitalised. 585  Federal banking 
agencies that regulate particular undercapitalised banks have to act based on the plans 
within 60 days of submission and they need to provide copies of the plans within 45 days 
starting from the date when the plans are approved.586 Concerning limited guarantee 
liabilities of bank holding companies, bank holding companies are not liable for all 
liabilities of ‘undercapitalised’ banks. The holding companies are responsible for a certain 
amount of liabilities depending on different situations and levels of compliance of 
undercapitalised banks with capital restoration plans.587 The limited guarantee liabilities 
do not affect certain affiliates within the group company, which means that any company 
that does not control an undercapitalised bank is not required to be responsible for a 
capital restoration plan and any legal person who is not the undercapitalised bank itself 
is not required to submit the plan, and compliance with other law and regulations is not 
affected.588 
To summarise, the capital restoration plan is important for both ‘undercapitalised’ 
banks and federal banking agencies as the plan aims to recover the financial situation of 
the banks to an adequately capitalised level and both the banks and regulatory agencies 
are required to make sure to comply with the plan. Full compliance of the plan could be a 
way to improve the capital adequacy of ‘undercapitalised’ banks in practice because steps 
and measures of the plan formulated by the banks are suitable for their current financial 
situations and are approved and supervised by federal banking regulators. 
 
(3) Restricted Asset Growth 
 
Restriction on asset growth of undercapitalised banks is the third compulsory 
measure put in place by the federal banking agencies that deal with the banks. Restricting 
asset growth could be a way to improve banks’ capital to achieve the goal of improving 
capital adequacy of undercapitalised banks. Concerning higher capital requirements 
imposed on undercapitalised banks by banking regulators, there are several ways for a 
bank to improve its capital ratio to satisfy regulatory standards on capital. Generally, the 
 
585 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (D) (ii) 
586 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (D) (iii) – (iv) 
587 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (E) (i) 
588 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (2) (E) (i) (I) – (II) 
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bank could retain earnings by reducing the dividends it pays or by increasing lending 
spreads of interest rates and profits from other lines of business, to increase income and 
improve capital.589 Another way of the bank to improve its capital ratio is to reduce lending, 
which involves changes made to the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet.590 The bank 
could slow the pace of lending in order to retain earnings and allow capital to increase or 
the bank could sell its assets to gain proceeds from the sale to improve capital level and 
to repay debts. The bank could also increase its capital by issuing new shares to raise 
additional equity.591 For example, the bank could make equity offerings to new investors 
to increase capital. However, issuing new equity may have an impact on the value of 
previous shares. Finally, the bank could reduce existing risks in its assets by reducing 
lending to high risk borrowers and by replacing high risk lending with low risk loans and 
securities.592 US banks increased low risk holdings of treasuries and decreased their 
commercial loans in the 1990s, which helped to improve their financial situations.593  
Based on rules of PCA, undercapitalised banks are required to restrict asset 
growth to restore capital so that they can reduce lending and reduce existing risks in their 
assets to control the growth of their assets. According to FDICIA, the average total assets 
of undercapitalised banks is generally required not to exceed the average total assets 
from the previous calendar quarters with the exception of certain conditions.594 Certain 
conditions for exception of asset growth restrictions include where federal banking 
agencies have approved their capital restoration plan, or where increase of total assets 
of the banks is consistent with their plans, or the banks’ ratios of tangible equity to assets 
increases at a rate that allows the banks to restore their capital level as ‘adequately 
capitalised’ within certain amounts of time.595 
 
589 Benjamin Cohen and Michela Scatigna, ‘Banks and Capital Requirements: Channels of Adjustment’ 
(2016) 69 Journal of Banking and Finance 56 
590 ibid. 
591 Natalya Martynova, ‘Effect of Bank Capital Requirements on Economic Growth: A Survey’ DNB 
Working Papers No.467 (March 2015) 
592 Oxford Economics, ‘Analysing the Impact of Bank Capital and Liquidity Regulations on US Economic 
Growth’ The Clearing House Association (April 2013) 
<https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/files/association%20documents/20130410_capital%20standa
rds_impact%20higher%20bank%20capital.pdf> last accessed 26 Aug 2019 
593 Allen Berger and Gregory Udell, ‘Did Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit and Cause a ‘Credit 
Crunch in the United States?’ (1994) 26 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 585 
594 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (3). 
595 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (3) (A) – (C). 
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(4) Preapproval of Certain Business by Banking Regulators 
 
The fourth mandatory measure of federal banking agencies to deal with 
‘undercapitalised’ banks is to control the growth of the banks’ businesses. 
‘Undercapitalised’ banks are required to gain approval of banking regulators before 
acquisitions, branching and new lines of business.596  Specifically, the banks are not 
allowed to directly or indirectly acquire interest in any other companies, establish new 
offices and start new lines of business with exceptions under certain conditions. 597 The 
conditions to get approval from banking regulators to expand ‘undercapitalised’ banks’ 
businesses are either where federal banking agencies have accepted the plans that the 
banks are implementing and the agencies determine that actions to expand the banks’ 
businesses are consistent with the plan, or the Board of Directors considers that the 
proposed actions will achieve the purpose of measures dealing with ‘undercapitalised’ 
banks.598 
These rules enable federal banking regulators to take mandatory measures to deal 
with ‘undercapitalised’ banks, including compulsory capital restoration plans and intrusive 
measures on asset growth and expansion of business. These mandatory measures aim 
to improve capital adequacy of the ‘undercapitalised’ banks. Capital restoration plans are 
vital in terms of mandatory measures for ‘undercapitalised’ banks. ‘Undercapitalised’ 
banks that fail to submit appropriate capital restoration plans or fail to implement such 
plans also need to comply with all provisions designed for ‘critically undercapitalised’ 
banks. 
 
b. Compulsory Measures for Significantly Undercapitalised Banks 
 
On the basis of compulsory measures for undercapitalised banks, the one 
particular compulsory measure for significantly undercapitalised banks is restrictions on 
senior executive officers’ compensation. In general, without prior written approval of 
federal banking regulators, ‘significantly undercapitalised’ banks are not permitted to pay 
 
596 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (4) 
597 ibid. 
598 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (4) (A) – (B) 
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any bonus to senior executive officers and the banks are not allowed to provide 
compensation for senior executive officers at a rate that is over their average 
compensation rates with the exception of bonuses, stock options and profit-sharing during 
certain amounts of time.599 The precondition of prior written approval of compensation of 
senior executive officers by federal banking agencies is to submit acceptable capital 
restoration plans on time by ‘significantly undercapitalised’ banks. Failure of compliance 
of submission of the plan leads to no grant of prior written approval of federal banking 
regulators.600 
 
c. Compulsory Measures for Critically Undercapitalised Banks 
 
In order to improve the performance of critically undercapitalised banks, 
compulsory measures are the main solution for the federal banking regulator. In addition 
to compulsory measures for all other banks that have better financial performance or 
higher capital ratios from well capitalised to significantly undercapitalised banks, critically 
undercapitalised banks are subject to another two categories of measures, specifically 
restrictions on activities of the banks and prohibition of payments on subordinated debts.  
In terms of restrictions on activities, compulsory measures for the activities of 
‘critically undercapitalised’ banks are not only stricter but also more specific. Detailed 
requirements with which the banks need to comply reveal the more specific aspect of the 
restrictions on activities of the banks. Critically undercapitalised banks are not allowed to 
conduct the following activities without prior written approval by the FDIC. 601  These 
activities have a great impact on banks’ businesses and operations. First, critically 
undercapitalised banks are restricted to enter any material transactions except their usual 
business, including investment, expansion, acquisition, sales of assets and other similar 
transactions, and the banks need to give notice to their federal banking agencies.602 
Second, extending credit for highly leveraged transactions is also restricted.603 The third 
restricted action is amending bylaws or charters of critically undercapitalised banks, with 
 
599 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (4) (A) 
600 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (4) (B) 
601 12 U.S.C. § 1831o 
602 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (2) (A)  
603 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (2) (B) 
163 
the exception where amending bylaws or charters is necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of other law, regulation or order.604 Fourth, making changes to accounting 
methods by the banks is also highly restricted.605 Fifth, critically undercapitalised banks 
are restricted to be involved in covered transactions.606 Sixth, the banks are restricted to 
pay excessive compensation and bonuses, and finally the banks are restricted to pay an 
excessive interest rate which will increase the weighted average cost of funds to a level 
that greatly exceeds the prevailing interest rate of insured deposits to any new or renewed 
liabilities.607  
All the activities of the banks are restricted until they get prior written approval of 
the FDIC. The stricter aspect of mandatory restrictions on activities of ‘critically 
undercapitalised’ banks is that getting prior written approval by the FDIC of all activities 
discussed above is the minimum requirement. 608  The FDIC, as the federal banking 
agency dealing with restrictions on activities of critically undercapitalised banks, is 
allowed to restrict activities of any critically undercapitalised banks.  
Prohibition of payments on subordinated debts is another category of mandatory 
measures for critically undercapitalised banks. The general requirement of this measure 
is to prohibit critically undercapitalised banks to make any payment of principal or interest 
to the banks’ subordinated debts after 60 days of being critically undercapitalised.609 
There are exceptions to this general requirement on the prohibition of payment on 
subordinated debts. One exception is when the banks have been in conservatorship or 
receivership or affected by other actions taken by The FDIC, and another exception is 
when the FDIC determines no prohibition on this matter will better achieve the purpose 
of PCA measures.610 There also are limited exceptions to subordinated debt, which refer 
to certain subordinated debts accrued during certain timeframes, and the prohibition of 
mandatory measure does not apply to these particular subordinated debts.611 
 
 
604 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (2) (C) 
605 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (2) (D) 
606 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (2) (E) 
607 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (2) (F) – (G) 
608 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (i) (1) 
609 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (2) (A) 
610 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (2) (B) (i) – (ii) 
611 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (2) (C) 
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3. Discretionary Corrective Measures for Undercapitalised and Significantly 
Undercapitalised Banks  
 
In terms of discretionary corrective measure, well capitalised and adequately 
capitalised banks are not subject to any discretionary corrective measures while 
undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks need to be compliant with these 
discretionary measures if their federal banking regulators decide to apply one or some of 
these measures. Critically undercapitalised banks are also subject to compulsory 
measures with two of these measures aiming to improve financial performance of critically 
undercapitalised banks, and one compulsory measure aiming to prepare for an orderly 
resolution. 
Compared with compulsory measures, discretionary measures of federal banking 
agencies are applied when necessary to better carry out the purpose of PCA and the 
discretionary measures have roles of specifying detailed rules concerning the financial 
situations of the banks and complementing application of mandatory measures. Unlike 
the progressive feature of compulsory measures of PCA that additional and intrusive 
measures are designed for banks with lower capital ratios, there is one set of discretionary 
measures for both undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks. In regard to 
undercapitalised banks, discretionary measures may be applied to the banks by 
appropriate federal banking agencies when necessary.612 At least one of the discretionary 
measures has to be applied to significantly undercapitalised banks by appropriate federal 
banking regulators.613 Whether to apply specific measures or a combination of measures 
to individual banks is at the discretion of banking regulators.  
The discretionary measures for both ‘undercapitalised’ and ‘significantly 
undercapitalised’ banks are recapitalisation requirements, restricted transactions with 
affiliates, restrictions on interests rate paid, restrictions on assets growth, restrictions on 
activities, improvement of management, prohibition of deposits from correspondent banks, 
prior approval of capital distribution by bank holding companies, divestiture requirement, 
and other appropriate actions determined by banking regulators to improve the banks’ 
capital. Some of the discretionary measures share similar functions as mandatory 
 
612 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (e) (5) 
613 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) 
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measures, and the difference between discretionary measures and mandatory measures 
is that federal banking regulators are entitled to intervene more in the banks’ business 
and operations to force the banks to restore their capital. 
 
a. Recapitalisation 
 
One of the discretionary measures of federal banking agencies is to require 
undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks to complete recapitalisation. 
Compared with restrictions on asset growth as one of the mandatory measures, 
recapitalisation in the discretionary section requires the banks to take more drastic actions 
to make changes to their assets, including selling shares and obligations and even for the 
banks to be acquired by, or combine with, other depository institutions under certain 
circumstances, thereby improving capital ratios of the banks. In order to achieve 
recapitalisation, at least one of the following is necessary. First, undercapitalised banks 
and significantly undercapitalised banks are required to sell shares or obligations, and 
capital ratios of the banks will be improved and categorised as an adequately capitalised 
bank after the sale.614 Secondly, further sales of shares of the banks are required, and 
the shares must be voting shares.615 The last step of the discretionary measure to achieve 
recapitalisation of the banks is to require the banks to be acquired by other depository 
institutions or to combine with another institution under the circumstance that financial 
situations of banks provide grounds for initiation of conservatorship or receivership.616 
Recapitalisation requirements of discretionary measures are not mild measures for banks 
to make changes to their assets. On the contrary, the requirements enforce the banks to 
take more drastic steps to improve the capital level of the banks, as selling shares and 
selling voting shares has a more direct impact on the banks’ business and operations. 
 
b. Restrictions on Transactions with Affiliates 
 
The second discretionary measure for undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks is restrictions on transactions with affiliates of the banks. The 
 
614 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (A) (i) 
615 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (A) (ii) 
616 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (A) (iii) 
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banks need to comply with rules in the Federal Reserve Act. Under PCA provisions, 
federal banking agencies are allowed to restrict transactions between the banks and their 
affiliates when there are no exemptions to restrictions under the Federal Reserve Act, 
and appropriate federal banking agencies of the banks are entitled to take further 
restrictions on the banks’ transactions with their affiliates.617 
After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), additional restrictions on transactions with affiliates have increased, and the 
additional restrictions have modified the definition of ‘affiliates’ and ‘covered transactions’ 
expanding the definitions of these two terms to include more situations.618 The restrictions 
on transactions with affiliates consist of four aspects. First, there is a clarification of 
affiliates. If proceeds of the transaction between the bank and any person are for the 
benefit of the person, or are transferred to the person, the transaction will be regarded as 
a transaction with affiliates.619 Second, the main restriction on transactions with affiliates 
is the number of transactions. A bank and its affiliates could conduct covered transactions 
with conditions on the number of transactions; specifically that the number of transactions 
between the bank and any affiliates will not be over 10% of capital stock and surplus of 
the bank, and the number of transactions between the bank and all affiliates will not be 
over 20% of capital stock and surplus of the bank.620 Another restriction on transactions 
with affiliates is that the bank is not allowed to purchase low quality assets from its 
subsidiaries except where the bank is determined to buy the assets before the assets are 
acquired by the affiliates based on independent evaluations.621  Finally, any covered 
transactions and transactions between the bank and its affiliates that are exempt from the 
restrictions need to comply with safe and sound banking practices.622  
 
 
617  Morrison & Foerster LLP, ‘Restrictions on Affiliate Transactions’ 
<http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/Section23ABChart.pdf> last accessed 26 Aug 2019 
618 12 U.S.C. § 371c (b)  
619 12 U.S.C. § 371c (a) (2) 
620 12 U.S.C. § 371c (a) (1) 
621 12 U.S.C. § 371c (a) (3) 
622 12 U.S.C. § 371c (a) (4) 
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c. Restrictions on Interests Rate 
 
The next discretionary measure for undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks is restrictions on the interest rate paid on deposits. In general, 
federal banking agencies could determine to restrict the banks’ interest rates that they 
pay on deposits, with reference to the interest rates on deposits of similar amounts as 
well as maturities and scale in the area where the banks operate. 623  However, the 
restrictions of federal banking agencies should not be retroactive, which means the 
banking regulators are not allowed to restrict interest rates paid on time deposits before 
the regulators started to take discretionary measures to act.624 
 
d. Restrictions on Asset Growth 
 
Discretionary measures for both undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks also include a measure for restrictions on asset growth of the 
banks. However, compared with restrictions on asset growth in mandatory measures for 
the banks, restrictions on asset growth as discretionary measures are stricter than those 
in mandatory measures and even require the banks to reduce their total assets in order 
to restore their capital.625 Unlike prior approval of the agencies before the banks initiate 
acquisitions, new branches and new lines of business in mandatory measures, the 
restrictions on activities refer to changing, reducing or terminating any activities that are 
regarded to pose more threat or to bear excessive risks to the banks and their subsidiaries 
by appropriate federal banking agencies.626 
 
e. Improvements of Management 
 
Another discretionary measure for federal banking agencies is to require 
undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks to improve management by 
changing the board of directors or appointing new senior executive officers. Controlling 
management of banks is a common way for banking regulators to improve the 
management level of the banks. This practice can be seen in several EU countries where 
 
623 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (C) (i) 
624 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (C) (ii) 
625 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (D) 
626 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (E) 
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domestic banking regulators can require banks in their countries to make changes in 
organisational and management structure and to remove or suspend a bank official as 
well as to make changes in the internal control system.627  
Federal banking agencies are able to take two kinds of discretionary measures to 
deal with management issues of undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised 
banks. The first kind of measure is to change the board of directors of the banks entirely 
and requires the banks to elect a new board of directors.628 Dismissal of directors follows 
the same rules as dismissal of senior executive officers. The second kind of measure is 
designed to deal with senior executive officers. Federal banking agencies are entitled to 
dismiss senior executive officers. Specifically, the senior executive officers who were in 
office for over 180 days immediately before the banks became undercapitalised can be 
dismissed by the agencies and this dismissal of senior executive officers is not regarded 
as removal of senior officers.629 The agencies are also allowed to appoint new qualified 
senior officers to take control of the banks’ management.630  
 
f. Restrictions on Activities of Bank-Related Parties 
 
Federal banking agencies have discretion to determine whether correspondent 
banks of undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks are prohibited to 
accept deposits from undercapitalised or significantly undercapitalised banks or not, 
which includes acceptance of deposits of correspondent banks and acceptance of 
renewals and rollovers of deposits.631 Another discretionary measure of the agencies to 
deal with the banks is to require prior approval of capital distribution of holding companies 
of the banks. Specifically, bank holding companies of the banks need to get prior approval 
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System before making any capital 
distribution of the companies.632 
 
 
627 Eva Hupkes (n 13) 14 
628 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (F) (i) 
629 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (F) (ii) 
630 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (F) (iii) 
631 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (G) 
632 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (H) 
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g. Divestiture of Banks 
 
The last discretionary measure of federal banking agencies to deal with 
undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks is to require the banks to divest 
themselves or liquidate their subsidiaries or require bank holding companies or controlling 
companies of the banks to divest the banks under certain situations. Generally, the 
agencies could choose one of three divestiture measures or combine the measures to 
deal with the banks. The first divestiture measure requires the banks to divest themselves 
or to liquidate any subsidiaries. The condition for the agencies to take these measures is 
that the subsidiaries of the banks are likely to be insolvent, and that the financial situations 
of the banks threaten to impose great risks or to greatly influence and reduce assets and 
earnings of the banks. 633  The second divestiture measure requires bank holding 
companies of the banks to divest themselves or to liquidate other affiliates of the bank 
holding companies. The condition for this divestiture measure is that the affiliates of the 
bank holding companies are likely to be insolvent, and pose threats to the financial 
situations of the banks or to dissipate a considerable amount of assets and earnings of 
the banks.634 The third divestiture measure requires any companies having control of the 
banks to divest themselves on the condition that appropriate federal banking agencies 
determine that the divestiture of controlling companies will benefit financial situations and 
future improvement of the banks.635  
Discretionary measures of PCA for undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks are stricter and more intrusive than mandatory measures of 
similar functions. Moreover, discretionary measures have an impact on business and 
operations on bank holding companies or any companies having control of the banks as 
well as subsidiaries of the banks. With stricter measures in place, undercapitalised and 
significantly undercapitalised banks are more likely to restore capital to meet regulatory 
requirements. 
Appropriate federal banking regulators are required to take discretionary measures 
with significantly undercapitalised banks, and discretion of the regulators for significantly 
 
633 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (I) (i) 
634 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (I) (ii) 
635 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (f) (2) (I) (iii) 
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undercapitalised banks is discretion to determine which measure or measures should be 
taken with the banks. The regulators also have the discretion of whether or not to take 
stricter discretionary measures which are designed for critically undercapitalised banks. 
This is similar to the application of discretionary measures to undercapitalised and 
significantly undercapitalised banks, where the appropriate banking regulators can decide 
whether or not to apply these discretionary measures.  
Compared with mandatory measures of undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks, discretionary measures for the banks have two features. One 
feature is that discretionary measures are stricter than mandatory measures. Another 
feature is that discretionary measures do not differentiate undercapitalised banks and 
significantly undercapitalised banks, which means both undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks are subject to one set of discretionary measures. This is different 
from the application of mandatory measures, where significantly undercapitalised banks 
are subject to more measures than undercapitalised banks. 
 
B. Corrective Measure for Preparing an Orderly Bank Resolution 
 
This type of measure normally deals with critically undercapitalised banks that 
have no chance of becoming solvent and financial viable. As one of the compulsory 
measures for critically undercapitalised banks, this type of measure acts as a bridge 
between bank regulation and bank resolution, which is significantly different from the 
compulsory and discretionary measures for banks in the previous four categories. 
Specifically, this type of measure refers to conservatorship or receivership of critically 
undercapitalised banks by the FDIC. In addition, other compulsory measures for critically 
undercapitalised banks are the same as significantly undercapitalised banks.636 
 
 
636 George Kaufman, ‘Central Banks, Assets Bubbles, and Financial Stability’ in Maris Blejer and Marko 
Skreb (eds) Central Banking, Monetary Policies, and the Implications for Transition Economies (Kluwer 
Academics Publishers 1999)157 
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1. Rules of Conservatorship and Receivership for ‘Critically Undercapitalised’ 
Banks in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
 
The general rule of conservatorship or receivership for critically undercapitalised 
banks requires appropriate federal banking regulators with the concurrence of the FDIC 
to appoint a conservator or receiver for a bank within 90 days after the bank has been 
determined to be critically undercapitalised.637 The federal banking agencies with the 
concurrence of the FDIC are allowed to take other appropriate actions that are determined 
to better further the purpose of the legislation other than conservatorship or receivership 
of the banks, and the agencies are required to document their reasons for taking such 
appropriate actions.638 Periodic redetermination of situations of critically undercapitalised 
banks is required if appropriate banking agencies decide to take actions other than 
conservatorship or receivership. Other appropriate actions for critically undercapitalised 
banks will be effective during 90 days starting from the date that the actions are 
determined to be taken other than conservatorship or receivership, and then critically 
undercapitalised banks should be placed under conservatorship or receivership unless a 
new determination that other appropriate actions will be in place is made by the agencies 
before the end of the first determination.639  
After conservatorship or other appropriate actions fail to restore capital and 
improve financial situations of critically undercapitalised banks, it is then followed by the 
final measure of initiation of receivership. This is the general rule for critically 
undercapitalised banks that fail to restore capital and there are exceptions to the general 
rules for the banks. A receiver will be appointed to critically undercapitalised banks during 
the calendar quarter that the banks have been critically undercapitalised; on average for 
270 days after confirmation of a critically undercapitalised category of the banks.640 There 
are two exceptions of appointment of receivership by federal banking agencies. One 
exception that gives federal banking agencies discretion to continue to take other 
appropriate actions is when critically undercapitalised banks have met further 
requirements. Further requirements for critically undercapitalised banks focus on different 
 
637 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (3) (A) (i). 
638 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (3) (A) (ii). 
639 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (3) (B). 
640 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (3) (C) (i). 
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aspects of the financial situation of the banks. Critically undercapitalised banks are 
determined by an appropriate banking agency and with concurrence of the FDIC to have 
a positive net worth, comply with the capital restoration plan substantially and be in need 
of consistent improvement of capital, be profitable and have sustainable earnings, and 
reduce the amount of nonperforming loans and the ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
loans.641 Another exception is both the head of the appropriate banking agency for a 
particular undercapitalised bank and the chairman of the board of directors certify that the 
bank is viable and will not fail.642 
 
2. Receivership of Critically Undercapitalised Banks by the FDIC 
 
The FDIC is allowed to be appointed as a receiver for critically undercapitalised 
banks and to close the banks. Under the circumstance that undercapitalised banks fail to 
submit a capital restoration plan or substantially fail to implement the plan with no future 
possibility to become adequately capitalised banks, The FDIC can be appointed as a 
conservator or receiver for undercapitalised banks.643 These are two of the grounds of 
the FDIC’s receivership. Apart from PCA’s grounds to start receivership, other grounds 
could also lead to initiation of the FDIC’ receivership. According to USC 1821 (c) (5)644, 
there are 11 more grounds for the appointment of a conservator or receiver for any bank, 
except under undercapitalisation rules in PCA. Specifically, the grounds include (1) 
insufficient assets of banks for obligations; (2) substantial dissipation of assets and 
earnings because of violation of statute or regulation or unsafe and unsound practice; (3) 
unsafe and unsound condition to transact business; (4) wilful violation of cease-and-desist 
order which has become final; (5) concealment or refusal to submit bank’s books, papers, 
records, or assets for inspection or examination; (6) inability to meet obligations or pay 
depositors in normal course of business; (7) substantial losses of capital or possibilities 
of substantial losses with no prospect to be adequately capitalised; (8) violations of law 
and regulation or unsafe and unsound practice or condition; (9) consent of bank’s board 
 
641 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (3) (C) (ii) (I). 
642 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (h) (3) (C) (ii) (II). 
643 Stanley Ragalevsky and Sarah Ricardi, ‘Anatomy of a Bank Failure’ (2009) 126 Banking Law Journal 
867,870 
644 12 U.S.C. §1821(c)(5) 
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of directors or shareholders of members of the appointment; (10) cessation of insured 
status; (11) guilty of money laundering offence of bank.645 The grounds of the FDIC’s 
appointment as a receiver are almost the same as the grounds of appointment as a 
conservator except that for the purpose of liquidation of banks only the FDIC must be 
appointed as a receiver.646 
The process for appointment of the FDIC as a receiver of a critically 
undercapitalised bank starts from the decision of the bank’s chartering authority to close 
the bank, which are the OCC for state-chartered banks and a state-chartering authority 
for state-chartered banks.647 Based on different grounds of appointment of a conservator 
or a receiver, the FDIC can be appointed by the chartering authority of the bank or by 
itself to be the conservator or receiver of the critically undercapitalised bank. The 
difference between conservatorship and receivership is whether the bank is still operated 
as a going-concern or the bank is directly faced with insolvency procedures and 
liquidation.648 Under conservatorship, the bank is operated as a going concern and is 
prepared to be rehabilitated or closed, while under receivership the aim is to close and 
liquidate the bank. 
After the decision of a bank’s chartering authority to close the bank and the FDIC 
is appointed to act as a receiver, the FDIC has the power and authority to take respective 
actions to deal with the bank for the benefits of the bank, the depositors and the deposit 
insurance funds. There are normally two kinds of steps that are available for the FDIC as 
a receiver. One is to find a buyer of the bank and another is to resolve and liquidate the 
bank. Once the resolution decision of the bank has been made, the FDIC gathers 
information of the bank, including value and liquidation value of the bank’s assets and 
liabilities, and determines resolution measures to deal with the bank.  
 
645 ibid. 
646 Heidi Mandanis Schooner, ‘Bank Insolvency Regime in the United States and the United Kingdom’ 
(2005) 18 Transnational Law 385, 389 
647 Donna Wilson and Kristopher Knabe, ‘FDIC Bank Failure Litigation: Understanding and Navigating the 
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Conference (18-20 April 2012) 
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Finding a buyer of the bank refers to the purchase of the bank by another healthy 
bank conducted by the FDIC, which involves several steps. Based on gathered 
information, the FDIC is able to market the failing bank and its assets to other eligible 
healthy banks. Potential buyers of the failing bank are allowed to bid on the bank prior to 
resolution of the bank by the FDIC. This is then followed by the disclosure of the FDIC’s 
reserve price concerning the liquidation value of the failing bank to eligible bidders. The 
bid of each eligible bank includes the current collectable value of the bank’s assets and 
an estimate of future value of potential assets to be required, and the bid will be submitted 
to the FDIC for assessment. The successful bid is selected based on evaluation of the 
lowest cost and impact on uninsured depositors, and the lowest cost principle plays an 
important role in selecting the winning bid. After the selection process of the FDIC to find 
an eligible buyer for the failing bank, it is resolution weekend. During the resolution 
weekend, part of the failing bank’s assets is dealt with by the acquiring bank and the FDIC; 
namely the implementation of the bid and the sale of the failing bank’s assets. The failing 
bank’s remaining assets are separated and put into receivership.649 
As a receiver to resolve a failing bank, the FDIC is entitled to close the failing bank, 
and control assets and succeed all rights of the bank. In other words, the FDIC takes the 
place of the failing bank and has the power and authority to operate the bank’s business. 
The FDIC has a variety of measures to conduct the resolution of the bank. Specifically, 
purchase and assumption and depositor payoff are the two types of commonly used 
resolution measures. There are also some other historical measures that were applied by 
the FDIC but these cannot be used in the current resolution of failing banks, including 
open bank assistance, net worth certificate program, income maintenance agreement, 
capital forbearance program and loan loss amortisation program and branch breakup.650  
Purchase and assumption (P&A) refers to a transaction between a failing bank and 
another healthy institution where the healthy institution purchases some or all assets of 
 
649 Linda McGlasson, ‘Anatomy of a Bank Failure: What Happens When the FDIC Pulls the Plug? A Behind 
– the – Scene Look at How Regulators Mobilise to Protect the Assets of Troubled Banks’ Bank Info Security 
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650  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Resolution Handbook (Dec 2014) 
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the bank and assumes some or all liabilities of the bank.651 Under the category of P&A , 
there are more specific types of P&A measures, including basic P&As, whole bank P&As, 
P&As with optional shared loss and bridge bank P&A.652 Depositor payoff is another 
category of resolution measures for the tFDIC. This is the measure where there is no 
lowest cost bid suitable for a P&A measure.653 Depositor payoff refers to payment of 
insured deposits being made in full by the FDIC to insured depositors of the failed bank 
where no liabilities of the bank have been assumed. 654  The two different types of 
depositor payoff are straight depositor payoff and insured depositor payoff. The difference 
between the two types of depositor payoff is whether the FDIC directly pays all the insured 
amounts of deposit or whether these deposits are transferred to another healthy institution 
with no disruption in service of deposits.655   
The two steps of the FDIC to resolve a failed bank, specifically sale of the failed 
bank and resolution of the bank, are related and both contribute to the final outcome of a 
bank resolution. Although being in the category of critically undercapitalised banks is one 
of various reasons of the appointment of the FDIC as a receiver, for critically 
undercapitalised banks, receivership by the FDIC is the last step of PCA measures which 
is eventually the last step for all banks that fail to operate or comply with law and 
regulations. As receivership is the last step, unlike previous PCA measures intending to 
restore capital ratios of banks, the FDIC’s receivership aims to resolve a failed bank in 
the least costly way with the least impact on the depositors and creditors of the failed 
bank.  
As PCA requires banking regulators to deal with banks in different capital 
categories with different measures, PCA measures differentiate the treatment of different 
banks by the regulators to achieve different goals and solve particular problems of banks 
in different capital categories. Specifically, regular banking regulation and supervision 
aims for banks in good financial condition, a heightened level of supervision and 
intervention deals with banks with some financial problems, and resolution measures and 
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processes solve problems of banks with critical financial situations. PCA measures 
integrate both banking regulation and bank resolution measures to deal with banks in 
different capital categories, which perform the function of a bridge between “no 
interventions” with a bank’s business to replacing the bank’s authority to conduct its 
business. 
Moreover, PCA measures are detailed and specific measures for banks in all 
categories. They instruct the banks to start or stop making certain transactions, decisions 
and doing business, and instruct banking regulators to intervene more in the businesses 
of the banks with less capital. Most of PCA measures aim to help the banks improve their 
capital ratios and these measures have an impact on various aspects of the banks, 
including shareholders, directors and managers, and banks’ businesses and activities.  
To summarise, PCA measures are stricter when a bank’s capital category 
continues to fall. For well capitalised and adequately capitalised banks, there are only 
general restrictions on capital. For undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised 
banks, there are lists of compulsory and discretionary measures that are more intrusive 
to the banks’ operations and activities. As for critically undercapitalised banks, not only 
restrictions on several aspects of the banks’ activities are enforced, but the banks are 
faced with more severe measures of receivership of the FDIC to end their operations as 
banks. The focus of PCA measures is mainly aimed at measures for undercapitalised and 
significantly undercapitalised banks, and primarily deals with improving capital adequacy 
of the banks to restore their capital to meet regulatory standards. 
 
II. Corrective Measures of UK Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
This section discusses corrective measures of structured early intervention for 
banks in the UK. With the same feature of US corrective measures, UK corrective 
measures are stricter than regular banking regulatory measures and have a progressive 
feature that increases the level of intervention if the banks’ financial performance 
continues to deteriorate. In general, UK corrective measures have a more integrated 
approach by incorporating both recovery measures and resolution measures for banks at 
each stage of structured early intervention. The UK corrective measures are triggered by 
supervisory assessment and judgement of the banks’ financial performance and risk 
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levels. At the earlier stages the banking regulator for troubled banks tends to focus more 
on recovery measures while resolution measures may play a more important role in 
dealing with troubled banks at the later stages.  
The Proactive Intervention Framework (PIF) is designed for the prudential banking 
regulator to identify and manage risks of banks at an early stage. PIF measures are 
designed to deal with the risks of several aspects of the banks’ businesses, including 
aspects of external context, business risk, management and governance, risk 
management and controls, capital, and liquidity of banks’ businesses. Supervisory 
measures of PIF are based on banking regulation and supervision measures of the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), which is an improved level of regulation and 
supervision of banks and is designed for banks with more risks. This section is structured 
to discuss corrective measures for the UK’s prudential banking regulator in the five 
categories of PIF respectively. 
 
A. Corrective Measures at Stage 1 of PIF 
 
Banks at stage 1 of PIF are subject to regular banking regulation and supervision 
measures as discussed in chapter 2. No additional measures for banks at stage 1 are 
required for the banking regulator to take actions and intervene. All supervisory measures 
for banks at stage 1 are consistent with regular banking regulation and supervision 
requirements, which is the groundwork for further additional measures for banks at other 
stages.656 The increased level of regulation and supervision, especially stricter corrective 
measures at other stages is built on, and in can be compared to the foundation of regular 
banking regulatory measures. 
 
B. Corrective Measures at Stage 2 of PIF 
 
Banks at stage 2 of PIF may have some vulnerabilities and deficiencies in their 
financial conditions or business which present moderate risks to their viabilities. The 
prudential banking regulator implements recovery and resolution measures to deal with 
the banks and their risks at stage 2. At this stage, the banking regulator focuses more on 
 
656 Allen & Overy (n 357) 
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recovery measures rather than on resolution measures which would have been 
implemented at stage 1 in order to prepare for a future resolution if necessary.  
Concerning recovery measures at stage 2, as the primary prudential regulator for 
banks, PRA has three specific recovery measures to deal with banks with moderate risks 
to their viabilities. First, PRA is entitled to improve the level of regulation and supervision 
of banks at stage 2, especially imposing additional requirements on the banks to disclose 
more information. PRA can request more information from the banks by applying 
information gathering power under the rules of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA). The information gathering power of the PRA refers to the option given to the 
PRA to go through a skilled persons review of the banks to acquire more information on 
whether the banks are in compliance with PRA and other regulatory rules, especially 
when the PRA is uncertain about, or has insufficient information on, the banks’ 
compliance.657 A skilled persons review as a supervisory tool of the PRA has several 
functions to achieve the PRA’s goals: specifically that skilled persons reviews can be used 
to diagnose and identify risks in the banks and then to monitor development of identified 
risks and further to prevent and limit the impact of these risks, and in the end to allow the 
PRA to respond and deal with these risks.658 The skilled persons review can be used 
under PIF to gather more information for the PRA, and it can also be used as a way of 
verification of information provided to the PRA or as a part of the PRA’s normal regulation 
and supervision.  
Another measure of the PRA to deal with risks of banks at stage 2 is to require the 
banks to solve certain problems within an appropriate timeframe.659 This measure is 
related to one of the PRA’s regulatory powers under FSMA to deal with risks of banks at 
early stage. Banks at stage 2 are required to correct and resolve identified risks or 
deficiencies that existed in their business in the first place.660 The PRA has a set of 
disciplinary measures for the banks if they fail to correct problems or co-operate with 
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regulations, including financial penalties and public censorship. In order to control and 
reduce the impact of risks, the PRA can also impose certain restrictions on the banks’ 
operation and business activities until the banks have taken certain actions and been in 
compliance with regulatory requirements.661  
The last recovery measure of the PRA at stage 2 of PIF focuses on the recovery 
and resolution plan of the banks. A specific requirement for the banks at stage 2 is to 
update the recovery plan on the basis of the recovery plan requirement at stage 1, and 
the banks may also need to activate their plans.662  
In regard to resolution measures and planning at stage 2 of PIF, there are two 
primary corrective measures for the PRA to take against the banks. Resolution measures 
at this stage are preliminary and prepare for further arrangements of resolution with 
moderate risks in the banks’ business. The first step for one resolution measure of the 
PRA is to review the banks’ resolution plans with the resolution authority to identify 
potential deficiencies in the banks, initiate prior planning and acquire sufficient information 
in advance, prior to the resolution of the banks.663 This is followed by an assessment of 
the resolvability of the banks by both the PRA and resolution authorities. 664  The 
assessment of the resolvability of the banks is based on particular resolution strategies 
of the resolution authorities concerning situations of individual banks. Based on the 
assessment of the PRA and the resolution authorities of the banks, specific measures 
and arrangements to deal with a potential future failure of the banks will be put in place 
to ensure a feasible process and implementation of resolution plans. At this stage, the 
PRA and resolution authorities will not take measures that resolve the banks, and the 
resolution measures of the PRA at stage 2 focus on preparations for potential resolution 
of the banks.  
The second resolution measure at stage 2 of PIF is evaluations conducted by 
FSCS to assess the quality of the banks’ data, provided to support a single customer 
review and to assess any obstacles to pay out or transfer deposits.665 As the institution 
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that makes payment to depositors in the situation of a bank resolution, FSCS assesses 
these aspects in advance so they can evaluate the relevant data of the banks before the 
actual resolution. 
To summarise, recovery and resolution measures of the PRA at stage 2 of PIF 
focus on managing moderate risks to the banks and their viabilities. The additional 
requirements of the banks to disclose information and resolve deficiencies within certain 
timeframes are designed to improve the current operation of the banks and to reduce 
their risk levels. The resolution measures of PIF focus on the joint review of prudential 
banking regulators and resolution authorities, to make respective plans tailored to 
individual banks in case of potential future resolution. Early preparation of relevant data 
and situations of the banks’ deposits are also assessed by FSCS at an early stage to 
prepare for potential future resolution of the banks. 
 
C. Corrective Measures at Stage 3 of PIF 
 
At stage 3 of PIF, identified risks pose a more serious threat to the safety and 
soundness of banks. This is the stage where more intrusive early intervention by banking 
regulatory agencies takes place.666  Other than an increased level of regulation and 
supervision at stage 2, more intrusive measures and actions will be imposed on the banks 
to restrict their operations and businesses until they satisfy the regulatory requirements. 
Both recovery measures conducted by the PRA and resolution measures co-operated by 
the PRA, and resolution authorities for the banks are options available. 
The recovery measures of the PRA at stage 3 of PIF consist of two aspects. One 
aspect focuses on restrictions imposed on the banks by the PRA, which are stricter 
compared with recovery measures of PIF at stage 2 with a higher level of supervision. 
Another aspect of the recovery measure is to require the banks to use the information set 
out in their recovery and resolution plans as appropriate.  
In regard to restrictions imposed on the banks by the PRA, these restrictions have 
a more direct impact on the operations and business of the banks compared with the 
recovery measures of stage 2. These restrictions or measures of the PRA are compulsory 
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measures for the banks, which shows the difference between the recovery measure at 
stage 2 allowing the banks to correct themselves within a certain timeframe. The PRA 
can impose any resulting measures or actions on the banks. These measures include 
changes made to the managers and directors of the banks, restrictions on capital 
distribution such as dividends payment and remuneration, restrictions on certain business 
activities, restrictions on balance sheet growth and stricter leverage limits, higher 
requirements on liquidity and capital guidelines for the banks. 667  Imposing these 
restrictions on the banks at stage 3 requires the banks to reduce risks existing in their 
businesses and prevent the banks from getting involved in any business that may 
increase the current risk level.  
Concerning the recovery plan of the banks at this stage, the banks are required to 
take advantage of the information and resources set out in the plan to reduce risks and 
improve overall operations.668 The recovery plans of the banks are designed to help the 
banks recover from threats and risks and help the financial system to be in a healthy and 
sustainable position. At stage 3, the PRA can require the banks to take the appropriate 
measures set out in their recovery plans to manage current threats and risks. These 
specific measures in the plan are designed by the banks to manage capital and liquidity 
deficiencies as well as other risks and pressures in the time of stress.  
Resolution measures for banks at stage 3 also become more intense. Although 
there are still no actual measures taken to resolve the banks, the PRA and resolution 
authorities will increase the level of engagement on resolution planning and will gather all 
information that both regulators consider necessary to carry out the task. 669  This is 
different from the review of resolution plans of the banks and assessment of resolvability 
of the banks at stage 2 as at stage 3 preparation and action for resolution of the banks 
by the PRA and resolution authorities are in place rather than only assessing situations 
of the banks. 
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D. Corrective Measures at Stage 4 of PIF 
 
Banks are faced with imminent risks of failure at stage 4 of PIF. In other words, the 
banks are very likely to fail to meet threshold conditions of banks with more worrying 
financial performance. However, the financial situations of the banks and their operations 
still have a chance to be corrected and remedied. To deal with banks and their risks at 
stage 4, the PRA also implements the same recovery measures and resolution measures 
for the banks as it uses in the preceding two stages.  
In regard to recovery measures of the PRA, the intensity of recovery measures will 
be further increased, especially measures to improve liquidity and capital adequacy.670 
Concerning other aspects of the banks’ operations and business activities, the scale of 
regulation and supervision of the PRA will increase and intensify respectively to restore 
the financial situations of the banks. The PRA also sets a timetable for the implementation 
of these improved regulation and supervision measures where the banks are required to 
correct their deficiencies within a certain timeframe.671  
At this stage the recovery plan needs to be initiated by the banks, as one of the 
recovery measures under the regulation of the PRA. Measures and actions in the 
recovery plan, designed by the banks, need to be applied, including measures of sales of 
assets of the banks, which helps the banks to improve their capital and liquidity.672 The 
banks need to demonstrate feasibility and credibility of recovery measures and actions 
conducted by the banks themselves, and explain whether there will be actual results or 
improvements after these measures and actions, thereby leading to the fact that 
measures and actions conducted by the banks themselves to improve their financial 
situation and overall condition are influenced by corrective measures of PIF at stage 4.673 
Concerning resolution measures at this stage, all relevant regulatory authorities, 
including the PRA, resolution authorities and FSCS as the deposit payment institution, 
make sure that measures and actions to prepare for future resolution of the banks have 
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been taken and relevant data of the banks has been collected for future reference.674 The 
resolution measures of stage 4 of PIF ensure a feasible resolution of the banks in the 
future if the banks’ situations continue to deteriorate. 
To summarise, measures of PIF at stage 3 and stage 4 focus more on recovery 
measures and aim to improve the banks’ financial situation and overall operations by 
imposing stricter restrictions. The intensity and scale of recovery measures increases 
from stage 3 to stage 4 with an increasing level of the banks’ risks and deterioration in 
financial situations. Concerning resolution measures at these two stages, the level of 
resolution planning increases with the banks, specifically from gathering all relevant 
information of the banks at stage 3 to ensuring all measures and actions preparing for 
resolution are in place for future resolution. At both stage 3 and 4, the banks still have the 
chance to correct their deficiencies and return to healthy conditions. 
 
E. Corrective Measures at Stage 5 of PIF 
 
Banks that are categorised in stage 5 of PIF are unlikely to return to the state of a 
regular and well-functioning operation. At stage 5, the banks are in resolution or being 
wound up. Unlike the previous three stages, PRA can only take resolution measures to 
the banks at stage 5 instead of still having both recovery and resolution measures. PRA 
and other regulatory authorities are in cooperation and each of the three regulatory bodies 
is responsible for one aspect of the resolution measures at this stage. PRA is responsible 
for determining whether the banks meet the threshold conditions, resolution authorities 
(Bank of England) focus on managing the banks under a special resolution regime, and 
FSCS contributes to deposit payment of the insured depositors. 
First, concerning PRA’s part of resolution measures at stage 5 of PIF, PRA 
determines whether banks meet the threshold conditions which are the minimum 
requirements for a bank to be approved to have their banking business conducted by 
banking regulators. As the prudential banking regulator, PRA’s role in bank resolution is 
to decide whether the banks are failing or likely to fail. PRA also determines whether there 
is a chance for operations of the banks to be corrected or rectified. If a bank fails to meet 
the threshold conditions and its operation is unlikely to be corrected, then PRA decides 
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the bank is not viable and further actions in the resolution regime are needed to deal with 
the bank.675 
This is then followed by the decision of the Bank of England (BoE) as the bank 
resolution authority on whether or not to put a failing bank under resolution regimes and 
what measures to take to deal with the bank in resolution. The failing bank is not directly 
put under the resolution regime after the decision of the prudential regulator. To trigger 
resolution regimes regulated by the BoE, there are normally three conditions before the 
BoE decides to put the failing bank under the resolution regime and deal with the failing 
bank by applying resolution tools. The failing bank first needs to satisfy two triggering 
requirements of the resolution regime, which are (1) the bank is failing or is likely to fail 
and (2) it is not reasonably likely that actions will be taken to change this.676 Based on 
these requirements, resolution power and tools of the BoE can only be applied to a failing 
bank if the resolution of the failing bank is in  the public interest, as the application of 
resolution tools has a direct impact on property rights. The third condition is that the BoE 
needs to consider resolution objectives when it decides whether or not to put the failing 
bank through the resolution regime. If the failing bank satisfies all requirements to trigger 
a resolution, then the bank will be put under the bank resolution regime and respective 
resolution tools will be applied by the resolution authority. However, if the failing bank 
does not satisfy the public interest test, the bank will be resolved by the statute bank 
insolvency process.  
Concerning resolution tools and measures of the BoE, there are three main 
resolution tools for the BoE to apply which are bail-in, transfer to a private sector and 
transfer to a bridge bank.677 Bail-in refers to the write-down of claims of the failing bank’s 
unsecured creditors and conversion of these claims into the bank’s equity to resolve the 
insolvency state of the failing bank.678 Both a transfer to a private sector tool and a transfer 
to a bridge bank tool are ways to transfer all or part of the failing bank’s assets and 
liabilities to another entity: either another bank or a bridge bank established and managed 
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by the BoE.679 The two additional measures of the BoE’s resolution tools are to transfer 
to an asset management vehicle, and the bank administration process, which are used 
with three main resolution tools to resolve the failing bank in an orderly way. 
For failing banks that do not satisfy the public interest test, these banks will go 
through the bank insolvency procedure.680 Under this circumstance, a liquidator will be 
appointed to the failing bank. The liquidator first ensures that the deposits of the failing 
bank either go through a rapid payment by FSCS, or transfer to a viable firm, and in both 
cases FSCS will take over the deposit claims in the insolvency procedure. Then the 
liquidator liquidates the failing bank as normal and winds up the bank to achieve the best 
result for creditors and other parties involved in the insolvency. 
FSCS also plays a role in bank resolution or winding up a failing bank, which is to 
make deposit payments or to fund deposit transfers. Compared with the FDIC, FSCS has 
no role in regulating banks and bank resolution, and the role of FSCS is to make deposit 
payments and to take over the claims after the payment in an insolvency procedure. 
Measures of PIF at different stages represent the UK version of corrective 
measures of structured early intervention. An increased level of regulation and 
supervision measures are based on measures of regular normal banking regulation and 
supervision. The stricter and more intrusive measures are additional requirements for 
troubled banks from stage 2 to 5 of PIF, which intervene in the troubled banks’ businesses 
to control growth and reduce risks.  
Measures of PIF at stage 1 provide a groundwork or baseline for measures of PIF 
at other stages. Measures of PIF at the last stage bridge banking regulation and bank 
resolution, which focus on cooperation among several regulatory agencies and 
arrangements to resolve failing banks. Apart from the first and the last stage of PIF, 
measures of PIF at other stages consist of recovery measures and resolution measures. 
These recovery measures focus on correcting deficiencies existing in the banks’ 
operation and business activities by imposing restrictions or duties on the banks. The 
intensity and intervention of these recovery measures increases from stage 2 to 4 as risk 
levels continue to go up and the financial situation of the banks deteriorates. Based on 
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the judgement of the prudential regulator about the risks and financial situation of banks, 
respective corrective measures of PIF can be applied to troubled banks to resolve their 
risks and issues. 
 
III. Corrective Measures of Chinese Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
Both the US’ Prompt Corrective Action and the UK’s Proactive Intervention 
Framework have the function of dealing with banks by taking corrective measures that 
are progressive and have an increased level of regulation and supervision, depending on 
financial situations and risk levels of banks. Under the current Chinese banking regulatory 
framework, corrective measures of structured early intervention for troubled banks do not 
feature a system where respective measures are designed for banks with different 
financial performance and risk levels at particular categories or stages.  
The options for corrective measures are limited. Banks are either under regular 
banking regulation and supervision, being suspended and managed by banking 
regulators, or being wound up in insolvency procedures. Current measures of structured 
early intervention for banks in China are mainly measures of banking regulators to 
suspend or manage banks other than normal banking regulation and supervision. In 
relation to corrective measures that could suspend or manage troubled banks, some of 
these measures are corrective measures that aim to prevent banks’ financial situations 
from deteriorating, similar to US and UK measures of structured early intervention with 
banks. However, some of these measures of banking regulators to suspend or manage 
banks are stricter compared with structured early intervention measures in the US and 
the UK. These measures can lead to more severe outcomes for banks than intrusive 
measures and intervention of operations and businesses of the banks under the US’s and 
UK’s structured early intervention for banks.  
This section discusses Chinese corrective measures of structured early 
intervention for banks from two aspects. One aspect discusses general corrective 
measures of banking regulators to manage and to prevent operations and businesses 
from deteriorating in China. Another aspect is stricter corrective measures that can even 
suspend operations of banks by banking regulators. 
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A. General Corrective Measures for Banks 
 
Depending on the financial performance and risk level of a bank, banking 
regulators could choose to enforce optional measures and/or corrective measures to 
correct the bank’s risks and deficiencies in its financial performance in China. For 
example, if a bank has minor risks, its banking regulators will suggest that the bank takes 
optional measures to manage risks. On the other hand, if it is a bank with severe risks or 
unstable financial situations, banking regulators will choose to apply corrective measures. 
Corrective measures that are put in place to manage situations of troubled banks 
by Chinese banking regulators are similar to the measures of an increased level of 
regulation and supervision for banks categorised in undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks in the US and to the measures for troubled banks at stage 2 to 4 
of PIF in the UK. These measures, including both optional and corrective measures, can 
lead to changes to the management and the board of a bank, restructure of assets and 
liabilities of a bank, issuing new shares, increasing equity by shareholders, sales of assets, 
restrictions on capital distribution and large payments, restrictions on certain types of 
business activities, and conducting a merger.681 These corrective measures also include 
an increased level of frequency of supervisory assessment and shortened time interval 
between reports of troubled banks.682 While these corrective measures are applied to 
banks with financial difficulties, there are additional penalties for management and the 
board of the troubled banks. The penalties for managers and directors are used to 
improve corporate governance of the banks, which provides managers and directors of 
the troubled banks to improve internal control of the banks. 
Apart from the corrective measures mentioned above, there is one particular type 
of corrective measures of Chinese banking regulators, which is the takeover of banks by 
banking regulators. Based on the banking law on takeovers, a takeover is a way or 
measure of banking regulators to regulate and restructure banks when the banks are 
failing or are likely to fail to protect the interests of depositors.683 A takeover has the 
feature of administrative measure by banking regulators. According to the Bank 
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Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China, a takeover can only be implemented 
by banking regulatory authorities other than the court or other regulatory authorities.684 A 
takeover is also regarded as a temporary and remedial measure, which aims to recover 
operations and businesses of troubled banks back to their normal and healthy conditions. 
Based on the Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks, a takeover period of a troubled bank 
does not go beyond a two-year limit.685  
The main difference between a bridge bank as a resolution tool and a takeover is 
that a takeover is an internal restructure of banks conducted by banking regulators which 
transfers the management of a troubled bank from the bank itself to the banking 
regulators.686 Another difference between a takeover and a bridge bank is the purpose 
and aim of the two measures. A takeover aims to recover a troubled bank’s ability by 
restructuring the management of the bank while a bridge bank aims to maintain the 
functions of a failed bank until the bank has been sold to a private sector purchaser or by 
other ways of selling the bank. 
In relation to the takeover of troubled banks, the problem with this corrective 
measure is the lack of specific rules and provisions for banking regulators to take action 
based on the following aspects. First, standards for banking regulators to initiate a 
takeover are vague and simple which leads to too much discretion of the banking 
regulators and difficulties to apply in practice.687 Second, in regard to purposes and aims 
of a takeover of recovering troubled banks’ abilities to healthy and normal operations, the 
current aim of a takeover is not the fundamental purpose of the takeover. When a bank 
is failing or likely to fail, the corrective measure of a takeover is not only to recover the 
bank’s ability to operate but more importantly to deal with systemic risks and liquidity 
issues in the financial system. Therefore, the aim of the current takeover is limited and 
incomplete.688 Another problem concerning a takeover is the primary banking regulator 
of this measure, especially after the enactment of the Deposit Insurance Regulation. The 
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deposit insurance funds management agency also plays a role in banking regulation and 
supervision. Concerning the application of a takeover, the current legislation does not 
clarify which regulator is the primary regulator to apply a takeover of troubled banks and 
does not explain what procedures the primary regulator will be organising and structuring 
to perform takeovers. 
 
B. Stricter Corrective Measures 
 
As the legal framework of structured early intervention for banks is currently 
incomplete and in need of improvement, there is a lack of organised and systemic 
corrective measures for banking regulators to deal with the risks of banks. A takeover, 
suspension of a bank’s operation and revocation of a bank’s license are regarded as the 
three major corrective measures for regulators to deal with troubled banks.689 This section 
discusses the other two corrective measures for banking regulators in China, which are 
suspension of a bank’s operation and revocation of a bank’s license. Compared with a 
takeover, these two corrective measures are stricter as operations of banks are affected.  
Rules of the suspension of a bank’s operation are formulated in both the Law of 
the PRC on Commercial Banks and the Banking Supervision Law of the PRC. Both these 
laws have specific rules on this measure. This corrective measure of suspension of a 
bank’s operation can also be used as a way to penalise troubled banks if they fail to 
perform the general corrective measures mentioned in previous sections. This section 
starts with the role of suspension of a bank’s operation as a corrective measure. 
According to the Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks690, the CBRC as the 
prudential banking regulator can use this corrective measure on its own judgement in two 
types of situations, which are the violation of laws of business activities of a bank and 
incompliance of regulatory standards. Concerning the violation of laws of business 
activities, under the following circumstances a bank will be regarded as violating the laws 
because of its business activities, which are (1) setting up a new branch of a bank without 
acquiring prior approval of banking regulators; (2) establishing separation, acquisition and 
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changes to the structure of a bank without acquiring prior approval of banking regulators; 
(3) making deposits and giving loans while increasing or decreasing interest rates that 
violate the law or by other inappropriate and unfair means; (4) renting and lending of 
banking license; (5) conducting foreign exchange business or acting on behalf of others 
to conduct foreign exchange business without prior approval of banking regulators; (6) 
purchasing and selling government bonds or issuing, purchasing and selling financial 
bonds without prior approval of banking regulators; (7) violations of the law by conducting 
trust and security business, making investments into property that is not used by a bank 
itself and investing non-bank financial institutions and other corporations; and (8) giving 
credit loans or secured loans that hold advantageous terms over general borrowers to 
related or affiliated parties.691 Concerning incompliance of regulatory standards, a bank’s 
operation will be suspended under the following situations, which include (1) rejection or 
obstruction of examination and inspection of banking regulators; (2) providing fake or 
hiding important facts on financial reports, statements and statistical statements; and (3) 
incompliance of capital adequacy ratio, liquidity standards, loan ratios of single borrowers 
and other regulatory standards on asset and liability ratio.692 
The CBRC can take this corrective measure to the banks under suggestions of the 
People’s Bank of China under the following circumstances. There are two types of 
circumstances where the corrective measure of suspension of a bank’s operation can be 
taken against a bank. One situation is violation of laws of a bank’s business activities, 
which are (1) conducting foreign exchange business without prior approval; (2) issuing 
bonds on the interbank market, purchasing and selling financial bonds and borrowing 
from overseas without prior approval; and (3) violation of law by borrowing from interbank 
lending.693 Another type of situation is failure to comply with regulatory requirements of 
the People’s Bank of China, which include (1) rejection or obstruction of regulation and 
supervision of the People’s Bank of China; (2) providing fake or hiding important facts on 
financial reports, statements and statistical statements; and (3) failure to make 
proportioned deposit reserves.694  
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Based on the Banking Supervision Law of the PRC, rules of suspension of a bank’s 
operation share many similarities with rules formulated in Laws of the PRC on 
Commercial Banks. Banking regulators can take this measure in the following situations: 
(1) establishing a new branch without prior approval of banking regulators; (2) making 
changes to, or terminating operations and businesses of a bank without prior approval; 
(3) failure to comply with laws and regulations by conducting business activities that are 
not registered or approved by banking regulators, and (4) failure to comply with laws and 
regulations by increasing or decreasing deposit interest rates and loan interest rates.695 
Apart from violations of laws of business activities, banking regulators can suspend a 
bank’s operation if the bank fails to comply with regulatory requirements. The specific 
situations of banking regulators to take this measure include (1) appointment of senior 
managers and directors without checking qualifications; (2) rejection or obstruction of 
onsite inspection or offsite examination; (3) providing fake or hiding important facts of 
financial reports, statements and documents; (4) failure to disclose information as 
required; (5) severely violating prudential regulation requirements and principles; and (5) 
failure to take general corrective measures.696 
These are all situations or triggering events of banking regulators to suspend a 
bank’s operation. These situations are also triggering events of revocation of a bank’s 
license. The difference between these two measures is whether a bank has been 
permanently stopped from operating as a bank or not. Whether suspension of a bank’s 
operation or revocation of a bank’s license will be imposed on a bank depends on the 
discretion of banking regulators and relates to the level of intervention with the bank’s 
activities and incompliance under particular situations. 
Rules formulated in the two laws are contradicting concerning the triggering events 
of the two stricter corrective measures. For example, under the Law of the PRC on 
Commercial Banks, incompliance of capital adequacy ratio, liquidity standards, loan ratios 
of single borrowers and other regulatory standards on asset and liability ratio of banks 
can be the trigger to either suspension or revocation. These requirements like capital 
adequacy ratios are prudential regulatory requirements. However, under Banking 
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Supervision Law of the PRC, suspension or revocation takes place when a bank severely 
violates prudential regulation requirements and principles. One of the contradictions of 
rules in the two laws is whether banking regulators should take corrective measures with 
a bank when it violates or severely violates prudential regulation requirements.  
These rules also provide banking regulators with discretion. The level of violation 
of prudential regulation requirements depends on the judgement of banking regulators. 
Concerning corrective measures, banking regulators also have the discretion to choose 
between suspension of a bank’s operation and revocation of a bank’s license. 
 
C. Problems of Chinese Corrective Measures 
 
On the basis of general corrective measures and stricter corrective measures, one 
problem with Chinese corrective measures is the lack of structure of these measures. 
This means that corrective measures by Chinese banking regulatory agencies may not 
have a clear process and timetable. There is an argument for an early structural approach 
towards taking corrective measures by Chinese banking regulatory agencies, which 
requires a strict timetable for each step of corrective measures to avoid further 
deterioration of troubled banks’ financial performance.697 Another obvious problem with 
Chinese corrective measures is the lack of different kinds of measures.698 This means 
that the number of corrective measures in China is limited and choices for banking 
regulatory agencies are constrained, thereby causing the fact that banking regulatory 
agencies are unlikely to tailor corrective measures to deal with particular situations of 
troubled banks. Because of this, some argue for specific compulsory and discretionary 
corrective measures that are designed in detail to be in place for banking regulatory 
agencies to deal with troubled banks.699 Finally, some scholars believe that troubled 
banks with minor problems should be treated differently compared with troubled banks 
with severe problems.700 They argue for a variety of different corrective measures to deal 
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with specific problems within troubled banks with minor risks and troubled banks with 
severe risks. 
 
IV. Comparisons of US, UK and Chinese Corrective Measures 
 
The comparisons of US, UK and Chinese corrective measures of structured early 
intervention for banks reveal and identify similarities and differences among corrective 
measures in the US, the UK and China. These similar and different features of corrective 
measures provide the foundation to assess whether the level of intervention based on the 
banking regulators’ discretion is within the right boundaries, and whether their discretion 
to exercise authority and power is too much or too little. Because of the unstructured 
nature of Chinese corrective measures, some corrective measures that work in the US 
and the UK could be adopted by Chinese structured early intervention for banks to equip 
Chinese banking regulators with more choices to deal with troubled banks. 
This section is structured as follows. The first part discusses similarities of US, UK 
and Chinese corrective measures. Then the focus moves to the discussion of differences 
among US, UK and Chinese corrective measures. The third part discusses the scope of 
discretion of banking regulators to intervene with troubled banks. Finally, this section 
discusses some corrective measures that could be taken into consideration when 
establishing or changing structured early intervention for banks. 
 
A. Similarities of US, UK and Chinese Corrective Measures 
 
The growing level of intervention, as is achieved through stricter and more intrusive 
measures, is the feature that US, UK and Chinese corrective measures all have. The 
feature of corrective measures is progressively stricter and imposes harsher restrictions 
on troubled banks.701  Although specific corrective measures for troubled banks at a 
particular stage are different, all US, UK and Chinese corrective measures impose stricter 
corrective measures on troubled banks with worse financial performance and higher risk 
levels.  
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In a more general context, US, UK and Chinese corrective measures all have this 
progressive feature, because all these corrective measures have less intrusive measures 
to deal with minor deficiencies and very intrusive measures to manage operations and 
businesses of troubled banks. However, from a more detailed perspective, there is a slight 
difference between the Chinese and the US and UK corrective measures. US and UK 
corrective measures are gradually progressive while Chinese corrective measures seem 
to be more extreme in relation to progressive intervention. For example, Both US and UK 
measures have the feature of a growing level of intervention with troubled banks and the 
measures start from minor intervention with the banks’ operations and businesses to 
more intrusive intervention to manage the risks and financial situations of the troubled 
banks. In the US, PCA measures that are applied to well capitalised and adequately 
capitalised banks are limited to restrictions on capital distribution and management fee 
distribution and these measures have a minor impact on banks’ operations and business 
activities. With capital ratios of the banks falling, the measures for banks become more 
intrusive from restrictions on asset growth to pre-approval and prohibition by banking 
regulators on certain business activities. In the UK, PIF measures at early stages focus 
on recovery measures which requires the banks to correct risks in their operations and 
business activities. With the increasing risks involved in the banks’ operations and 
businesses, recovery measures change from the requirements of banks to correct 
deficiencies and additional reporting requirements, to the measures dominated by the 
banking regulators such as changing managers and directors and restricting certain 
business activities of the banks. In contrast, Chinese corrective measures treat troubled 
banks with different financial conditions in a more abrupt way. This means that the level 
of intervention with Chinese corrective measures seems to be at two ends of the spectrum, 
leading to a more extreme level of intervention from minor corrective measures to very 
intrusive measures. For example, general corrective measures have a limited impact on 
a bank’s operations and businesses while suspension of a bank’s operation and 
revocation of a bank’s license are very strict corrective measures that influence 
operations and the daily business of the banks. 
In relation to the progressive feature of corrective measures, the way to structure 
corrective measures is important, especially for Chinese corrective measures. Whether 
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corrective measures should be structured in a gradually progressive way or in a more 
extreme and abrupt way needs to be considered to achieve a better outcome through 
structured early intervention with banks. In other words, is it necessary for Chinese 
corrective measures to be structured into a similar gradually progressive way to deal with 
troubled banks compared with US and UK corrective measures? The answer is positive. 
Chinese corrective measures should be transformed into a more gradual progressive way 
to manage financial conditions and risk levels of troubled banks for the following reasons. 
To start with, this gradual progressive feature of corrective measures is compatible 
with the aim and purpose of structured early intervention for banks in order to deal with 
troubled banks at early stages with different levels of intervention, thereby turning around 
worrying financial performance and high risk levels of banks to a stronger performance. 
The growing level of intervention as revealed by stricter corrective measures is designed 
to encourage good behaviour of troubled banks to reduce the likelihood of both insolvency 
and more stringent regulation. By improving financial performance, troubled banks are 
less likely to be intervened with by banking regulators and more prone to failure. 
Moreover, the growing level of intervention with corrective measures is the 
necessary and viable way to deal with banks with different financial conditions and levels 
of risks. If there is only one set of corrective measures, these measures may be too 
intrusive for banks with minor deficiencies in their financial performance and be too 
conservative for banks with severe deficiencies in their business operations and risk 
levels. The growing and progressive feature of corrective measures plays an important 
role in dealing with troubled banks, enabling banking regulators to take specific corrective 
measures that suit the current situations of particular troubled banks. 
Finally, the growing level of intervention, as is determined by corrective measures 
with different levels of intrusion on troubled banks’ business and operation, act as the 
bridge between regular banking regulation measures and bank resolution measures, 
especially corrective measures at the last stage. The growing level of intervention with 
corrective measures could enable troubled banks and banking regulators to make early 
preparations of potential failures. Currently there is a blank for corrective measures in 
China to make preparations and undertake planning before the actual initiation of a 
special bank resolution regime or insolvency procedures to wind up a bank. In contrast, 
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US and UK corrective measures in the last category or stage, focus on preparations for 
the bank resolution process and these measures function as a bridge to initiate the bank 
resolution process to resolve troubled banks. In the last category of PCA, there are stricter 
measures to intervene in critically undercapitalised banks compared with the corrective 
measures in previous categories. The last stage measures of PCA focus on initiation of 
conservatorship and receivership of the troubled banks and to resolve the banks under 
receivership. At the last stage of PIF, measures focus solely on resolution of the troubled 
banks due to the fact that under PIF, banks within the last stage have no possibility for 
corrective measures to be effective. Being categorised into the last step of PIF triggers 
the special resolution regime or insolvency procedure of winding up troubled banks. More 
gradual progressive corrective measures, especially with preparations for bank resolution 
at later stages, could provide more measures for banking regulators and compensate the 
blank in Chinese corrective measures. These early preparations for potential bank failures 
are likely to ensure a smoother process for dealing with failed banks compared with the 
current extreme corrective measures, being either minor corrective measures or closure 
of troubled banks. 
 
B. Differences between US, UK and Chinese Corrective Measures 
 
The growing level of intervention is a similarity shared by US, UK and Chinese 
corrective measures though a slight difference exists between gradual progressive 
corrective measures and abrupt progressive correctives. From a broader perspective, 
corrective measures in the US, UK and China have more differences than similarities, 
especially differences in designs of corrective measures and categories of corrective 
measures in the three countries. 
 
1. Differences in Design of Corrective Measures 
 
Design of corrective measures constitutes two factors: how these measures are 
structured, and what the main function of these measures is in the legal framework of 
banking regulation and resolution. In the context of banking regulation and resolution, 
how corrective measures are structured refers to whether corrective measures have the 
role of acting as the in-between measures of regular banking regulation and bank 
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resolution. The main function of corrective measures refers to whether the measures 
focus more on recovery and correction of troubled banks or on preparations for early 
resolution of troubled banks.  
Concerning US structured early intervention for banks, corrective measures have 
the role of linking regular bank regulatory measures and bank resolution procedures. US 
corrective measures are structured to enable a gradually progressive level of intervention, 
which allows US banking regulators to adjust the level of intervention for a particular bank 
with its specific financial performance and risk level. One example is a variety of choices 
of compulsory and discretionary corrective measures for banking regulators to manage 
troubled banks, especially for those banks in the category of undercapitalised and 
significantly undercapitalised banks. The combination of different corrective measures is 
more likely to address particular problems in the banks’ businesses and operations. The 
level of intervention can be increased to conservatorship or receivership of a particular 
troubled bank if the bank is unlikely to become viable, leading to resolution of the bank. 
Various corrective measures are designed to deal with troubled banks before reaching 
the final resolution. The main function of US corrective measures, as the second factor of 
the design of US corrective measures, is to correct problems that evolved in troubled 
banks’ businesses and to help the banks recover from financial trouble and high risks. A 
number of corrective measures is designed to equip banking regulators to manage 
different situations of troubled banks, especially with the emphasis on undercapitalised 
and significantly undercapitalised banks. These two categories of banks have the 
possibility of becoming financially viable again and turning around from risky and unstable 
business operations. During these two stages, both compulsory and discretionary 
measures are available for banking regulators to use and manage troubled banks in order 
to restore the troubled banks’ financial performance. 
Concerning UK structured early intervention for banks, corrective measures also 
have the role of linking regular banking regulatory measures and bank resolution 
procedures. Corrective measures from PIF stage 2-4 are structured to resolve the 
increased level of risks and deteriorating financial performance of troubled banks. At each 
of these three stages, PRA is able to apply recovery and resolution measures to deal with 
troubled banks with different levels of risks and financial performance. These corrective 
198 
measures act as the bridge between UK banking regulatory measures and measures of 
the Special Resolution Regime, which adopts the increased level of intervention whilst 
not being too intrusive to close troubled banks. If a troubled bank has no future of 
becoming viable, at stage 5 of PIF, the troubled bank needs to go through bank resolution 
or insolvency proceedings. Considering the main function, as the second factor of the 
design of UK corrective measures, UK corrective measures tend to focus more on 
resolution preparations of troubled banks throughout stages 2-5. Although UK corrective 
measures do incorporate recovery measures as an important part of corrective measures, 
the actual choices of recovery measures are less detailed than US corrective measures. 
For example, at stage 2-4 the recovery measures are designed in a more general way 
without explicitly explaining how banking regulators will take such recovery measures to 
achieve the increased level of intervention and supervision. The positive side of UK 
corrective measures is having a focus on resolution planning and preparation which 
enables both banks and banking regulators to work together at a very early stage and 
throughout the whole process from stage 2 to stage 5. 
Concerning Chinese structured early intervention for banks, corrective measures 
have no function of linking banking regulatory measures and bank resolution measures. 
One example is the abruptly increased level of intervention by Chinese corrective 
measures. These measures are unlikely to deal with troubled banks with different financial 
conditions accordingly because no early preparations for stricter measures and bank 
resolution after general corrective measures are in place in China. The level of 
intervention with stricter corrective measures tends to lead to a pause of troubled banks’ 
businesses and operations instead of correcting the problems of troubled banks. The 
functions of these stricter corrective measures are similar to the functions of bank 
insolvency proceedings and can achieve the results of suspending troubled banks’ 
operation, which can be too strict and abrupt for banks with severe financial difficulties. 
More specifically, the two types of measures of structured early intervention for banks in 
China, general corrective measures and stricter corrective measures, do not gradually 
differentiate the level of intervention with banks. General corrective measures increase 
the level of intervention compared with banking regulation and supervision measures 
while suspension of a bank’s operation and revocation of a bank’s license are serious 
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intervention measures that have a direct and serious impact on the banks’ businesses. 
Especially when it comes to stricter corrective measures, these are similar to bank 
resolution measures in China, which all have a direct impact on the banks’ operation, 
management and ownership. These two types of measures are on two separate ends of 
the spectrum, which leads to a lack of corrective measures for banks that are able to 
intervene and banks with more severe financial situations. Therefore, corrective 
measures of Chinese structured early intervention for banks are not structured to achieve 
the function of a bridge between banking regulation and bank resolution. 
Considering the main function of Chinese corrective measures, these measures 
tend to focus more on the recovery of troubled banks instead of achieving early 
preparations of potential bank resolution. General corrective measures are similar to US 
and UK corrective measures which have an impact on different aspects of the banks’ 
businesses and operations from management to asset growth. Stricter corrective 
measures tend to focus on a pause on the banks’ businesses and operations and prevent 
financial conditions of troubled banks from deteriorating further. Both these types of 
corrective measures include early preparations for potential bank failures. For example, 
co-operation and coordination among different banking regulators to work on a resolution 
plan at early stages. 
In terms of a suitable design of corrective measures, these corrective measures 
should be structured to act as a bridge between banking supervision and regulation and 
bank resolution with the main function of achieving both recovery and early preparations 
of troubled banks. Corrective measures that are structured to work as a bridge between 
banking regulation and bank supervision could be more effective. First, structured early 
intervention for banks represents a gradually increased level of intervention depending 
on financial conditions and risk levels of a bank. The linking role of corrective measures 
is in accordance with the feature and aims of structured early intervention for banks to 
make this regulatory mechanism achieve its best result. Second, both special bank 
resolution and bank insolvency proceedings are costly and expensive. Without sufficient 
corrective measures for troubled banks with severe financial problems and high risk levels, 
these banks are more likely to go through the bank resolution process or get wound up. 
These corrective measures at the latter stages are important for banking regulators in 
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dealing with severely troubled banks. For example, US corrective measures for 
significantly undercapitalised banks and UK corrective measures for banks at stage 4 of 
PIF enable banking regulators to take actionable and practical measures to intervene in 
troubled banks’ businesses and operations. These measures however are missing in 
Chinese corrective measures.  
Considering the main function of corrective measures to achieve both recovery 
and early preparations of potential failure, all US, UK and Chinese corrective measures 
need a certain level of improvement in this regard. Because of the function of structured 
early intervention for banks as an in-between regulatory mechanism, corrective measures 
should have consideration of both corrections of problems of troubled banks and early 
preparations of potential failure. Corrective measures should start with the emphasis on 
intervening with the aim of correction and recovery of troubled banks and gradually 
decrease the emphasis on this aspect. In the meantime, corrective measures should 
gradually increase the emphasis on intervening with the banks, with the aim on 
preparations of potential bank failures. When this is done from the early stages, the focus 
on correction and recovery of troubled banks with minor problems is more likely to prevent 
the problems from developing. As these problems develop, financial conditions of the 
troubled banks are more likely to deteriorate, thereby increasing the necessity to prepare 
for potential failures with bank resolution authorities.  
US corrective measures have a strong focus on correction and recovery of troubled 
banks’ business and operation, but a relatively weak focus on early preparations. Until 
troubled banks are categorised as critically undercapitalised banks, preparations for 
potential failure, namely conservatorship and receivership by the FDIC, cannot be 
enforced on the banks. In the previous four categories, very few corrective measures 
enable banking regulators to make early preparations for potential bank failure, thereby 
making a gradually increased focus on early preparations impossible for current US 
corrective measures. UK corrective measures have two tracks for emphasis on both 
recovery and resolution measures to deal with troubled banks. In terms of corrective 
measures that aim to achieve corrections and recovery of troubled banks, details and 
conditions of these measures need to be further specified compared with US corrective 
measures where a number of corrective measures are listed and specified for banking 
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regulators to apply. The design of Chinese corrective measures, compared with US and 
UK counterparts, needs to be restructured to include both recovery and resolution 
measures in a structural way to achieve the role of linking banking regulation and bank 
resolution. Some of the corrective measures, such as a takeover, can still be incorporated 
as an alternative choice for Chinese banking regulators to deal with troubled banks at 
early stages of intervention. 
 
2. Differences in Categories of Corrective Measures 
 
Whether and how corrective measures are categorised is another main difference 
among US, UK and Chinese structured early intervention methods for banks. More 
specifically, each country has its own way to categorise corrective measures. On the one 
hand, different ways to categorise corrective measures show different emphases on aims 
and purposes of structured early intervention for banks in a particular country. For 
example, UK corrective measures have a strong focus on early preparations for potential 
failure and require troubled banks to take early actions for potential bank resolution. On 
the other hand, different ways of categorisation of corrective measures provide several 
perspectives on possible ways to construct corrective measures in structured early 
intervention for banks in a particular country. These different ways of categorising 
corrective measures reveal their advantages and disadvantages, enabling a more 
comprehensive consideration for designing a structured early intervention for banks. 
In the US, compulsory measures and discretionary measures are the two 
categories of corrective measures. Mandatory measures are applicable to all banks, 
depending on the capital ratios of the banks. Discretionary measures are applicable to 
some troubled banks with moderate to severe financial problems and risks, depending on 
the banking regulators’ judgements and the decisions on the banks’ risks and financial 
situations. A distinctive feature of PCA corrective measures is the variety of discretionary 
measures for banking regulators where these US banking regulators are entitled to apply 
one or several discretionary measures to troubled banks. An advantage of US categories 
of corrective measures is the mandatory nature of some of the corrective measures. The 
mandatory nature enables banking regulators to take some of the corrective measures to 
deal with troubled banks to reduce the impact of too much discretion. In the meantime, 
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banking regulators have the discretion to decide whether further enforcement on 
undercapitalised and significantly undercapitalised banks is necessary by applying 
discretionary measures. This provides US corrective measures with a chance to balance 
rules and discretion. For example, banking regulators could determine financial conditions 
of troubled banks and manage specific problems and issues of a particular troubled bank 
by applying discretionary measures. Banking regulators’ capabilities to determine what 
combinations of compulsory and discretionary measures are suitable for undercapitalised 
and significantly undercapitalised banks demonstrates the room for discretion. However, 
this chance to balance rules and discretion could lead to misuse and abuse of 
discretionary corrective measures by banking regulators. This means that banking 
regulators may choose not to take the necessary discretionary measures at a particular 
time to further intervene in troubled banks’ business and operation. As a result, troubled 
banks may continue to operate with high risks and insufficient capital to maintain a safe 
and sound conduct. The two categories of compulsory and discretionary corrective 
measures show the emphasis of US corrective measures to enforce actual corrective 
measures on troubled banks, which adopts a practical approach to make changes to 
troubled banks by regulators. 
In the UK, recovery measures and resolution measures are the two main 
categories of corrective measures. In most of stages of PIF, troubled banks are subject 
to both recovery and resolution measures. Recovery measures of PIF focus on corrective 
functions and increase the level of intervention depending on the judgement of banking 
regulators on the risks and financial situations of the banks. Resolution measures focus 
more on cooperation among several regulatory agencies to prepare for a future resolution. 
A distinctive feature of UK corrective measures is preparations for a future resolution of 
a troubled bank in the early stages, before the bank develops unsafe and unsound 
operations. To comply with PIF corrective measures, troubled banks have to make 
recovery and resolution plans themselves and execute the plans before reaching actual 
bank resolutions. One advantage of this type of categorisation is that early preparations 
and sufficient time are provided for both troubled banks and banking regulators if the 
banks fail eventually. This is the result of constant planning and implementing recovery 
and resolution plans devised by troubled banks and banking regulators throughout the 
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whole process of PIF. The disadvantage of UK corrective measures exists because of a 
relatively small number of specific corrective measures for recovery of troubled banks. 
This means that a more tailored combination of recovery measures for troubled banks 
with different financial conditions and risk levels may be less likely to achieve. In other 
words, in terms of recovery measures at early stages, increasing the number of corrective 
measures that represent different levels of intervention in troubled banks’ businesses and 
operations could contribute to the recovery function of corrective measures in the UK. 
In China, corrective measures have no formal categories except for being 
differentiated on the basis of the level of intrusiveness of these measures as general and 
stricter corrective measures. A reason for the current categories of corrective measures 
is a lack of a systemic legal framework to deal with troubled banks. The history in the 
Chinese banking supervision and regulation of using administrative ways to manage 
troubled banks also contributes to the current categories of corrective measures. This 
refers to the preference of banking regulators who tend to take administrative orders from 
governmental bodies to deal with troubled banks, thereby creating no needs to establish 
a comprehensive regulatory framework. This causes a lack of foundation for categorising 
corrective measures in the past. The number of corrective measures of Chinese 
structured early intervention for banks is inadequate compared to both US and UK 
measures which may contribute to the difficulties to categorise the measures based on 
either functions, nature or other standards. 
US, UK and Chinese corrective measures all have their distinctive features and 
vary on the basis of emphasis on different aims and functions of measures. Both the US’s 
and the UK’s ways to categorise corrective measures could work as examples. Even 
though US and UK corrective measures have different categories, both ways of 
categorisation have a distinctive feature with a different focus on achieving one aim of 
dealing with troubled banks, either compulsory correction or early preparations for 
resolution. Due to a lack of necessary arrangement and design of corrective measures, 
categories of Chinese corrective measures are simplified, which may need more efforts 
to develop and design a focus on managing troubled banks as a distinctive feature. 
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C. Boundaries of Banking Regulators’ Discretion on Early Intervention 
 
Structured early intervention for banks in the US, the UK and China have different 
approaches to the banking regulators’ discretions in relation to enforcing corrective 
measures on troubled banks. This is similar to differences among US, UK and Chinese 
triggering events, especially the choice of objective standards and subjective standards. 
Because of the necessity of supervisory discretion in the context of early intervention of 
troubled banks, the scope of supervisory discretion in determining which measures work 
for a particular troubled bank is worth exploring. This section discusses the current 
arrangement of regulatory agencies’ discretion in US, UK and Chinese corrective 
measures. Then this section discusses what level of supervisory discretion can be 
regarded as good practice in terms of actually correcting problems of troubled banks. 
The regulatory authorities in the US, the UK and China have different levels of 
discretion in terms of enforcing corrective measures on troubled banks. On the basis of 
comparisons of US, UK and Chinese corrective measures, Chinese regulatory agencies 
have the least discretion in terms of determining which corrective measures to take with 
troubled banks, US banking regulatory agencies have some extent of discretion combined 
with rule-based compulsory measures and UK banking regulatory agencies have the 
most discretion in this context.  
One reason for this difference is the different choice of rules or principles in relation 
to designing and structuring corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks 
in the US, the UK and China. In the context of Chinese corrective measures, general 
corrective measures, such as a takeover, and stricter corrective measures, including 
suspension of banks’ businesses and revocation of banking license, can only be applied 
under specific circumstances. This means that banking regulatory agencies have no 
discretion to apply these corrective measures to troubled banks as they see fit. In the 
context of US corrective measures, banking regulatory agencies are able to combine 
compulsory and discretionary measures to deal with troubled banks. This means that 
regulatory agencies have some level of discretion in deciding what discretionary 
measures are viable under some specific circumstances for troubled banks. By exercising 
such discretion, banking regulatory agencies could be more flexible in achieving the goal 
of managing troubled banks and provide more tailored solutions for particular troubled 
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banks. In the context of UK corrective measures, recovery measures are at the banking 
regulatory agencies’ discretion, especially recovery measures which are enforced by 
regulatory agencies at stage 3 of PIF, such as restrictions on business activities, changing 
the management or board of troubled banks and imposing stricter capital requirements. 
These measures are the core of the corrective measures which show the increased level 
of intervention at different stages. The discretion for core corrective measures enables 
UK regulatory agencies to manage troubled banks on a case by case scenario.   
Another factor that causes differences in regulatory agencies’ discretion on 
corrective measures is the preference of self-regulation or strict regulation by banking 
regulatory authorities in the US, the UK and China. Different attitudes and approaches 
towards financial regulation could have an impact on how banking regulatory agencies 
deal with troubled banks and their discretion on deciding on specific corrective measures. 
In the UK, self-regulation of the financial sector is a feature of regulation of the industry 
which lacks a sense of rigorousness from a historical perspective.702 The retention of 
some of the features of self-regulation before the internationalisation of the financial 
sector may contribute to less strict and rigorous regulation of the financial market.703 This 
means that the history of self-regulation of the financial sector can have an impact on 
regulation of the financial sector even after reforms and developments. For example, the 
enactment of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and the 
establishment of Financial Services Authority (FSA) was a movement to change the 
situation of a less strict financial regulation. 704  FSA was tasked with too many 
responsibilities and very few resources.705 FSA objectives of regulation tended to focus 
more on consumer protection instead of prevention of failure of financial institutions and 
promotion of competitiveness and efficiency, thereby leading to the fact that the objective 
of this arrangement was recognised as being weak. 706  This shows barriers to 
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transformation from a self-regulating approach to a stricter approach of regulation, 
thereby revealing the impact of self-regulation of the financial sector on reforms and 
developments of the financial regulation.  
The situation in Chinese banking regulation is very different from the UK. Because 
of a relatively short history of the financial market and regulation, the financial system was 
established by the state instead of gradually developed on its own over a long period of 
time. The financial regulation was greatly influenced by administrative orders and 
measures by governmental bodies and then started to transform to a rule-based 
framework. From a historical perspective, Chinese banking regulation tends to follow 
prescribed rules to determine what banking regulatory agencies could do. Although 
specific rules in relation to which banking regulatory agencies can apply corrective 
measures and how they apply specific measures are inadequate, a general context of 
how banking regulators could apply corrective measures has been established. UK and 
Chinese preferences on the approach of banking regulation as to whether emphasis on 
self-regulation or a stricter regulation mechanism from the historical perspective should 
be applied are two extremes. The UK’s banking regulation is influenced by its history of 
self-regulation over time. Chinese banking regulation is greatly influenced by the 
governmental intervention through policies and orders. Because of different perspectives 
and history in banking regulation, this has an impact on how current regulatory 
mechanisms are structured and the level of discretion which banking regulators could 
have. This leads to the fact that the current regulatory mechanisms share more features 
with UK and Chinese historical approaches. 
The different choices of rules or principles and the different preferences of self-
regulation or stricter regulatory mechanisms are two reasons for different levels of 
discretion of banking regulatory agencies in corrective measures for troubled banks. In 
order to achieve an optimal outcome of intervening with troubled banks, what is a good 
way to structure rules and principles for banking regulatory agencies in terms of applying 
corrective measures? More specifically, how much discretion is appropriate for banking 
regulators to deal with troubled banks with corrective measures? 
In relation to an appropriate level of discretion given to banking regulatory agencies 
for applying corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks, either no 
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discretion at all or too much discretion is not going to work. If all corrective measures are 
on the basis of prescribed rules without any discretion for regulatory agencies, banking 
regulatory authorities can only apply these corrective measures when the conditions for 
these measures are satisfied. This means that listing all situations and conditions for 
applying corrective measures is required and necessary if a full and comprehensive set 
of rules for regulating and supervising troubled banks is an objective. However, this can 
be very unlikely to be achieved, especially with the rapid changes in the banking sector.  
Similarly, too much discretion also has a negative impact on supervision and 
regulation of troubled banks. First, too much discretion provides a foundation for 
regulatory forbearance where banking regulators tend to delay taking actions to deal with 
troubled banks and allow the troubled banks to continue to operate. Second, too much 
discretion could lead to uncertainty of the application of rules. This means that by applying 
discretion, banking regulators could impose restrictions on troubled banks in a more 
random, opaque and less quantitative way.707  This means that troubled banks may 
sometimes be faced with legal sanctions or penalties that increase the level of 
intervention by banking regulators on an ad hoc basis unexpectedly.708  
Neither too little nor too much discretion provided with banking regulatory agencies 
is a good way to be incorporated into structured early intervention for banks when it comes 
to correcting problems of troubled banks. In terms of corrective measures, regulatory 
discretion is necessary. However, discretion may not play a major part in this process. 
This means that regulatory discretion should be built on the basis of rule-based corrective 
measures. In detail, corrective measures that are mandatory should be based on 
prescribed rules, specifying particular situations and conditions for the application of such 
compulsory measures. In the meantime, banking regulatory agencies have the discretion 
to decide whether discretionary measures are needed under particular circumstances to 
tailor the application of corrective measures for specific troubled banks. 
On the basis of comparisons of US, UK and Chinese corrective measures, US 
banking regulatory agencies have limited discretion. From the perspective of limited 
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discretion, the boundary of US regulatory agencies’ discretion is better than the UK and 
Chinese ways of structuring the discretion for regulatory agencies. Because of the limited 
discretion for banking regulatory agencies to take corrective measures, on the one hand, 
US banking regulatory agencies have to decide to take discretionary corrective measures 
for specific troubled banks by using their discretion in dealing with troubled banks. On the 
other hand, in terms of rule-based corrective measures, US banking regulatory agencies 
have to follow rules to determine compulsory measures. In other words, compulsory 
measures act as rules and banking regulators have to take such measures when certain 
conditions are satisfied while discretionary measures act on the basis of banking 
regulatory agencies’ discretion to decide whether certain corrective measures are 
necessary to deal with specific troubled banks.  
In this context, though rule-based compulsory measures have been incorporated 
in PCA, US banking regulatory agencies can sometimes still be regarded to have a wide 
range of discretion as to how to interpret test results and what measures can be used as 
corrective measures to deal with troubled banks.709 This is the result of a history of 
confidential supervision where banking regulatory agencies are allowed to make 
exceptions and variations of rules to accommodate particular conditions of specific banks 
by discretion, possibly without appropriate checks on the banks.710 For example, when 
determining the financial performance of a troubled bank such as accounting irregularities, 
US banking regulators with discretion are more likely to tolerate these deficiencies rather 
than taking timely corrective measures to remedy the deteriorated financial conditions of 
the troubled banks.711 This is also the case for banking regulators’ stress testing for banks 
where banking regulatory agencies are regarded as ‘highly discretionary’ in terms of their 
interpretations of standards and outcomes.712 
In order to find out the appropriate level of discretion for banking regulators, 
discussion of the functions of discretion can be helpful. First, corrective measures as a 
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way of supervising troubled banks have a secondary role in maintaining the safety and 
soundness of troubled banks, as opposed to  rule-based objective regulation of troubled 
banks.713 US banking regulatory agencies’ discretion should work as a supplement to 
mandatory rules in intervening with troubled banks. 714  Second, discretion enables 
banking regulators to solve specific problems and financial conditions of troubled banks 
in a more flexible way. The flexibility allows banking regulators to apply tailored corrective 
measures to troubled banks for a smooth operation of the whole financial system.715  
Based on the US model of limited discretion combined with rules, the discretion of 
banking regulatory agencies on corrective measures could be further limited. The extent 
of this limitation means only necessary or the least scope of discretion is provided for 
banking regulators when applying corrective measures. This means that compulsory 
corrective measures are rule-based corrective measures with no discretion given to the 
banking regulatory agencies. These rules on compulsory measures could reduce 
uncertainty and inconsistency that may exist in dealing with different troubled banks. This 
design should also articulate clear conditions and situations for discretionary corrective 
measures. In this context, though banking regulatory agencies could determine specific 
corrective measures, the defined context further limits the scope of banking regulatory 
agencies’ discretion. This design provides banking regulatory agencies with limited 
discretion, allowing them to determine what type of discretionary corrective measures 
should be applied and what aspects of banking business and operations need further 
restrictions. This could be a way to offset the limitations of the banking regulatory 
agencies’ knowledge and professionalism in economies in transition where the actual 
outcome of using discretion deviates from the original design.716 
The boundary between rules and discretion in corrective measures allows less 
discretion for banking regulatory agencies compared with the current US model in 
corrective measures. The main difference is setting clear conditions and situations for 
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banking regulatory agencies to take discretionary measures. This could reduce the 
possibility of taking no discretionary measures or delays in taking additional corrective 
measures. Compulsory corrective measures are based on rules with no discretion for 
banking regulatory agencies. This is similar to the current US model. Banking regulatory 
agencies also have discretion to decide on specific discretionary corrective measures, 
which shares similarities with the US model. 
To summarise, the boundary for banking regulatory agencies’ discretion in relation 
to corrective measures is set towards the preference of rules. On the basis of rules for 
corrective measures, including rules for conditions and requirements for the measures, 
compulsory corrective measures are set to apply to guarantee intervention for troubled 
banks at early stages to avoid delays in intervention or further deterioration of troubled 
banks. Discretionary corrective measures enable banking regulatory agencies to deal 
with particular problems or aspects of troubled banks’ businesses in a tailored way to 
impose additional restrictions to achieve the goal of correction at early stages. 
 
D. What Corrective Measures Could Work in Structured Early Intervention for 
Banks 
 
On the basis of comparisons of US, UK and Chinese corrective measures, though 
differences among corrective measures in the three countries exist, some corrective 
measures in these countries may be worth considering in relation to establishment or 
reform of structured early intervention for banks. For example, the US’s compulsory and 
discretionary corrective measures and the UK’s early preparations for potential bank 
resolution are most in accordance with structured early intervention for banks’ objectives 
and aims. These corrective measures play an important role in early intervention by 
banking regulators with troubled banks. In the context of establishing structured early 
intervention for banks, these corrective measures that show advantages in US and UK 
corrective measures may contribute to the establishment or reform of structured early 
intervention for banks. 
In terms of Chinese corrective measures, in order to improve overall functions and 
possibilities of successfully dealing with troubled banks, the two following options may 
work to achieve the goal: establishing compulsory and discretionary corrective measures 
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and making early preparations for possible resolution or winding up of troubled banks. 
First, the US category of compulsory and discretionary corrective measures is 
advantageous because the division of corrective measures could achieve a balance 
between rules and discretion in relation to dealing with troubled banks by banking 
regulatory agencies. On the basis of this concept of compulsory and discretionary 
corrective measures, depending on the desired level of discretion for banking regulatory 
agencies, the boundary between rules and discretion could be set. In the Chinese context, 
corrective measures could be designed in a more detailed and specific way by 
incorporating compulsory and discretionary corrective measures at the early stages of 
intervention. On the one hand, banking regulatory agencies could have a variety of 
corrective measures to deal with troubled banks with either one or several measures. On 
the other hand, by determining what corrective measures are compulsory or discretionary, 
the scope of regulatory discretion is limited so that too much discretion and relevant 
regulatory forbearance can be avoided. As discussed above, the boundary between rules 
and discretion is set towards rules with limited discretion. Specifically, compulsory 
measures are set by prescribed rules and conditions, and situations for discretionary 
corrective measures are set by rules and specific discretionary corrective measures at 
the banking regulatory agencies’ discretion when dealing with particular troubled banks. 
Chinese corrective measures could adopt this to give a limited scope of discretion to 
banking regulatory agencies while utilising rule-based corrective measures to ensure 
early intervention is mandatory. 
Second, the UK’s early preparation for possible future resolution or winding up of 
troubled banks is another corrective measure that could be incorporated in structured 
early intervention for banks. This corrective measure enables both troubled banks and 
banking regulatory agencies to have a full picture of the troubled banks’ financial 
conditions and risk levels, especially allowing banking regulatory agencies to make 
realistic plans and co-operate with resolution authorities at an early stage. On the basis 
of this concept of early preparation, both troubled banks and banking regulatory agencies 
could take respective measures at each stage of structured early intervention for banks 
to further plan for the next stage. In the context of Chinese structured early intervention 
for banks, current corrective measures do not include consistent recovery and resolution 
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planning at each stage of early intervention. By incorporating early preparations of 
potential resolution or winding up of banks, both troubled banks and banking regulatory 
agencies could reassess financial conditions and risk levels of the banks at each stage. 
Then they could further determine resolution or winding up plans with relevant authorities 
and revise recovery and resolution plans for troubled banks at particular stages.  
In relation to corrective measures of structured early intervention for banks, the 
types of corrective measures that are incorporated in early intervention may have an 
impact on the discretion of banking regulatory agencies and the co-operation among 
different regulatory agencies in dealing with troubled banks. As a result, before setting 
each corrective measure for banking regulatory agencies, considering the overall 
objective and aims of structured early intervention for banks in a particular country may 
help achieve a better outcome in dealing with troubled banks. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
US, UK and Chinese corrective measures share few similarities and all have their 
own features. Compulsory and discretionary measures are the two main categories of US 
corrective measures. US corrective measures focus more on undercapitalised and 
significantly undercapitalised banks. This means that a variety of compulsory and 
discretionary corrective measures are the banking regulatory agencies’ options on how 
to manage financial problems and risks of troubled banks. Moreover, US corrective 
measures are more specific in rules, which give clear instructions for banking regulatory 
agencies. UK corrective measures have an emphasis on early preparation for potential 
failure. This means that at each stage of PIF, both recovery and resolution measures 
need to be considered. The benefit of UK corrective measures is early preparation and 
coordination among different banking regulatory agencies, which allows different levels 
of co-operation and coordination at each stage of PIF. Chinese corrective measures, 
general corrective measures and stricter corrective measures have different levels of 
intervention without a progressive feature. This means that troubled banks are not 
managed with a gradually increased level of intervention by banking regulatory agencies. 
The similarity among US, UK and Chinese corrective measures is that the level of 
intervention with corrective measures is increasing. Specifically, US and UK measures 
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have a progressive feature while the level of intervention by Chinese corrective measures 
is less progressive and more abrupt. Two main differences among US, UK and Chinese 
corrective measures are design of corrective measures and categories of corrective 
measures. In relation to design of corrective measures, both US and UK corrective 
measures have the role of linking banking regulation and bank resolution by having a 
progressive level of intervention represented by all corrective measures at each stage of 
early intervention. However, Chinese corrective measures do not have this function 
because of the abruptly increased level of intervention by general and stricter corrective 
measures. 
Banking regulatory agencies’ discretions are also related to how corrective 
measures of structured early intervention for banks are structured. The US, UK and 
Chinese corrective measures give banking regulatory agencies in the three countries 
different levels of discretion. In other words, whether structured early intervention for 
banks is rule-based or discretion-based is related to the level of discretion given to 
banking regulatory agencies in taking corrective measures. In the context of establishing 
or reforming structured early intervention for banks, the level of discretion needs to be 
considered. In addition, the US’s category of compulsory and discretionary measures and 
the UK’s early preparation for potential failure are factors that could be considered. The 
US’s mandatory and discretionary corrective measures provide a way to limit the scope 
of banking regulatory agencies’ discretion and the UK’s early preparation sets an example 
of how to co-operate and coordinate with other banking regulatory authorities for troubled 
banks at different stages of early intervention.  
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Chapter 5 Policy Recommendations for Structured Early Intervention for Chinese 
Banks 
 
In the context of the Chinese banking sector, the performance of structured early 
intervention in troubled banks has not yet led to the creation of a formal system distinct 
from general banking regulations. In China, the current structured early intervention 
regulatory scheme has been shaped by a series of triggering events and corrective 
measures that occurred as a result of administrative takeover actions and closure by 
regulatory authorities and government intervention. Current triggering events create 
duplications and overlaps in the process of identifications of troubled banks, and current 
measures tend to be either those similar to regular regulation measures or to more 
intrusive measures such as revocation of a bank’s license. On the assumption of a special 
resolution for banks in China, this chapter focuses on the structured early intervention for 
Chinese banks according to the perspectives of the main banking regulator for structured 
early intervention, triggering events, and corrective measures. 
Based on the above, this chapter is thus structured as follows. The first section 
solves the problem of who regulates troubled banks and discusses the regulatory 
framework of Chinese banking regulations and the primary regulators of structured early 
intervention for banks. The next section discusses the issue of how to regulate from the 
perspective of triggering events and explores the suitability of rule-based and discretion-
based structured early intervention for banks in China. The third section covers how to 
regulate from the perspective of specific measures that can be applied to troubled banks 
by the primary banking regulator in China. The fourth section discusses the structured 
early intervention for Chinese banks in the context of dealing with cross-border banks, 
especially with respect to cooperation and coordination between Chinese banking 
regulators and home or host country banking regulators. The final sector lists all of these 
features and summarises the structured early intervention for Chinese banks. 
 
I. Who Regulates: The Primary Regulator of Structured Early Intervention for 
Banks Under the Chinese Banking Regulatory Framework  
 
The question of who regulates troubled banks in the context of structured early 
intervention for banks directly relates to which regulatory authority is the primary banking 
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regulator for said early intervention. The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
and China have different national regulatory frameworks to regulate and supervise 
troubled banks. Because of this dissimilarly, the arrangements of the primary banking 
regulator of structured early intervention for banks in these countries are different.  
When it comes to the regulatory frameworks for troubled banks and the primary 
banking regulators, designs of the frameworks have a direct impact on determining the 
primary banking regulator, and any change in the framework may lead to a change or a 
redistribution of the authority of the primary banking regulator. For example, the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) divvied up 
the role of the Financial Service Authority (FSA) in the UK, while a structural change 
combined the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) into the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CBIRC). To select the primary banking regulator for troubled banks in China, 
the first step is to ensure that the banking regulations and relevant resolution regulatory 
frameworks are suitable for the Chinese banking sector. This section evaluates the 
current Chinese regulatory framework of banking regulations and the arrangements of 
the primary banking regulator for troubled banks and then discusses policy 
recommendations for banking regulatory frameworks and especially the primary banking 
regulator for structured early intervention for banks in China. 
 
A. The Background: Chinese Regulatory Framework of Banking Regulations 
and Resolutions 
 
Unlike the US and UK comprehensive regimes that regulate and resolve banks, 
covering the entire life cycle of banks, the Chinese regulatory framework for banks still 
requires improvements, especially in terms of establishing and improving institutions of 
structured early intervention and bank resolutions. 717  The proposal for the Chinese 
regulatory framework of banking regulations and resolutions could include an order to 
establish a suitable special exit mechanism embedded in special bank insolvency 
proceedings that is controlled and supervised by administrative authorities or 
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governmental authorities for troubled banks as compared with the insolvency procedures 
of nonbank firms. This provides a foundation for the discussion of structured early 
intervention for banks in China. 
A brief analysis of why such an exit mechanism is needed is as follows. First, 
because of the important functions of banks in the economy and their vulnerability to risks 
and loss of public confidence, general insolvency proceedings may not be sufficient 
enough to deal with troubled banks, so, therefore, a special insolvency regime is needed 
as an exit mechanism for troubled or insolvent banks. Banks have special functions in 
terms of a country’s economy wherein banks offer and perform banking services by 
providing credits and liquidity to the society and act as the intermediary between monetary 
policy and the economy.718 Banks additionally complete the task of transforming short-
term deposits to fund long-term investments and are able to make profits by meeting the 
needs of financing during the process of maturity transformation.719 The transformation 
could lead to several risks, including credit and interest rate issues and the need to 
provide on-demand liquidity to cover their liabilities, especially under stress or in times of 
crises. In addition to these risks, as mentioned, banks are vulnerable to a loss of public 
confidence, and rumours that a bank is no longer viable could lead to a bank run and 
cause difficulties for the bank in raising funds, which may be even more likely to contribute 
to a crisis.  
The main difference between banks and nonbank firms is that banks have the 
function of transferring maturity of short-term liquid liabilities (deposits) to long-term illiquid 
assets (loans), provide financial services, and act as bridges between monetary policy 
and the economy.720 Other nonbank financial institutions may also perform such functions, 
but not generally all three. For example, after the Global Financial Crisis (GFS), the 
functions of banks seemed to be less special than they had been, because central banks 
tend to improve the robustness of payment systems by establishing a real-time gross 
settlements basis, their transmission mechanism developed more channels, and broader 
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supervision came to be enforced over a wider range of institutions.721 However, although 
there are similar services and functions performed by financial intuitions or shadow banks, 
banks remain as the centres of financial sectors, especially with regard to the situation in 
China where several huge state-owned banks exist and citizens’ attitudes toward and 
reliance on banks are perpetuated. Chinese banks remain special and the three 
aforementioned features of banks are valid as well for Chinese banks. These features of 
banks, including Chinese banks, explain why a special regime for bank insolvency is 
needed. 
When it comes to Chinese general insolvency proceedings, the proceedings may 
not lead to a smooth resolution of troubled banks. The proceedings—which include 
conciliation, reorganisation, and bankruptcy as the three options—enable creditors to 
rescue their interests.722  Courts can be involved in the insolvency proceedings. For 
example, creditors can choose to negotiate with the troubled company or file for an 
insolvency application to the court in China in a crisis involving a nonbank firm.723 
However, general insolvency proceedings may not be the suitable exit mechanism for 
troubled or even insolvent banks.724 One explanation is that general insolvency law and 
special bank insolvency law have different resolution purposes. Bank insolvency law aims 
to protect the financial stability and interests of the public as compared with the main goal 
of general insolvency law, which is to achieve fair distribution of debtors’ assets to 
creditors.725 Moreover, general insolvency proceedings can be difficult to manage in the 
context of bank crises in China, as either one of these proceedings takes a long time and 
banks loss assets quickly when a rumour or information of a doubtful solvency status of 
a bank spreads.726 The cost of the judicial process for dealing with bank insolvency in 
China can also be expensive.727 On the basis of special features of banks and the design 
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of Chinese general insolvency proceedings for managing troubled banks, a special bank 
insolvency regime in China constitutes a solution of an exit mechanism for troubled banks. 
Second, a suitable exit mechanism for troubled banks could enable the Chinese 
banking sector to function in a more efficient way and therefore is beneficial to deepening 
the financial reform in China. This is particularly related to the policy of opening up the 
Chinese financial sector. On the basis that no systemic risk emerges, special bank 
insolvency proceedings could improve the efficiency of the Chinese financial sector in the 
following two ways. Special bank insolvency proceedings could identify and deal with 
insolvent banks at earlier stages than the current general insolvency proceedings. The 
early initiation and timely resolution of insolvent banks are likely to reduce the impact of 
contagions in the banking sector, as the insolvency proceedings should be designed to 
ensure a smooth liquidation of insolvent banks with as little a negative impact as possible 
while also maintaining good stability of the financial system.728 An exit mechanism that 
allows insolvent banks to successfully exit the market also leads to a more market-based 
financial sector and promotes fairer competition amongst banks. An exit mechanism that 
is designed for banks would be a special step forward for the Chinese banking sector 
wherein the government tends to provide an implicit guarantee for the business and 
solvency of banks and would reduce the level of involvement of the government in the 
banking sector and enable the market to redistribute some of its resources by allowing 
troubled banks to exit the market.729 With the growth and opening up of the Chinese 
financial market, Chinese banks and the Chinese banking sector are more likely to be 
influenced by turbulence and instability of the global financial market and domestic banks 
are more likely to encounter risks and financial instability. The need for an exit mechanism 
for insolvent banks under the regulatory framework thus is increased.730 
Third, special bank insolvency proceedings enable banks to consider risks 
associated with their business decisions and operations while they are solvent and thus 
reduce any reliance on the implicit guarantees of the government and the consequences 
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caused by moral hazards. The establishment of bank insolvency proceedings could 
reduce the reliance of banks on the government’s implicit guarantees when they are faced 
with risks and troubled situations, as an exit mechanism could lead to an effective 
resolution for a troubled bank instead of the government’s efforts to intervene 
complicating things. Banks are likely to act more consciously and prudently without the 
government offering implicit guarantees to bear the consequences of the former’s risky 
decisions, and moral hazard situations that arise after banks make risky decisions yet do 
not experience the outcomes due to the government providing protections could be 
reduced. 
Although special bank insolvency proceedings need a more comprehensive 
discussion in terms of details and arrangements of the proceedings, the brief discussion 
explains the need to establish such proceedings in the Chinese banking regulatory 
framework. On the basis of comparisons of US, UK, and Chinese regulatory frameworks, 
one of the differences is that China has not established special bank insolvency 
proceedings, which reveals the problem of having no bank insolvency proceedings in 
China and lacking exit mechanisms for troubled banks. Structured early intervention for 
banks could function better with special bank insolvency proceedings in place because 
the proceedings contribute to the management of troubled banks, especially at latter 
stages of structured early intervention for banks, and the same proceedings provide an 
exit for troubled banks that have been through structured early intervention without a 
positive outcome. Special bank insolvency proceedings relate to structured early 
intervention for banks and provide a more complete framework for structured early 
intervention for banks to function in the context of Chinese banking regulations and 
resolutions. 
 
B. The Proposed Primary Banking Regulator of Structured Early Intervention 
for banks 
 
On the basis of the introduction of the current Chinese regulatory framework of 
banking regulations, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has gained increased power 
and authority for making rules to conduct prudential banking regulations in addition to its 
macro-prudential regulations gathered after the structural change in 2017, while the China 
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Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) became the main regulatory 
agent for banks and insurance companies on the basis of an institution-based regulation 
after the merger of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) occurred in 2018.731 The deposit insurance 
funds management agency (hereafter is referred to as the ‘deposit management agency’) 
is an affiliate agency of the PBOC, as appointed by the State Council, and not an 
independent company.732 The PBOC, the CBIRC, and the deposit management agency 
are the three main banking regulators in the Chinese banking sector at this time.  
In terms of structured early intervention for banks, whether the PBOC, the CBIRC, 
or the deposit management agency should be the primary banking regulator is vital to 
decide in order to promote a well-functioning structured early intervention scheme for 
banks, especially given the current intertwined roles and responsibilities among these 
various banking regulators. The currently proposed primary banking regulator for 
structured early intervention for banks is the CBIRC, as this organisation is the prudential 
regulator for individual banks on a micro-level. Although based on the Deposit Insurance 
Regulation733, the deposit management agency is entitled to intervene in troubled banks 
at early stages and to take corrective measures to rectify risks associated with troubled 
banks, the stratification of the roles and responsibilities of early intervention between the 
CBIRC and the deposit management agency remain unclear. The following discussion 
explains the reasons for why the CBIRC should be the primary banking regulator for 
structured early intervention for banks and introduces possible arrangements to separate 
the regulatory roles and responsibilities of the CBIRC from those of the deposit 
management agency. 
 
1. Why the CBIRC Should Be the Primary Regulator of Structured Early 
Intervention for Banks 
 
Structured early intervention for banks act as a supervisory mechanism for the 
banking regulator to identify bank risks and operations at the early stages and to intervene 
early to avoid negative impacts and bank failures. They are applied at early stages in the 
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process of dealing with troubled banks as compared with during bank insolvency 
proceedings, which instead provide an exit mechanism and a process by which to 
manage to resolve failed banks. The primary banking regulator of structured early 
intervention for banks should be the most suitable one for achieving goals of this 
mechanism as chosen from among the PBOC, the deposit management agency, and the 
CBIRC. 
The PBOC, as the central bank of China, has the responsibility of maintaining 
financial stability and regulating systemic risks on the basis of macro-prudential banking 
regulations. It also holds the responsibilities of acting as the Lender of the Last Resort 
(LOLR) and as the lead financial regulator in the management of financial groups, 
including banks.734  More specifically, under the current regulatory framework in the 
Chinese financial sector, the PBOC is responsible for monetary policy and financial 
regulation, including but not limited to formulating and executing monetary policy, issuing 
and managing circulation of the Chinese currency (CNY), managing and operating 
national foreign reserves and gold reserves, and publishing rules and regulations related 
to financial regulations and operations.735 The primary banking regulator of structured 
early intervention for banks should be the institution that conducts daily regulation and 
supervision of banks, or the early identification of risks and problems could be hard to 
achieve. From this perspective, the PBOC is not suitable for identifying risks and 
problems and obtaining first-hand information of banks as the macro-prudential regulator 
when compared with regulators that conduct daily regulation and supervision activities. 
In terms of the deposit management agency, the following discussion explains why 
the agency is not the suitable regulator of structured early intervention for banks. One 
reason is that the deposit insurance scheme has been regarded as a tool of the PBOC, 
together with the Chinese central bank’s tools of macro-control and prudential regulation. 
The relationship between the deposit management agency and PBOC can be seen from 
the situation of that the deposit management agency is an affiliate of the PBOC.736 As an 
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affiliate agency, the deposit management agency is closely related with the PBOC. The 
roles and responsibilities of the deposit management agency have been regarded as 
additional functions of the PBOC, specifically early intervention and corrective measures 
enacted to deal with risks by the deposit management agency and the appointment of the 
deposit management agency as the receiver, administrator, and liquidator of insolvent 
banks.737 The PBOC and its decisions on dealing with an insolvent bank could have an 
impact on the deposit management agency wherein the agency acts like an executor of 
the PBOC’s decisions. Additionally, due to the affiliated status of the deposit insurance 
agency and the PBOC, the agency may encounter the same difficulties in identifying the 
risks and problems of troubled banks at early stages given that the agency is not 
responsible for the daily regulation of banks. 
Another reason is that the legal status of the deposit management agency is 
unclear and this contributes to an uncertain scope of authority of the deposit management 
agency under the current regulatory framework. Mandates of the deposit insurance 
scheme normally are of four types, and each type of mandate provides the deposit 
insurance scheme with different scopes of authority and arrangements with other financial 
safety net participants. The four types of mandates of the deposit insurance scheme are 
the paybox mandate, paybox-plus mandate, loss-minimiser mandate, and risk-minimiser 
mandate.738 Based on these mandates, the authority of the deposit insurance scheme 
ranges from reimbursement of insured deposit funds to a comprehensive set of resolution 
authorities depending upon the formal arrangements of the deposit insurance schemes 
of individual countries.739 The paybox and paybox-plus mandates enable the deposit 
insurance agency to mainly reimburse the insured deposits to depositors.740 Additional 
responsibilities of paybox plus mandates include functions in the resolution process by 
assisting and cooperating with banking regulators or the resolution authorities. This is the 
case for the UK deposit insurance scheme, and the Financial Service Compensation 
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Scheme (FSCS) as the deposit insurance agency cooperates with the PRA in the latter 
stages of the Proactive Intervention Framework (PIF), in structured early intervention for 
UK banks, and in reimbursements of depositors during the resolution process.741 After 
the GFS, deposit insurance schemes around the world more often tended to perform 
functions as loss-minimiser mandates wherein the deposit insurance agency participates 
in least-cost resolution strategies.742 The risk-minimiser mandate provides the deposit 
insurance agency with a wider scope of authority that entitles the agency to have 
resolution powers and other prudential oversight responsibilities.743 The mandate of the 
US deposit insurance scheme is the type of risk-minimiser approach wherein the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has the resolution powers to deal with insolvent 
banks after negative PCA outcomes. 
The mandate of the Chinese deposit management agency has an undefined status, 
which means the scope of the agency’s authority requires further clarification in the law. 
According to the Deposit Insurance Regulation, the deposit management agency is 
entitled to apply early intervention and corrective measures to troubled banks and to be 
appointed as the receiver, administrator, and liquidator of insolvent banks. 744   The 
mandate of the Chinese deposit insurance scheme can be regarded as the loss-minimiser 
type or paybox-plus type depending upon the explanations of the scope of the early 
intervention authority. On the basis of the deposit management agency’s roles and 
responsibilities, the agency is entitled to play a role in the resolution process without the 
functions of other prudential oversight regulations and thus can be regarded as a loss-
minimiser type of deposit insurance scheme. Considering the relationship between the 
deposit management agency and the PBOC, the deposit management agency could be 
regarded as a dependent agency in comparison with the authority of the PBOC and the 
CBIRC. Without a clarified mandate of the deposit management agency, the scope of the 
agency’s authority could be difficult to determine, which could result in difficulties in 
establishing the specific functions of the deposit insurance scheme in the banking 
regulatory framework. Moreover, when it comes to the function of early intervention of the 
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deposit management agency, the Deposit Insurance Regulation does not specify details 
in relation to early intervention functions, and this could cause overlaps with the authority 
of the CBIRC in the context of the regulation and supervision of banks, especially when 
dealing with troubled or insolvent banks.745 
Following the above discussion of the PBOC and the deposit management agency, 
the following section focuses on why the CBIRC should be the primary regulator of 
structured early intervention for banks in China. Of note, the reasons are twofold. First, 
the CBIRC is an institution-based prudential regulator and is responsible for both off-site 
and on-site examinations of banks, which enables the CBIRC to establish a regulatory 
information system that analyses and assesses bank operations and risks and to review 
regular and timely updates on bank performance and risk levels. 746  One of the 
preconditions of successful structured early intervention for banks requires knowledge of 
accurate and timely financial information of banks, and this requirement mainly promotes 
certain standards of triggering events of structured early intervention to provide timely 
financial information of banks and reflect the true statuses of banks.747 This timely and 
accurate information of banks can be useful when a suitable banking regulator has access 
to and takes advantage of such. As the micro-prudential banking regulator, the CBIRC 
has the advantages of accessing certain information and in a more timely manner than 
other banking regulators—namely, the PBOC and the deposit management agency—
under the current regulatory framework in the Chinese banking sector. The CBIRC 
conducts the daily regulation of banks and has established a series of triggering events 
combining both objective triggers such as capital ratios and subjective triggers such as 
supervisory judgements in order to determine the financial conditions and risks of a bank 
at a certain time, whereas other banking regulators may not have access to all the details 
of financial conditions and risk levels of particular banks.748  
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Second, on the basis of comparisons of structured early intervention for banks in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, the primary banking regulator of PCA 
in the United States and PIF in the United Kingdom are both prudential banking regulators 
who are responsible for regular bank regulation and supervision efforts. These 
experiences provide examples and practices for the primary banking regulator to consider 
in composing structured early intervention for banks in China and show the plausibility of 
the prudential banking regulator being the primary banking regulator for structured early 
intervention for banks. In the process of dealing with troubled banks in the US, including 
insolvent banks, early intervention with troubled banks and attaining receivership of 
insolvent banks are the two steps of the process.749 The primary banking regulator of 
banks, depending on the chartering authority of the banks, applies corrective actions to 
banks based on the capital ratio category of said banks to improve the level of intervention 
enforced on the banks. The primary banking regulator then cooperates with and appoints 
the FDIC as a receiver of the insolvent banks if the corrective measures fail and the banks 
need to be resolved and exit to the market. Similarly, the PRA in the UK, as the prudential 
banking regulator, is entitled to first consider applying enhanced level of intervention to 
troubled banks and prepare for possible resolution in the future with the FSCS, then, 
eventually at the last stage of structured early intervention for banks, to work with the 
Bank of England as the resolution authority required to liquidate troubled banks. Both the 
US and UK practices show the dominant role of the prudential banking regulator at the 
early stages of structured early intervention for banks to improve the level of intervention 
to correct operations and stabilise the financial conditions of troubled banks. On the one 
hand, establishing the prudential banking regulator as the primary banking regulator is 
likely to save the needs for cooperation and coordination among several banking 
regulatory authorities in the early stages. This could ensure the efficiency of conducting 
an enhanced level of intervention by one primary banking regulator in relation to making 
decisions and applying corrective measures at the early stages. On the other hand, 
mandates of deposit insurance schemes in the US and UK are clear, and the scopes of 
the authority of the deposit insurance agencies in these two countries are defined without 
providing them with the authority of early intervention to deal with the deterioration of bank 
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financial conditions and risk levels. The US and UK arrangements of a primary banking 
regulator of structured early intervention for banks show the feasibility of the dominant 
role of the prudential banking regulator as the primary banking regulator. Cooperation 
with resolution authorities, whether the authority is the central bank or the deposit 
insurance agency, is left to the latter stages of structured early intervention for banks 
where troubled banks are no longer viable and cannot be corrected by early intervention. 
These arrangements could work as a reference for the Chinese arrangement of the 
primary banking regulator of structured early intervention for banks, especially on the 
basis of the current distribution of roles and responsibilities of the CBIRC and deposit 
management agency. 
 
2. Possible Allocation Patterns of the Roles and Responsibilities of the Deposit 
Management Agency and the CBIRC 
 
Before the discussion of a potential arrangement of roles and responsibilities of 
the CBIRC and deposit management agency is presented, it is worth clarifying the 
understanding of ‘the process or mechanism of dealing with troubled banks’. This can 
refer to either of the following: either the application of resolution tools in the resolution of 
insolvent banks or the whole process from an enhanced level of regulation and 
supervision of troubled banks to the eventual resolution of troubled banks. The scope of 
the process or mechanism of dealing with troubled banks in the second understanding is 
wider than the first understanding. The process or mechanism of dealing with troubled 
banks in the context of Chinese law and literature tends to refer to the bank resolution 
process wherein the deposit management agency resolves insolvent banks by using a 
series of resolution tools, including purchase and assumption, bridge banks, and open 
bank assistance. This understanding of the process is very similar to the FDIC’s role as 
the deposit insurer in receiverships or resolution processes. As the understanding of ‘the 
process of dealing with troubled banks’ may be different in different contexts, this 
subsection is constructed in accordance with the second understanding of the process 
wherein structured early intervention for banks and bank resolution constitute the process 
of dealing with troubled banks. Structured early intervention for banks refer to the starting 
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phase of dealing with troubled banks wherein an enhanced level of intervention has been 
imposed on troubled banks to improve their financial performance and stability. 
As mentioned above, both the CBIRC and the deposit management agency have 
power and authority in relation to the process of early intervention, although the CBIRC 
is provided with more authority and power in terms of initiating the process of dealing with 
insolvent banks under the current regulatory framework to gradually improve the level of 
intervention. Conversely, the deposit management agency is provided with more authority 
and power as the receiver, administrator, or liquidator in the resolution process of dealing 
with insolvent banks by means of a takeover, administrative closure, or liquidation before 
entering into the judicial process of bank resolution. It also acts as the rule-making 
authority in relation to these functions. 
In relation to the roles and responsibilities of early intervention of troubled banks, 
under the current regulatory framework, the CBIRC has been the primary banking 
regulator in both prudential banking regulations and early intervention.750 The CBIRC is 
entitled to decide whether to pursue measures or not, including takeover, administrative 
closure, reorganisation of troubled banks, and the liquidation of banks that are closed 
because of administrative closure.751 The deposit management agency has the role of 
suggesting that the CBIRC take the above actions when faced with troubled or insolvent 
banks in situations where the banks have been going through or are likely to suffer credit 
crisis where interests of depositors and customers can be seriously affected or 
damaged.752 The rule-making authority of the deposit management agency could be a 
cause of overlaps in the authority of early intervention. 
The proposed arrangements of roles and responsibilities of the CBIRC and the 
deposit management agency in terms of structured early intervention for banks is to allow 
the CBIRC to be the primary banking regulator on this matter and to enable the deposit 
management agency to work collaboratively with CBIRC at latter stages of structured 
early intervention for banks to ensure the smooth and prepared resolution of troubled 
banks. The reasons for the proposed arrangements are twofold.  
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First, in terms of structured early intervention for banks, on the basis of the 
proposed arrangement, overlaps in the authority and powers of the CBIRC and the 
deposit management agency can be avoided, and thus reduce the negative impacts, such 
as an increase in cost, of excessive regulations implemented to correct the same problem. 
The tendency for overlaps in regulatory authority between the CBIRC and the deposit 
management agency stems from the fact that roles and responsibilities of banking 
regulators cover all deposit-taking financial institutions.753  This means that both the 
CBIRC and the deposit management agency are responsible for all deposit-taking 
financial institutions in that the CBIRC conducts prudential regulation and the deposit 
management agency is responsible for all insured deposits of these institutions, 
respectively. This is different from the roles of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in carrying out the regulation and 
supervision of certain banks.754  The division of roles and responsibilities of banking 
regulators in the US is easier to identify and differentiate because each banking regulator 
is responsible for a certain category of banks depending on whether the banks are 
national or state banks and whether the banks participate the Federal Reserve System 
or not. The FDIC also has clarified roles and responsibilities as the receiver of insolvent 
banks because of the risk-minimiser mandate type of the deposit insurance system.  
The overlaps between the CBIRC and the deposit management agency happen 
because the deposit management agency is entitled to conduct early intervention and to 
enforce different insurance premiums on the basis of the risk levels of individual banks as 
determined by the deposit management agency.755 Additionally, the deposit management 
agency is entitled to formulate and publish rules in relation to its roles and responsibilities 
as an insurer. The scope of this entitlement is broad, because the prudential operation of 
banks, the ability to make repayments of debts, risk management, capital adequacy, and 
receiverships are all related to the roles and responsibilities of the deposit management 
agency.756 Therefore, both the judgement of the risk levels of banks and the authority to 
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make rules could cause overlaps between the authority and powers of CBIRC as the 
prudential banking regulator.  
The proposed arrangement limits the scope and boundary of the deposit 
management agency to the latter stages of structured early intervention for banks, 
especially the resolution phase of dealing with troubled banks. This enables the CBIRC 
as the primary banking regulator to intervene in the operations of troubled banks at early 
stages. One benefit of the arrangement is the savings of the costs and resources of the 
deposit management agency because the agency is less experienced and resourceful in 
comparison with the prudential banking regulator, especially as an affiliate to the PBOC. 
The CBIRC has comprehensive regulatory systems to supervise and monitor banks in 
terms of risk assessment, regulatory rating, and onsite and offsite examinations.757 The 
arrangement is also likely to alleviate the pressure on banks to engage in compliance as, 
otherwise, banks are faced with two sets of rules and examinations—one by CBIRC as 
the prudential regulator and one by the deposit management agency acting as an insurer 
to check banks’ prudence on a regular basis and as a resolution authority—increasing 
the costs and time required for compliance. 
Second, the collaboration and coordination of the CBIRC and the deposit 
management agency at latter stages of structured early intervention for banks could 
ensure a smooth process of dealing with troubled banks, with the dominant role being 
transferred to the resolution authority. The central bank, the prudential banking regulator, 
and the deposit insurance agency constitute a financial safety net where a suitable 
arrangement of functions and cooperation amongst these regulators are the basis of an 
effective and stable financial regulatory system, especially with the deposit management 
agency being a relatively new regulator in the Chinese financial safety net.758 The deposit 
management agency under the proposed arrangement focuses on the resolution of 
insolvent banks. Its involvement, ranging from assessing resolvability to contingency 
planning, in the latter stages of structured early intervention for banks, providing a 
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transition period, could contribute to a comprehensive planning and better preparation for 
the resolution process. The arrangement of collaboration and coordination between the 
CBIRC and the deposit management agency is derived from structured early intervention 
for UK banks, where the resolution authority is involved in each stage of the structured 
early intervention for banks and gradually improves the level of assessment of troubled 
banks to prepare in more detail for possible resolution.759 At the final stage of structured 
early intervention for banks, the resolution authority becomes the primary regulator and 
resolves the troubled banks when they are not viable.760 On the basis of the cooperation 
between the two Chinese banking regulators, the deposit management agency’s early 
involvement in structured early intervention for banks enables it to access regulatory 
information about troubled banks from the CBIRC’s comprehensive regulatory systems 
and make preparations for possible resolution of the troubled banks rather than having 
authority over structured early intervention for banks. 
To conclude, first, the problem with the background of structured early intervention 
for banks is a lack of an exit mechanism that is designed for banks. This has an impact 
on the process of dealing with troubled banks in China, as, currently there are no formal 
proceedings to follow in dealing with bank insolvency, which could affect the operation of 
structured early intervention and require the government to take administrative measures. 
Second, the existing problem with the primary banking regulations for structured early 
intervention for banks is derived from both the mandates of the Chinese deposit insurance 
scheme and the undefined scope of the deposit management agency’s authority. The 
CBIRC should be the primary banking regulator for structured early intervention for banks 
because it has established systems to detect changes and access information about a 
bank’s financial condition. In addition, establishing the prudential banking regulator as the 
primary regulator for structured early intervention for banks seems to be a good practice, 
based on the US and UK experience. Finally, in relation to the allocation of roles and 
responsibilities of the CBIRC and the deposit management agency, the CBIRC should be 
responsible for structured early intervention for banks, while the deposit management 
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agency should complement at the latter stages to ensure a smooth resolution of insolvent 
banks. 
Bank regulation and 
supervision 
The PBoC:  
Macro-prudential regulation and 
drafting rules for regulation 
Normal and regular 
regulation and 
supervision of banks 
CBIRC: Institutional-based regulator 
Structured early 
intervention for banks 
CBIRC: An enhanced level of 
regulation and supervision 
Minor stage 
Moderate stage 
Severe stage 
Special bank 
resolution regime 
The deposit insurance funds 
management agency and resolution 
authorities 
Resolution 
 
Table 7 Proposed Chinese Regulators 
II. How to Regulate: Triggering Events of Structured Early Intervention for 
Banks 
 
Under the abovementioned banking regulatory framework, the CBIRC, as the 
primary banking regulator for structured early intervention for banks, must closely monitor 
banks and react to changes in bank financial conditions and risk levels where appropriate. 
Triggering events of structured early intervention for banks provide the primary banking 
regulator with a set of standards to determine whether an enhanced level of intervention 
and supervision of particular banks is needed. US, UK, and Chinese triggering events 
adopt different methods to achieve the objective of identifying troubled banks in a timely 
manner. On the basis of comparisons of triggering events, whether triggering events 
adopt objective standards or regulatory discretions and whether a formal or regularly 
structured early intervention system are considered are the two main differences of 
triggering events among the three countries. This section discusses the proposed set of 
standards for triggering events of structured early intervention for banks in China in 
relation to policy recommendations from the perspectives of objective and subjective 
standards and formal or regular systems. 
 
A. Objective, Subjective, or Combined Triggering Events 
 
As used in this dissertation, the term ‘triggering events’ refers to a set of standards 
that the primary banking regulator applies to determine the financial conditions and risk 
levels of banks. As explained in Chapter 3, triggering events can come in the form of 
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objective standards, such as capital ratios; in the form of subjective standards, such as 
supervisory assessments on the basis of the judgements of banking regulators; or in the 
form of combined triggering events that integrate both objective and subjective standards. 
On the basis of comparisons of US, UK, and Chinese triggering events, differences are 
derived from variations in underpinning theories, considerations of pros and cons of 
objective versus subjective standards, and traditions in regulating the financial sector. In 
terms of Chinese structured early intervention for banks specifically, the current triggering 
events adopt a combination of objective and subjective standards. 
However, objective standards as triggering events could be a more suitable choice 
for the Chinese structured early intervention for banks. In addition to capital ratios as one 
type of objective standard, triggering events for the Chinese structured early intervention 
for banks should include other types of objective standards, especially the nonperforming 
assets coverage ratio. A series of objective standards could consist of triggering events 
to indicate bank financial conditions and to function as signals for the primary banking 
regulator to use to determine whether further corrective measures are necessary for 
particular banks. The following three reasons explain why a series of objective standards 
could be suitable for functioning as triggering events in the context of Chinese structured 
early intervention for banks. 
First, objective standards as triggering events can be a way or an alternative to 
initiate structured early intervention quicker as banks fail to meet certain requirements, 
which could be a way to reduce the negative impact, including delays on determining 
bank financial conditions by the regulator’s judgement, thus reducing the dependence on 
the outcomes of the government’s efforts in dealing with troubled banks. One advantage 
of objective standards is to avoid forbearance of regulators and reduce the costs of 
government intervention of troubled banks, as takeover and closure of banks by the 
government are costly methods for resolving troubled banks.761 In the context of dealing 
with troubled banks in China, the government’s intervention in managing troubled banks 
is a common measure, because triggering events did not function early enough to provide 
 
761 Craig O. Brown and I. Serdae Dinc, ‘Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the 
Banking Sector Is Weak’ (2011) 24 The Review of Financial Studies 1378 
233 
indications of financial conditions of banks for the primary banking regulator.762 As a result, 
when problems of troubled banks emerge, corrective measures of early intervention may 
not be the most effective or suitable measures at that time for dealing with troubled banks; 
therefore, government intervention are needed, especially in the case of a lack of exit 
mechanisms for insolvent banks.  
Problems with government intervention in troubled banks can be seen in four 
example cases of resolution of troubled banks in China. These cases include the 
resolutions of Weihai Commercial Bank in 1998, Hainan Development Bank from 1997 to 
now, eight credit unions in Ge’er Mu from 2005 to 2007, and Yinpeng City Credit Union 
from 1999 to 2008. In all four cases, the Chinese central bank, prudential banking 
regulators, and the local government participated in the process of managing these 
troubled banks wherein the central bank provided emergency liquidity support and the 
local government provided direct and material help to recover the banks—for example, 
using local monetary funds, refunding taxes, and dealing with nonperforming loans.763 
The involvement of the prudential banking regulator (i.e., the CBRC and its local divisions) 
in dealing with troubled banks at early stages was very limited, and only the adjustment 
of management and appointment of a special onsite working unit to improve the operation 
of troubled banks were used.764 Government intervention has played an important role in 
dealing with these troubled banks, and these banks have either been forced to exit the 
market by the administrative intervention or been through the liquidation process as 
promoted by judicial judgement.765 These cases reveal the tendency of intervention by 
the government on troubled banks. 
In terms of regulatory forbearance and timely intervention in China, due to the 
history and tradition of the Chinese financial sector, forbearance regarding the operation 
of troubled banks seems to be a common strategy of regulatory authorities. As regulatory 
forbearance is a relatively subjective means of assessment and judgement of troubled 
banks, Chinese banking regulators have a wide scope of discretions with which to 
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determine if forbearance is the right thing to do, which leads to the situation wherein 
troubled banks can continue to operate, provoking severe moral hazards in the banking 
sector.766 For example, the prudential banking regulator could choose not to take any 
measures to some state-owned banks under some circumstances and the state would 
instead therefore have to intervene to deal with the results of regulatory forbearance. The 
state provided liquidity assistance for the China Construction Bank and Bank of China to 
increase their equity and improve their capital adequacy in order to meet Basel 
requirements by using the state’s foreign currency reserve, and the state also provided 
assistance to deal with these banks’ nonperforming loans.767  
The former governor of the PBOC pointed out that, in the Chinese banking 
regulatory framework, there is a lack of the mechanism of prompt corrective actions that 
identify and deal with changes in bank financial conditions and risks and reduce the 
impact and risks associated with regulatory forbearance derived from the decisions and 
judgements of banking regulations.768 In addition, the factor of public interests should be 
taken into consideration when designing the specific types of structured early intervention 
for banks in particular countries.769 In this regard, objective standards as triggering events 
can be an alternative that functions to provide signals of banks’ financial conditions and 
risks on the basis of ratios other than supervisory assessments and judgements, which 
are related to regulatory forbearance.  
Regardless of the accuracy and efficiency of objective standards as triggering 
events, the use of such standards could prevent regulatory forbearance from happening 
if banking regulators choose to deal with troubled banks by using structured early 
intervention for these banks in individual cases. The design of structured early 
intervention for banks allows the primary banking regulator to take corrective action once 
troubled banks fall below certain ratios or levels rather than allowing forbearance and 
delays in intervening in the troubled banks. One important aspect of objective standards 
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as triggering events is the need to provide another independent set of indicators for 
banking regulators to use to determine a bank’s financial condition, which works in parallel 
with supervisory assessment. As a result, when dealing with troubled banks, in terms of 
the objective of achieving public interests, structured early intervention for banks could 
be triggered promptly as an alternative. Although the current Chinese triggering events 
present elements of objective standards including capital ratios, the role of this part of 
triggering events seems to be minor as compared with the role of regulatory judgement. 
This is demonstrated by the state’s intervention in state-owned banks and local 
governments’ efforts in dealing with troubled banks.770 Objective standards provide a way 
to identify potential problems in bank financial conditions and a way to prevent excessive 
discretions from banking regulators at the same time, which could promote a balance 
between structured early intervention and regulatory forbearance as two ways of dealing 
with troubled banks. In the context of the Chinese banking sector, because of traditions 
and the practice of regulatory forbearance as well as government intervention, objective 
standards as a possible way to reduce the regulatory forbearance at early stages of the 
process of dealing with troubled banks are necessary. 
Second, alternative objective standards, such as nonperforming asset coverage 
ratio (NPACR) and loan loss reserve adequacy standards, could provide a more accurate 
assessment of troubled banks in comparison with risk-based capital ratios such that the 
early identification of troubled banks is more likely to be achieved. NPACR refers to a 
ratio that assesses whether a bank is willing or unwilling to preserve a sufficient amount 
of reserves for potential future loan losses and to reflect the level of forbearance by 
banking regulators in dealing with banks with insufficient loan loss reserves.771 This ratio 
is calculated as the ‘total equity capital plus loan-loss reserves less nonperforming assets, 
all divided by total assets (all in book values)’.772 In essence, NPACR measures the 
capital adequacy of a bank, as it represents the ratio of equity to assets in the case that 
banks are required to prepare for reserves for nonperforming loans and assets.773 The 
result from this ratio and formula is that inadequate reserves for nonperforming loans and 
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assets could greatly reduce the amount of a bank’s capital, while adequate reserves for 
nonperforming loans and assets could improve the level of capital adequacy of a bank. 
As a result, a bank’s financial performance and operations can be assessed in a 
straightforward way by banking regulators, especially by using the book value of the 
banks’ assets.  
In relation to the accuracy of NPACR, as an alternative objective standard to trigger 
structured early intervention for banks, the following two reasons explain why NPACR 
could be a more accurate ratio to assess a bank’s financial performance. The first reason 
is that NPACR considers two factors that may have an impact on a bank’s overall financial 
performance and operations. The two factors include capital adequacy and asset 
quality.774 Traditional capital ratios, such as capital requirements (e.g., tier 1, tier 2 capital, 
and minimum capital adequacy ratios) are normally calculated in the way that a bank’s 
capital is divided by their risk-based assets to assess a bank’s capital adequacy. As 
compared with those traditional capital ratios, NPACR takes both capital adequacy and 
asset quality into consideration. In particular, the formula to calculate this ratio contains 
the factors nonperforming assets and loan loss reserves, which reflect the asset quality 
of a bank. The accuracy of loan loss reserves is derived from the ability of loan loss 
reserves to reflect material changes in banks’ business and situations.775 The rationale 
behind the accuracy of loan loss reserves is that banks do not necessarily increase their 
loan loss reserves at the same pace as their nonperforming assets increase and therefore, 
under this circumstance, NPACR declines, and this declination reflects the weakness in 
assets and the reduced asset quality.776 Moreover, empirically, the accuracy of loan loss 
reserves to assess bank insolvency risks and financial performance has been tested and 
revealed that the adoption of loan loss reserve adequacy standards could effectively 
improve the accuracy of the recognition of troubled banks with high insolvency risks,  
thereby triggering early intervention in a timely manner.777  
The second reason that NPACR could be a more accurate indicator is that the ratio 
tends to reduce the incentives for banks to maintain deficient capital and insufficient loan 
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loss reserves as well as reduce the incentives for banking regulators to require 
inadequate loan loss reserves.778 In other words, NPACR is an indicator that reveals the 
actual capital adequacy status of banks, which means that the ratio is able to identify 
banks with sufficient capital ratios that comply with current risk-based capital regulation 
but in fact have excessive nonperforming assets and insufficient loan loss reserves for 
these potential losses. For example, in the US banking sector, during the recent GFS, the 
loan loss reserves increased together with the increase of nonperforming assets but still 
remained insufficient as compared with the amount of nonperforming assets of banks.779 
Under this circumstance, when preparing loan loss reserves, only capital adequacy and 
relevant traditional capital ratios are taken into consideration, and this is likely to lead to 
an overestimation of the level of capital that is able to absorb risks incurred by 
nonperforming assets and the preparation of less loan loss reserves for the potential 
insolvency risks of banks.780  
Furthermore, the application of NPACR to detect weakness in troubled banks is 
able to accurately reveal banks with weaknesses in assets quality and financial 
performance, which is compatible with the Chinese banking context in which 
nonperforming loans and assets are core problems for both the banks themselves and 
banking regulators. This means that NPACR is more likely to reflect the actual financial 
positions of banks in China with potential problems of nonperforming loans and assets 
and to better detect whether banks have weaknesses in capital adequacy and asset 
quality. Nonperforming loans have constituted a problem in the Chinese banking sector 
for a long time because of the macro-economy environment, government policies, and 
structural financial reforms.781 Currently, one main characteristic of nonperforming loans 
in China is that the scale of nonperforming loans in the Chinese banking industry 
continues to grow rapidly, which means that the total amount of remaining nonperforming 
assets and the ratio of nonperforming assets both have experienced a growth trend in the 
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recent two decades.782 Another main characteristic is that nonperforming loans tend to 
be concentrated in several industries, which refers to the fact that manufacturing and retail 
together account for more than 56% of nonperforming loans among all sectors and 
industries.783 The historical way China has dealt with nonperforming loans has been to 
establish asset management companies to deal with nonperforming assets of banks and, 
during the asset-transferring process, the state eventually bears some of the losses 
derived from these nonperforming assets. 784  The current trend in dealing with 
nonperforming loans in China is to apply asset securitisation, which depends upon the 
market forces to deal with nonperforming assets. 785  Because of the amount of 
nonperforming loans and assets in the Chinese banking industry, a ratio that considers 
the nonperforming loans of banks could be a more suitable way to assess the actual 
financial performance of the banks and therefore provide a more accurate reflection of 
the banks’ financial statuses and insolvency risks. As compared with traditional capital 
ratios, NPACR could perform better as a single ratio that assesses the financial conditions 
of banks, especially for banks in China, with the consideration of nonperforming loans 
being able to act as triggers of structured early intervention for banks. 
Finally, in comparison with subjective standards and combined triggering events, 
another advantage of objective standards, especially NPACR, as triggering events could 
be a more efficient way to identify troubled banks. The reasons are threefold. The first 
reason is that NPACR could be an efficient way for banking regulators to identify troubled 
banks from a practical perspective. Unlike capital ratios produced by the Basel Committee 
of Banking Supervision, the use of NPACR could be a clearer and easier way for banking 
regulators to identify overdue loans and calculate the ratio to determine and predict the 
financial performance and conditions of banks. From the perspective of pursuing the early 
identification and indication of problem banks, Basel capital ratios have been used as 
triggering events of early intervention of banks by banking regulators around the world 
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with limited positive effects on early intervention, 786  though Basel capital ratios are 
designed to be banking regulatory requirements and have a net-positive effect in a long-
term on some counties’ economy from a cost–benefit perspective787. In addition to the 
lagging nature of capital ratios, the problem with Basel capital ratios in relation to early 
warnings is the calculation of Basel capital ratios and the collection of data from banks, 
as the process of data collection and calculation can be complicated, including especially 
the calculation of risk-weighted assets, which is essential to the calculation of the tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio and total risk-based capital ratio.788 The clarity of NPACR can be 
shown from the convenience for banking regulators to identify overdue loans when 
different overdue dates of these loans can be easily observed. Because of this, banks 
could reduce the possibilities of masking deficiencies in capital adequacy and banking 
regulators could be abler to intervene in banks with less capital to absorb potential losses 
caused by the accumulation of nonperforming assets. 
Moreover, the sensitivity of NPACR to detect variations in the capital adequacy 
and asset quality of banks shows the efficiency of NPACR as an objective standard in 
relation to triggers of structured early intervention for banks. This is especially an 
advantage when compared with traditional capital ratios in assessing banks’ financial 
performance and positions. The sensitivity of NPACR is derived from the formula for 
calculation. As mentioned above, NPACR is calculated as ‘book equity capital plus loan 
loss reserves less nonperforming assets, all divided by year-end assets’789. As the core 
factor in the formula, the factor of nonperforming loans of a bank is calculated based on 
these loans having different past-due dates. Specifically, the nonperforming loans is the 
sum of ‘20% of the loans past-due by 30 to 89 days, 50% of the loans past-due by 90 to 
180 days, and 100% of the nonaccrual loans and OREO (referring to loans that are 
deemed to be substandard, doubtful, or a loss during onsite examinations by US banking 
regulators)’.790 Given the different percentages of these nonperforming loans, the final 
ratio can be sensitive to nonaccrual loans and the loans that are regarded as doubtful 
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assets and losses. Therefore, in addition to the accuracy, the efficiency of NPACR is 
shown from its ability to reflect changes in nonperforming loans in a timely way.  
The third reason is that NPACR could be more easily incorporated into the 
structure of triggering events as compared with other multivariable models in which more 
changes may be needed to maintain a smooth operation of these objective standards to 
complement the current banking regulatory framework in China. For example, 
nontraditional banking activities, which are one of the fee sources of bank noninterest 
income, have an economical effect on the possibilities of bank insolvency and may act as 
a set of multiple variables to assess banks’ stabilities and risks.791 Noninterest income is 
categorised into the following three groups: nontraditional stakeholder activities, including 
investment banking or other banking activities that require banks to have risky assets; 
nontraditional fee-for-service activities, including securities brokerage or other activities 
that do not require banks to have risky assets; and traditional fee banking activities, 
including depositor services.792  When it comes to assessing the insolvency risk and 
financial performance of troubled banks in the context of a banking crisis, banking 
supervisors should consider all of these categories of noninterest income banking 
activities.793 The three categories of noninterest income as three types of variables have 
different implications toward the financial performance of banks, depending on whether 
the banks are financially stable and in distress or not.794 Another set of variables that test 
and incorporate several financial ratios—including the equity to assets ratio, 
nonperforming loans to assets ratio, net income to assets ratio, and loans to assets ratio—
reveals that the risk of bank failure could be reduced by higher profits and capital or 
increased by higher expenses and nonperforming loans, respectively.795 No matter which 
set of variables is adopted to assess the potential insolvency risks of troubled banks, the 
implication from these sets of variables is that considering capital ratios as the only 
triggers to early intervention and the standard to use to maintain the financial stability of 
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banks may not be the most effective way.796 These two sets of multiple variables may 
necessitate more time be taken by banking regulators to consider them in relation to their 
adaptability and cost-efficiency and to incorporate a new set of variables to assess banks’ 
financial performance. Conversely, NPACR as a single variable may provide a simpler 
way for banking regulators to rethink the accuracy and efficiency of capital ratios as 
triggers of bank early intervention systems. 
In the context of structured early intervention for banks in China, objective 
standards as the main triggering events could be a way to reduce the forbearance of 
Chinese banking regulators and government intervention in dealing with troubled banks 
in previous cases. Moreover, because of the accuracy of NPACR as an objective 
standard, NPACR assesses the overall financial performance and operation of banks and 
considers the actual financial status of banks by incorporating the factor of nonperforming 
loans into the ratio. The efficiency of NPACR also shows that it could be a suitable 
objective standard for triggering events because it can be easy to adopt NPACR from a 
practical perspective with the stipulation of needing to collect easily identifiable data from 
banks. NPACR can also be sensitive to changes in nonperforming loans of banks and 
can detect potential changes in the financial performance and positions of banks and is 
easy to incorporate into a country’s current regulatory framework to complement the 
functions of capital ratios as early intervention triggers. 
 
B. Formal or Regular Triggering Events for Structured Early Intervention 
 
The concept of formal or regular triggering events refers to the relationship 
between triggering events for early intervention and banking regulatory requirements, 
particularly regarding as to whether triggering events are a separate set of standards 
particularly for early intervention or form part of regulatory requirements for prudential 
banking regulation. This issue matters because each country may have a distinct 
preference toward certain types of triggering events of structured early intervention for 
banks. Due to differences in traditions and practices in the banking regulatory frameworks, 
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these two types of triggering events constitute one main difference among various 
countries. 
On the basis of comparisons of US and UK triggering events, the types of triggering 
events of early intervention for banks in these countries reflect the tradition of their 
banking sectors and are compatible with the rules and practices of their banking 
regulations. Currently, despite the fact that triggering events for early intervention of 
troubled banks constitute combined triggers in China, said triggers are more of a mixture 
of the regular and formal types of triggering events. Because of the combination of 
triggering events, both triggers that are part of banking regulatory standards and triggers 
that are separate and supplemental to regulatory requirements are applicable for 
determining the financial performance and insolvency risks of banks. However, this kind 
of combined triggering approach is more likely to cause inconsistencies in relation to the 
identification of troubled banks and overlaps in the scope of authority of different banking 
regulators. The policy recommendation for the type of triggering events to be incorporated 
would be formal triggering events only that are separate from normal banking regulatory 
requirements, used to specifically assess and determine the financial performance of 
banks. The following two reasons explain why the adoption of only formal triggering 
events of structured early intervention for banks in China is more suitable. 
First, a formal set of triggering events of structured early intervention for banks 
offers clear triggers to respective measures, and this could increase the level of 
transparency between banks and banking regulators in the context of banking regulations. 
A formal set of triggering events in fact provides responsibilities of banking regulators 
when certain ratios of banks fall below benchmarks and specifies procedures in relation 
to corrective measures and regulatory actions that will be applied to particular banks. The 
clear and transparent triggers are particularly important for systemically important banks 
where the clearer and more transparent requirements could reduce or avoid insecurity 
and negative impacts caused by these banks.797 In the case of a banking crisis, urgent 
and timely measures are needed for the period while financial regulations have not been 
clearly and adequately established in the regulatory framework, as shown by experiences 
 
797 Christine Kaufmann and Rolf H. Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’ (2010) 13 
Journal of International Economic Law 779 
243 
in many countries during the recent financial crisis.798 The focus of regulation should 
transfer to centre on the need to provide transparent and clear rules and standards for 
the intervention by regulators and the state, therefore reducing uncertainties in the 
financial system and preparing for potential early intervention.799 
The trend in rules and criteria in relation to banking and financial regulations is to 
clarify said rules and criteria and to specify the responsibilities of banking regulators after 
the recent GFS.800 One aspect of this trend is to establish a banking regulator who is 
responsible for macro-prudential regulation and supervision and the other aspect is to 
establish formal and transparent rules and regulations to address potential financial 
difficulties and to deal with possible banking crises.801 However, in the recent GFS, rules 
and criteria for early intervention, including triggering events, and the division of 
responsibilities amongst different banking regulators are not sufficiently clear and 
transparent at a national level.802 For example, UK early intervention had the tradition of 
providing more discretion for banking regulators to decide banks’ financial performance 
and insolvency risks and determine whether more intrusive measures are needed. In 
terms of clearer rules and criteria, in the UK, the Banking Act of 2009 was a step forward 
to establish formal rules in the statutory framework in relation to dealing with bank 
difficulties and bank crises. For early intervention of banks in the UK, further 
establishment of clearer and more transparent rules and criteria may be required to 
enhance transparency, while the clarification of what circumstance could be the starting 
point of early intervention and what exact corrective measures that could be applied by a 
specific banking regulator is warranted because the current PIF is based more on 
discretions and lacks a level of transparency in relation to triggering events. This is the 
case for both the US and China, where there exist needs to further improve transparency 
in the rules and criteria of triggering events of structured early intervention for banks. 
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Considering that the role of transparency is to provide a basis for financial 
regulations within the legal and constitutional framework,803 the necessity of enhancing 
transparency also relates to market confidence as one of the values of banking regulation. 
Market confidence is derived from clear obligations based on the law. This reveals the 
differences between the activities that can be left with market discipline and the activities 
that are under the regulation of rules. Following the aspect of the trend that formal and 
technical rules will be the legal basis for banking regulators’ decisions, discretion-based 
regulatory requirements, including triggering events, are less transparent than those 
articulated in the law, as these rules are not clearly stated. As a result, in order to achieve 
a more robust banking regulation and early intervention, the line between transparent, 
clear, and technical legal requirements and the necessary degree of discretions given to 
banking regulators needs to be drawn before a financial crisis arises.804 
In the context of the early intervention of troubled banks, a formal set of triggers 
has a positive impact on clear and technical triggers and transparency between banks 
and banking regulators in terms of the specific circumstances that will be considered as 
starting points of early intervention. This also contributes to promoting market confidence 
in establishing a more robust regulation, especially with an appropriate arrangement with 
necessary discretions of banking regulators. 
Second, a formal set of triggering events of structured early intervention for banks 
can also be effective and efficient in identifying troubled banks when considering the 
following three aspects: the division of responsibilities and authorities of banking 
regulators; clear objectives of early intervention; and the long-term effect of banking 
regulators’ decisions on the troubled banks and the banking sector. In relation to the 
division of responsibilities and authorities of banking regulators, because the nature of a 
formal set of triggering events is a set of independent and separate triggers under an 
early intervention mechanism, this enables solely the designated banking regulator rather 
than all banking regulators in a country to be responsible for applying these triggers.  
 
803 Rolf H. Weber, ‘Mapping and Structuring International Financial Regulation – A Theoretical Approach’ 
(2009) 20 European Business Law Review 651 
804 Kaufmann and Weber (n 816) 
245 
From a broader perspective of banking regulation, either discretion of the sole 
banking regulator or rivalries amongst several banking regulators could have a negative 
effect on the identification and management of risks in the banking sector, including 
systemic risks, thus reducing the effectiveness of banking regulations. 805  Under the 
banking regulatory framework wherein multiple banking regulators have authority on early 
intervention, cooperation and coordination mechanisms are needed to ensure the 
recognition of systemic risks and the consideration of macro-regulation concerns 
associated with integrated and interconnected financial systems among these 
regulators.806 Therefore, it is necessary to set a border on functions and to stratify aspects 
of authority among the banking regulators so as to ensure the effective and efficient 
regulation of banks.807 In the context of structured early intervention for banks, similar 
situations apply wherein functions and authority of particular banking regulators need to 
be allocated and divided. A formal set of triggers provides detailed standards, which 
specifies the function of initiating the early intervention of troubled banks. Arguably, a 
formal set of triggers could be more useful in the context of multiple banking regulators, 
because these triggers outline the context and timing of decisions and actions from the 
particular regulator amongst several banking regulators. Only the banking regulator who 
has the authority to initiate structured early intervention for banks could apply these 
triggering events to assess the financial performance of the banks. This is a way to reduce 
overlaps of authority among different banking regulators and therefore improve the 
efficiency of the regulation of troubled banks at early stages.  
Regarding the clear objective of the early intervention mechanism, a formal set of 
triggering events that is independent and separate from normal banking regulatory 
requirements for prudential regulation could be a way to reduce delays on the part of the 
banking regulator in identifying troubled banks and therefore lead the identification 
process to be more efficient. Apart from the lagging nature of capital triggers, the design 
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of structured early intervention for banks that shares the same standards—specifically, 
capital adequacy as an assessment of banks’ financial performance and insolvency risk—
as a regular prudential banking regulation could also contribute to regulatory forbearance. 
One reason for this is that the regulatory assessment of banks’ financial performance and 
overall situations tend to be conducted on a yearly basis. This means that the interval 
between two assessments is relatively long and banking regulators may not be 
adequately updated regarding changes to financial situations and risk levels. With a 
formal set of triggers of early intervention, the assessment of banks’ financial performance 
and risk levels is not limited to banking regulatory requirements and the time period of 
such an assessment. In addition, the objectives of early intervention and prudential 
banking regulations may be slightly different from one another. Early intervention aim to 
detect problems and changes in financial performance and risk levels of banks at early 
stages, while regular prudential banking regulatory requirements ensure that banks are 
safe and sound in terms of their operations. Because of the differences in these objectives, 
using the same requirements or standards in early intervention for banks may not be the 
most efficient approach. As a result, with appropriate rules for the frequency of 
assessment in relation to early intervention of banks, a formal set of triggering events may 
contribute to a timelier assessment of banks’ financial performance, therefore avoiding 
delays in detecting changes in banks’ operations and risk levels. 
The long-term effect of decisions made by banking regulators about troubled banks 
and the banking sector is closely related with the long-term effectiveness and efficiency 
of banking regulators’ decisions about troubled banks. A formal set of triggering events 
could be difficult and complex to adapt as additional standards to complement prudential 
banking regulatory requirements in the beginning. However, because of the objective of 
triggering events of early intervention, in the long-term, the effectiveness and efficiency 
of a formal set of triggers could be seen from a more accurate recognition of troubled 
banks, especially with objective triggers. Based on a formal set of triggering events with 
objective standards, with the accuracy and efficiency of objective standards, a formal set 
of triggers could better achieve the objective of early identification of troubled banks, 
which enables banking regulators to more accurately assess the financial performance 
and risk levels of banks and to make a more rational decision in terms of whether early 
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intervention is needed as well as what is the ideal timing of the initiation of early 
intervention. 
Regarding the type of triggering events, use of a formal set of triggers could be 
more advantageous than regular prudential banking regulatory requirements. A formal 
set of triggering events would help to improve the transparency of early intervention 
between banks and banking regulators because of the clear and technical triggers set out 
in the formal set of triggering events. Moreover, a formal set of triggering events could 
also contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the identification of troubled banks 
at an early stage, as the formal triggers clearly outline the standards and authority of the 
particular regulator, set out the objectives of the early intervention mechanism, and could 
have a long-term positive effect on troubled banks and the banking sector. 
 
III. How to Regulate: Specific Measures of Structured Early Intervention for 
Banks 
 
In addition to triggering events of structured early intervention for banks, corrective 
measures constitute another important aspect of successful structured early intervention 
of troubled banks. After the assessment of banks’ financial performance, the 
implementation of corrective measures is the key to improving both the overall financial 
performance of banks and particular aspects of banks’ operations such as capital 
adequacy and asset quality. Unlike the differences between the US, UK, and Chinese 
triggering events, the corrective measures of the three countries share more similarities. 
Theoretically, corrective measures mainly focus on restrictions to the following aspects of 
banks, including but not limited to management and governance, capital and assets, 
shareholders’ rights, and operations and expansions. 808  The level of intervention of 
corrective measures on these aspects of banks’ business and operations vary depending 
on the performance and risks of banks.  
In addition to recovery and resolution planning, corrective measures for specific 
aspects of banks’ business and operations are necessary. The current practice of 
corrective actions in China tends to be punitive, which focuses more on the punishment 
of troubled banks by takeover, the suspension of banks’ licenses, and the revocation of 
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banks’ licenses. This reveals a lack of corrective measures that have an ex-ante feature 
to intervene at early stages. Because of this, corrective measures that aim to improve 
stability and solve financial difficulties are in need of an organised system to balance both 
early corrective measures and punitive corrective measures such that a better effect and 
results on troubled banks can be achieved. Based on US and UK experiences, under 
structured early intervention for banks, banks can be categorised into five groups, with 
the first category having the same standards as normal banking regulations and the last 
category dealing with failed banks. The categories in between include corrective 
measures that have an impact on the business and operations of banks that aim to restore 
their financial stability and reduce difficulties in their operations. Corrective measures for 
policy recommendation of Chinese structured early intervention mainly focus on these in-
between categories—namely, the minor stage, moderate stage, and severe stage. This 
section primarily discusses recovery and resolution plans and corrective measures for 
different aspects of banks’ business and operations at the three main stages of structured 
early intervention for banks, respectively. 
 
A. Recovery and Resolution Planning 
 
Recovery and resolution planning refers to the plans made to address bank 
performance and financial stability. However, these plans have different purposes and 
objectives in terms of maintaining and restoring the financial stability of banks. Recovery 
plans happen at earlier stages of or even before early intervention, while resolution plans 
are executed at latter stages of early intervention in association with the resolution of 
troubled and nonviable banks. 
 
1. The Necessity of Recovery and Resolution Planning 
 
Recovery and resolution planning constitutes an important corrective measure of 
structured early intervention for banks. The necessity of these plans is twofold. First, as 
some parts of recovery and resolution plans, especially the recovery plan, are drafted by 
banks themselves, this process enables banking regulators to access more information 
from the perspective of the operation and performance of banks. In recovery plans, banks 
are required to describe certain scenarios and their own prescribed measures and actions, 
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in order to accelerate the process to take a particular measure from a range of readily 
available measures in these plans. Because of the disclosure of recovery plans, 
especially descriptions of scenarios and actions, banking regulators are able to access 
potential new information about the banks offering the plans, even if the potential for the 
information can be excessive or inaccurate. 809  The new information not only allows 
banking regulators to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of individual banks but 
also enables them to design more suitable and compatible resolution plans for particular 
banks. The regulators need to consider a wide range of factors that may have an impact 
or which are related to specific situations of banks, including the nature of the business, 
size and interconnectedness of a particular bank in relation to its group company, and the 
financial system as well as potential impact of the bank’s failure.810 The new information 
gained from the recovery plan could fill in some gaps in banking regulators’ understanding 
of individual banks, therefore enabling them to prepare more tailored resolution plans for 
certain banks. 
Second, recovery and resolution planning provides a sense of certainty for both 
banks and banking regulators in the context of an uncertain scenario of a potential bank 
failure. Recovery and resolution planning presents a different take on the management 
of troubled banks in comparison with normal insolvency proceedings, where specific 
measures taken by an administrator or liquidator can be more unpredictable. With this 
level of certainty, in the potential bank crisis context, banks are able to guide themselves 
through predesigned recovery plans and, therefore, having prior knowledge in relation to 
potential circumstances and what steps to take is valuable. 811  The planning also 
contributes to a reduced level of disorderly management of troubled banks and potential 
bank failure. 
In order to gain the positive effects of recovery and resolution planning, banks need 
to undergo serious assessment and consideration in an event of failure, whilst bank 
regulators must closely evaluate and scrutinise any plans. However, recovery and 
resolution planning does not definitively lead to a certain and orderly management 
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approach for addressing troubled banks and potential bank crises. The key concerns are 
related to the timing and effect of such planning required by banking regulators, as the 
process of early intervention of troubled banks could take a relatively long time.812 In 
addition, such plans do not guarantee an effective resolution of troubled banks even if the 
plans were implemented at early stages. 813  As required by the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD), especially article 15, to assess the resolvability of individual 
banks,814 banking regulators subject to this Directive in Europe could be more likely to 
interfere with and require banks to make plans at early stages. However, this is not a 
compulsory requirement regarding the specific timing of such planning imposed by 
banking regulators on banks. 
 
2. Elements of Recovery and Resolution Plans 
 
In general, recovery and resolution plans refer to plans that aim to provide a 
roadmap in order to guide banks in the face of difficulties or even crises in the context of 
that the banks are likely to return to insolvency and turnaround is possible.815 Both plans 
have the feature of ex-ante regulation. The recovery plan is drafted and prepared by the 
banks themselves, while the resolution plan is the banking regulators’ responsibility to 
prepare. This is the main difference between the two plans. 
Elements of recovery and resolution planning could consist of the following four 
stages to maximise the effect of the plans to address banks having difficulties. In summary, 
from the first stage to the final stage, each of the respective actions, recovery plans, 
resolution plans, considerations of bankruptcy scenario, and restructurings of banks’ 
business should be taken into account to make the ex-ante planning work.816 At the first 
stage, banks play a major role in devising and preparing the recovery plan where the 
most important part is a simplified legal structure.817 The simplified legal structure refers 
to the efforts of banks in the plan to clarify their legal structures from a complicated and 
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unclear structure so that banking regulators can better understand the banks and their 
structures in the context of difficulties and crises. This provides the basis for the necessity 
of recovery and resolution planning, where banking regulators have clearer information 
and a deeper understanding of individual banks. More importantly, in the context of 
difficulties and crises, when having clearer versions of legal structures, banking regulators 
can better divide different parts or business lines of the banks and identify only the 
important parts that need to be rescued rather than providing assistance to the whole 
bank. 
Another element of recovery and resolution planning, the second stage, is the 
preparation of resolution plans by banking regulators. Banking regulators make use of 
resolution plans when banks are unlikely to become viable so as to resolve said troubled 
banks in an orderly way.818  Because the resolution plan is made before the actual 
difficulties or crises arise, resolution plans have similar benefits for banking regulators as 
recovery plans do for banks. In relation to the content of resolution plans, the plan more 
so covers resolution tools and options that can be applied to banks in crisis, excluding 
excessive financial assistance.819 For example, per the requirements of BRRD, resolution 
plans should include but not be limited to solutions and actions to separate the functions 
of a bank, ways for assessing the values of each function of the bank in question, and 
where to obtain funding for the resolution plan. In more detail, resolution plans are 
required to separate critical functions and business functions from other functions of 
banks using both legal and economic perspectives to ensure these two functions are 
viable in the context of insolvency. 820  The operation of and access to the market 
infrastructure functions are required to prepare things in advance in the resolution 
plans.821  
Apart from these basic contents, the arrangement of burden-sharing for individual 
banks in the resolution plan is advised to be taken into consideration. Burden sharing has 
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two functions in the resolution plan. First, it clarifies the burden of the final cost of 
resolution of individual banks, where private stakeholders should be the first group to bear 
the costs while, under circumstances with systemic importance, public funds can be 
temporarily provided for troubled banks.822 Second, in the context of the cross-border 
resolution planning of banks, burden sharing among different countries and authorities 
could be beneficial to the cohesion of home and host regulatory authorities and can 
enable these regulators to take preventive measures.823 In the case of the failure of such 
cross-border banks, both the home and host countries may need to provide assistance 
from public funds. In order to avoid this consequence, these regulatory authorities are 
more likely to ensure that timely supervision and measures are taken to minimise the 
negative effect. The willingness amongst these regulators to cooperate and assess 
particular cross-border banks having difficulties or crises is expected to increase. As a 
result, a burden-sharing arrangement in a resolution plan for a cross-border bank 
prepares home and host regulators alike for potential difficulties and incentivises these 
regulators to cooperate to reduce the possibility of forbearance and costs to public funds 
in the affected countries. 
The third stage, considerations of the bankruptcy scenario, complement the 
functions of recovery and resolution plans in the previous two stages. Considerations of 
the bankruptcy scenario enable both banks and banking regulators to review and highlight 
weaknesses, shortcomings, and inconsistencies associated with particular banks in the 
context of deposit insurance schemes and resolution processes and therefore outline the 
most significant problems for banking regulators.824 Prior consideration of the bankruptcy 
scenario is able to direct banking regulators’ attention to the most critical weakness of 
banks and inconsistencies during the resolution process in the case of a bank crisis. The 
consideration of the bankruptcy scenario needs extra attention from Chinese primary 
banking regulators for early intervention. On the basis of the current Chinese bank 
resolution regime (currently, bank insolvency is based on normal insolvency law and 
needs further reform to ensure a special bank insolvency law), there are no current rules 
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set in resolution planning in relation to the compatibility between bank resolution and the 
deposit insurance scheme. In the context of the special bank resolution regime, the 
resolution regime should be compatible with the current deposit insurance scheme to 
ensure a standardised payout of insured funds to depositors. This arrangement may also 
need to be included in the recovery and resolution planning at this stage to promote a 
relatively short period of time before the payout. 
The fourth stage, representing the last element of recovery and resolution planning, 
is a chance to restructure the bank business on the basis of the revelation of the banks’ 
legal and economic structure. This stage enables banking regulators to persuade banks 
to simplify their business parts and structures to meet the restructuring desires of banking 
regulators, especially when banks are unwilling to restructure their business in the context 
of difficulties and crises.825  
These four stages are the four elements of recovery and resolution planning for 
banks established prior to the actual difficulties and crisis. Based on the pursuance of 
recovery and resolution planning beforehand, both banks and banking regulators could 
have some extent of certainty and be more prepared to address more critical weaknesses 
of particular banks experiencing difficulties and crises. 
 
B. Corrective Measures at the Minor Stage 
 
Before going into details about corrective measures, it is worth noting that the main 
functions of these measures when banks fall below requirements are set out in the 
triggering events. One function of corrective measures is to prevent financial performance 
and insolvency risks of banks from worsening, which focuses on improving their overall 
profitability and management.826  Another function of these corrective measures is to 
reduce potential losses that may arise from troubled banks’ desperate behaviours to use 
costly funding and excessive risk-taking to improve their solvency.827 The functions of 
these corrective measures determining the level of intervention vary from less strict and 
intrusive measures to measures that have a direct impact on troubled banks. Although 
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corrective measures of structured early intervention in this section are developed on the 
basis of a formal intervention regime, overlaps between these corrective measures and 
regular prudential banking regulatory measures exist.828 This is particularly the case for 
banks where problems start to emerge. 
The minor stage refers to the stage where banks are faced with more minor 
difficulties and problems in relation to their financial performance and concerns of future 
insolvency risks arise but they show a good chance of restoring their capital. The specific 
corrective measures at each stage vary from country to country depending on particular 
considerations of each country’s needs and the characteristics of its banking system. 
Based on comparisons of US mandatory measures for ‘undercapitalised’ banks and UK 
corrective measures at stage 2 of PIF, the following measures could be options for dealing 
with banks with minor difficulties that may have an impact on their insolvency risks and 
financial performance. These corrective measures are the heightened level of monitoring 
by banking regulators (in other words, increased level of regulation and supervision), 
requirements on capital restoration plans (activation of recovery and resolution plans), 
restrictions on asset growth, preapproval of certain activities by the banking regulator, 
and solutions to certain problems of troubled banks within certain timeframe. To 
summarise, at the minor stage, corrective measures tend to be stricter than normal 
banking regulation, with additional restrictions reaching beyond the regulation of banks in 
the ordinary course of business. Based on the impact that these measures could have, 
the following four corrective measures could be considered as choices for banks with 
more minor difficulties in China. 
The first measure is the increased level of regulation and supervision of banks with 
minor difficulties. The measure focuses more on the information to which banking 
regulators could have access. Based on the comparison of the US and UK practices, this 
measure requires banking regulators either to pay closer attention to changes of the 
banks or to acquire and assess more information on the banks in order to analyse the 
financial situation of a bank and adopt further measures. A more specific way to impose 
an increased level of regulation and supervision could be additional requirements for 
troubled banks to disclose relevant information required by banking regulators. Reasons 
 
828 ibid. 
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for why more information given to banking regulators could benefit early intervention are 
twofold. First, because of information asymmetries, banking regulators cannot always 
acquire first-hand information of banks in a timely manner, so, when banks are faced with 
minor difficulties, requiring them to disclose more information to enable the regulators to 
assess the situation more comprehensively is beneficial. Banks tend to keep information 
in relation to their lending activities and their own financial performance private,829 with 
the exception of information made publically available in relation to public trading. 
Standard banking regulations aim to reveal only some relevant information to maintain 
the safety and soundness of banks. As compared with banks, banking regulators are 
often at a disadvantaged position in relation to readily available information about the 
banks.830 Additional requirements regarding information disclosure by troubled banks 
further enable banking regulators to understand and assess the actual financial conditions 
of said troubled banks, which is particularly important in the context of banks having 
difficulties. Moreover, the increased level of regulation and supervision encourages 
greater transparency between banks and banking regulators. This is crucial for dealing 
with troubled banks with minor difficulties where banking regulators could have gained 
the knowledge of how troubled banks manage themselves and how they deal with and 
reward risks.831 Transparency between banks and banking regulators also represents a 
trend in the banking regulations that arose after the GFC, where both banks and the 
regulators could support each other in relation to information access, regularly reviewing 
as well as monitoring risks to improve the effectiveness of the banking regulations and 
early detection of difficulties in banks. 
The second measure involves restrictions on asset growth, and this measure aims 
to control the rapid growth of banks’ assets. Based on current capital regulations as a 
measure to control asset growth, in order to respond to this measure, banks tend to 
reduce their total assets by reducing the credit supply to their clients rather than improving 
 
829 Allen Berger and Sally Davies, ‘The Information Content of Bank Examination’ (1998) 14.2 Journal of 
Financial Services Research 117 
830 David Moss, John Cisternino and Tobin Project, New Perspectives on Regulation (The Tobin Project 
2009) 13 
831 Gerard Caprio. Jr. ‘Financial Regulation after the Crisis: How Did We Get There and How Do We Get 
Out?’ (November 2013) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2350564> last accessed 
26 Aug 2019 
256 
the amount of their capital available to meet regulatory requirements.832 However, this 
does not solve the actual problem of excessive risk-taking by banks. From this 
perspective, restrictions on banks’ asset growth should focus more on regulating 
excessive risk-taking actions by banks to making this measure have a greater impact on 
banks’ business and operations instead of reliance on reducing total assets. 
The third measure is restrictions on banking activities. This type of measure 
imposes restrictions on banks when they intend to conduct their business as usual despite 
issues. These restrictions on banking activities focus on controlling the aspect of 
operation and expansion of banks. For example, prior approval of banking regulators is 
compulsory. This specific measure allows banking regulators to assess bank financial 
performance and risks against the potential activities or business to determine whether 
these banking activities or business could further influence the overall financial conditions 
and risks. In addition, requiring banks to solve certain problems within certain timeframe 
compels the banks to deal with the problems identified by banking regulators first before 
conducting other banking activities within a certain timeframe to restore their financial 
conditions and improve the level of solvency.  
 
C. Corrective Measures at the Moderate Stage 
 
The moderate stage refers to the stage wherein banks are undercapitalised and 
having difficulties with their financial performance with a chance of restoring their financial 
stability. At this stage, banking regulators could apply more intrusive actions on all 
aspects of troubled banks to rectify weaknesses of the banks and require the banks to 
rebuild capital adequacy, because, at this stage, the banks are still likely to meet capital 
adequacy requirements and become financially viable again. Based on US and UK 
experiences, at the moderate stage, banking regulators are per their discretion able to 
take corrective measures to address banks’ business and operations, management and 
governance, and shareholders. These more intrusive measures usually tend to intervene 
in the normal operations of banks and have a direct impact on banks’ decisions in relation 
to these aspects. For example, US discretionary measures for ‘significantly 
undercapitalised’ banks enable banking regulators to take a range of actions to address 
 
832 Gropp, Mosk, Ongena, and Wix (n 435) 34 
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bank operations to correct weaknesses in the banks’ operations and intervene in their 
business. 
On the basis of the impact on the different aspects, the following discusses 
potential corrective measures that could be applied to troubled banks in China at the 
moderate stage. The first category of corrective measures has an impact on troubled 
banks’ shareholders’ rights. Specifically, this category of measures could enable banking 
regulators to suspend shareholders’ voting rights, to restrict or prohibit the distribution of 
dividends, to appoint an administrator or liquidator, and to conduct mergers or 
acquisitions for particularly troubled banks. Restrictions or prohibitions by banking 
regulators on shareholders’ rights would be designed to improve the financial conditions 
of the banks. The rationales for this are related to different incentives between 
shareholders and creditors and between shareholders and directors. One reason is that 
banks’ shareholders may be incentivised to take excessive risks to gain their own benefits 
because the role of limited liability enables shareholders to transfer risks to creditors, thus 
creating conflicts between them.833 Another reason is also associated with shareholders’ 
appetite for risks. Because banks as financial institutions may have a more diverse range 
of risk portfolios and deposit insurance schemes provided by states, shareholders may 
be more incentivised to impose pressure on management for higher returns. However, 
these shareholders may encounter setbacks from managers and directors who insist on 
a more traditional way of banking, leading to conflicts between shareholders and bank 
management. Banks are more likely to survive financial crisis without the government’s 
bailout assistance if having directors who are less likely to be directed or influenced by 
shareholders.834 In the context of troubled banks at the moderate stage, banks need to 
reduce excessive risk-taking to stabilise their financial conditions, with intervention on 
 
833 Micheal Jenson and Willian Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
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shareholder rights being potential measures to achieve an effective recovery of particular 
troubled banks for the benefit of the public.835 
The second category of corrective measures has an impact on the management 
of banks, specifically mainly having a direct impact on the managers and directors of 
troubled banks. The specific measures include the removal and new appointment of 
managers or directors and the placement of restrictions on fees and bonuses paid to bank 
management, which could be a way to improve the quality of the governance of troubled 
banks. In more detail, banking regulators are permitted to identify and assess whether 
executive officers can fulfil their duty to be adequately involved in the daily business and 
operations of banks, particularly in the risk-management process and in exercising the 
diligence necessary to keep the independence of critical control functions and staff from 
the income-making functions and staff.836 In terms of the removal and new appointment 
of managers and directors, banking regulators should be allowed to require members of 
the board to be removed if the regulators recognise that particular members do not meet 
the ‘fit and proper’ test following an evaluation of their expertise.837 This category of 
measures enables banking regulators to evaluate the eligibility and credibility of banks’ 
management to improve the level of governance of troubled banks. 
The third category of corrective measures at the moderate stages relates to the 
impact on banks’ operations and expansion plans. Restrictions on asset growth and 
banking activities at the minor stage have the same but less intrusive effect on troubled 
banks. This category of measure allows banking regulators to have a direct impact on the 
normal business and operations of banks. Banking regulators could take the following 
actions to intervene in troubled banks’ operations: requiring banks to improve capital 
and/or liquidity adequacy, restricting the expansion plans of banks’ operations, requiring 
banks to reduce the size of their business and sales of assets and liabilities, restricting or 
prohibiting certain business lines, and requiring prompt provisioning for nonperforming 
loans. 838  These measures tend to focus more on the business strategy and risk 
 
835 Valis SG Babis, ‘Bank Recovery and Resolution: What about Shareholder Rights?’ (2012) Legal 
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management processes of troubled banks. These measures emphasise control and 
management of the business strategy of troubled banks. From the perspective of the bank 
balance sheet, these corrective measures impose restrictions on banks’ business 
decisions for expansion and engagement in certain lines of business as well as the 
management of assets. Banking regulators’ assessment and review of troubled banks’ 
business strategies could be beneficial to identify reasons that lead to the current financial 
conditions of the banks, therefore enabling both banks and banking regulators to better 
understand the compatibility of bank sizes and structures with business growth and risks 
associated with their choices.839 Moreover, these measures enable banking regulators to 
identify and deal with risks faced by troubled banks. Because of the vulnerability of 
troubled banks to risks, supervisory intervention that require banks to take certain 
measures to reduce excessive risks are required. This is particularly important when 
troubled banks’ own risk management systems do not perform well enough to monitor 
risk limits, risk exposures, and risk-taking behaviours in relation to credit and operation 
risks.840 
The use of corrective measures by banking regulators should be most helpful in 
relation to troubled banks at the moderate stage to restore overall operations and resolve 
financial difficulties. As the range of measures are both comprehensive and have a more 
intrusive feature than corrective measures at the minor stage, banking regulators are 
more likely to actually influence the business and operations of troubled banks and to 
correct weaknesses of the banks when there is a chance for the banks to survive their 
financial difficulties. 
 
D. Corrective Measure at the Severe Stage 
 
The severe stage refers to the stage where banks are faced with critical financial 
conditions with a slight chance to restore their financial stabilities and capital adequacy. 
At this stage, banking regulators could apply more direct and intrusive actions and make 
practical preparations for potential resolution. Based on US, UK, and Chinese corrective 
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measures, the following measures could be considered as choices for corrective 
measures at the severe stage for troubled banks under Chinese structured early 
intervention for banks: assessment of corrective measures at previous stages, restrictions 
on most aspects of banks’ business and operations, restrictions or prohibitions on certain 
types of payment, and a temporary takeover of troubled banks. At this stage, troubled 
banks are faced with imminent risks to failure and need to improve their capital adequacy 
and liquidity fast. The majority of these proposed measures focus on maintaining liquidity 
and managing the risks of troubled banks. 
The first category of measures is the assessment of corrective measures at 
previous stages. If a troubled bank has been through the previous stages with different 
corrective measures, banking regulators’ assessment of these previous measures could 
be a way to elucidate the mismatch between banks’ conditions and prescribed measures 
when there is still a chance for those banks to attain adequate capital and become 
financially stable again. This also provides banking regulators with another chance to 
evaluate troubled banks’ financial conditions and problems in their operations to 
determine corrective measures to be applied at severe stages. 
Based on the assessment, as compared with corrective measures at the minor and 
moderate stages, the intensity and the level of intervention would greatly be improved; 
however, the basic nature of corrective measures remains the same at the severe stage 
and these corrective measures have an impact on bank business and operations, 
management and governance, and shareholders. The second category of measures is 
restrictions on most aspects of banks’ business activities and operations except the 
normal and regular banking activities, which has an influential impact on bank business 
and operations. These aspects include a range of banks’ business activities. For example, 
in relation to banking activities, one could place compulsory restrictions on troubled banks 
designating the need to acquire prior written consent before exploring major changes and 
business activities that pose excessive risks to their financial conditions. This enables 
banking regulators to scrutinise potential banking activities against troubled banks’ 
financial conditions and risks to further assess whether such banking activities would be 
good for the banks’ performance and operations. For example, in relation to other 
corrective measures under this category, these measures could impose compulsory 
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restrictions on troubled banks’ material transactions. The material transactions include 
investment, expansion, acquisition, highly leveraged transactions, and other similar 
transactions that could materially have an impact on troubled banks’ financial conditions. 
In relation to restrictions and prohibitions on certain types of payment, limitations on the 
payment of subordinate debts and restrictions on capital distribution and management 
fees could reduce the possibility of any further payments in an attempt to help preserve 
the liquidity and capital adequacy of the troubled banks. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
On the basis of a special bank resolution regime, structured early intervention for 
banks constitute an enhanced level of regulation and supervision from regulatory 
authorities to intervene in banks’ business and operations to deal with their financial 
performance and risks to reduce the possibilities of potential bank failure. In the context 
of the Chinese banking sector, the PBOC, the CBIRC, and the deposit management 
agency have different roles and scopes of power in relation to regulating and supervising 
banks. 
The CBIRC, as the prudential banking regulator, could be the regulatory authority 
who is responsible for structured early intervention for banks in China. Triggering events 
of structured early intervention for banks should mainly depend on objective standards. 
Different levels of intervention and corrective measures could be applied by the CBIRC 
at each stage for troubled banks. In the case of cross-border banks, when these banks 
are faced with financial difficulties, the CBIRC should work together with home or host 
country banking regulators to keep up-to-date with information about the troubled banks 
in order to deal with any insolvency risks of these banks. 
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Stages of Structured 
Early Intervention for 
Banks 
Triggering 
Events 
Corrective Measures 
Minor stage NPACR: 6% 
Recovery and resolution planning: 
Reviewing and implementing 
recovery plan; 
Making initial preparations for future 
resolution 
Information access 
Minor restrictions on asset growth 
Minor restrictions on banking 
activities 
Moderate stage NPACR: 5% 
Corrective measure on shareholders’ 
rights 
Corrective measure on banks’ 
operations and expansion 
Corrective measure on the 
management of banks 
Preparations for potential resolution 
with other regulatory authorities 
Severe stage NPACR: 4% 
Assessment of the effectiveness of 
previous measure 
Full restrictions on banks’ operations 
and expansion 
Temporary takeover of the banks by 
the government 
Final preparations for the future 
resolution 
 
Table 8 Proposed Chinese Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
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Conclusion 
 
In relation to managing financially troubled banks, early intervention is an 
indispensable aspect of successful regulation and supervision of banks, particularly in the 
context of a banking crisis. The necessity and importance of early intervention for troubled 
banks has been shown in many banking crises – identifying troubled banks and taking 
timely corrective measures to those banks could reduce or avoid the negative impact of 
banks’ value being depleted rapidly and bank insolvency. This means that early regulatory 
response to troubled banks could contribute to a more positive outcome of managing 
these banks and provide alternatives to bank insolvency.841  
Many countries have experienced and provoked reforms and changes in their 
banking regulatory structures. The United States has incorporated early intervention, PCA, 
in its banking regulatory framework since the early 1990s. The United Kingdom has 
changed its banking regulatory framework and introduced early intervention for banks 
because of BRRD after the GFC. The concept of early intervention existed in the Chinese 
banking regulatory framework, however, the current early intervention arrangements for 
troubled banks is very basic and lack clarity in many aspects. From a comparative 
perspective, this thesis discusses US, UK, and Chinese structured early interventions for 
banks in relation to their triggering events and corrective measures. On the basis of the 
comparison between these three countries, the thesis analyses the specific banking 
regulator, triggering events and corrective measures of the Chinese early intervention 
arrangement and provides policy recommendations for designing structured early 
interventions for Chinese banks. 
To conclude the thesis, the concluding chapter has the following sections. The first 
section examines and answers research questions in the thesis. The next section 
discusses the main findings of the thesis. Then this section discusses the potential 
reforms of structured early intervention for banks in China. 
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I. Answering Research Questions 
 
This thesis identifies structured early interventions for banks as an early 
intervention mechanism that provides banking regulators with timely signals and sufficient 
regulatory resources for dealing with troubled banks at early stages before reaching the 
level of bank insolvency. Based on this, the following sections answer research questions 
in the introduction chapter of the thesis. 
 
A. Designs, Advantages, and Disadvantages of Structured Early Interventions 
for US, UK, and Chinese Banks 
 
The thesis discusses current US, UK, and Chinese structured early interventions 
for banks from the perspectives of the regulator, triggering events, and corrective 
measures. In relation to structured early interventions for US banks, the prudential 
banking regulator at the federal level is responsible for initiating structured early 
interventions for US banks. Bank capital ratios are the main triggering events of US 
structured early intervention. Based on the triggering events, banks are categorised into 
five stages with different compulsory and discretionary corrective measures that 
represent different level of intervention. The timely observation of signals of bank financial 
conditions and the willingness of banking regulators are related to a successful 
implementation of structured early interventions for banks. The US PCA approach to 
some extent improved the overall safety and soundness of banks after its establishment 
during the 1990s. However, in the GFC, capital ratios proved to be a lagging indicator of 
bank financial conditions and inconsistency of the corrective measures that are decided 
and based on banking regulators’ discretion, contributed to the underperformance of PCA.  
In relation to structured early interventions for UK banks, the prudential banking 
regulator is the competent authority for initiating structured early interventions for banks. 
Triggering events are introduced on the basis of supervisory assessments of bank 
operation and performance, and corrective measures consist of both recovery and 
resolution corrective measures. Supervisory assessments as triggering events provide 
an advantage in UK PIF because of the comprehensive and accurate assessment of bank 
performance. On the other hand, the discretion of the UK prudential banking regulator 
may cause late identification and the initiation of corrective measures. In addition, another 
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disadvantage of the UK PIF is related to some of its corrective measures that may have 
limited effects in relation to correcting the weaknesses of troubled banks (e.g., moral 
suasion).  
In relation to structured early interventions for Chinese banks, the mechanism is 
less organised and comprehensive as compared with structured early interventions for 
US and UK banks. Triggering events are established on the basis of both capital ratios 
and supervisory assessments. Corrective measures consist of general corrective 
measures and stricter corrective measures. Structured early interventions for Chinese 
banks are in need of further development from the perspective of the following 
preconditions of successful structured early interventions for banks: independence and 
accountability of the regulatory agencies, accurate and timely financial information, 
adequate authority, and adequate resolution procedures.842 
 
B. Evaluation of US, UK, and Chinese Triggering Events of Structured Early 
Interventions for Banks 
 
This thesis contends that US triggering events are based on capital ratios. The 
advantages of US capital ratios as triggering events are twofold: specifically, 1) they 
constitute a set of straightforward benchmarks for evaluating bank financial conditions 
and, 2) to some extent, limit the discretion of banking regulators and prevent regulatory 
forbearance. On the other hand, the effectiveness of capital ratios is impacted because 
of the inability of capital ratios to reflect the financial conditions of a bank in a timely 
manner. This thesis argues that NPACR should be considered as an alternative to the 
idea of capital ratios for assessing bank financial conditions and triggering corrective 
measures for the following two reasons: 1) the NPACR considers capital adequacy and 
asset quality of banks in one ratio and 2) NPACR outperforms capital ratios in terms of 
timeliness and is predictive of bank financial conditions.  
UK supervisory assessment as triggering events incorporate banking regulators’ 
judgements on several aspects of bank performance. These triggering events provide 
banking regulators with a more comprehensive understanding of bank financial conditions 
than capital ratios do. The assessment of several aspects of bank performance provides 
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additional information in relation to the overall safety and soundness of a bank and 
therefore enables banking regulators to determine the likelihood of the potential failure of 
a bank. The disadvantages of supervisory assessments are twofold. One issue is that 
supervisory assessments are unlikely to be predictive regarding bank financial conditions 
even if successful in providing a comprehensive assessment of a bank’s current 
performance. The other is there exist high costs and infrequent timing associated with 
such supervisory assessments and therefore banking regulators are unable to obtain 
timely financial performance data of banks by these triggering events. 
In relation to Chinese combined triggering events, on the one hand, these 
triggering events incorporate the advantages of capital ratios and supervisory 
assessments together. However, because both capital ratios and supervisory 
assessments are not predictive in assessing bank financial conditions, their combination 
is also unlikely to provide timely data on the financial condition of a bank for banking 
regulators. One of the other disadvantages of the Chinese combined triggering events 
approach is the inconsistency of the application of the rules to banks. Moreover, 
consideration of these two sets of triggering events can cause overlaps in achieving the 
same result of an increased level of intervention for troubled banks. 
On the basis of comparisons of the US, UK, and Chinese triggering events, this 
thesis argues the following two factors are relevant to the differences observed in 
triggering events. One factor is whether triggering events are regarded as an additional 
or an integral set of standards in relation to regular banking regulatory requirements. 
Another factor is whether triggering events are rule-based or discretion-based standards 
that act as references to initiate the following corrective measures. 
 
C. Evaluation of US, UK, and Chinese Corrective Measures of Structured Early 
Interventions for Banks 
 
This thesis examines US compulsory and discretionary corrective measures for 
banks in all five capital categories. Well-capitalised and adequately capitalised banks are 
only subject to a few requirements imposed by corrective measures on capital adequacy. 
US corrective measures focus more so on undercapitalised and significantly 
undercapitalised banks. Both compulsory and discretionary corrective measures that 
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intend to control asset growth and bank business can be applied to these troubled banks. 
Critically undercapitalised banks are subject to more intrusive measures, including 
receivership by the FDIC.  
UK corrective measures consist of recovery and resolution measures in dealing 
with troubled banks. On the one hand, UK recovery measures are established and 
formulated in a less detailed and comprehensive manner in comparison with the US 
corrective measures. The number of UK corrective measures at stages 2 through 4 of PIF 
is limited. On the other hand, UK resolution measures begin to take place at very early 
stages of PIF. This enables the prudential banking regulator and other banking regulatory 
agencies to coordinate and cooperate at early stages.  
Chinese corrective measures include both general corrective measures and 
stricter corrective measures. These two types of measures are two extremes in early 
intervention. General measures are not typically intrusive and may have a more limited 
impact on troubled banks, while some stricter measures are too intrusive and may lead 
to the closure of troubled banks. Chinese corrective measures for troubled banks have to 
be more structural, with a clear process and timetable in place for each measure. In 
addition, the limited number of corrective measures can limit the actual effects and results 
of attempts to manage troubled banks. 
On the basis of the comparison of corrective measures of structured early 
interventions for US, UK, and Chinese banks, this thesis identifies that the following two 
factors are related to differences among corrective measures in the three countries. One 
is whether corrective measures are designed to actually be an increased level of 
intervention with the aim of achieving recovery of troubled banks. The other factor is the 
variation in the categories of corrective measures, and this can reflect the emphasis of 
corrective measures of a country’s structured early interventions for banks, whether the 
emphasis is a compulsory correction of troubled banks or early preparation for resolution. 
 
D. A Suitable Structured Early Interventions for Banks in China 
 
In relation to a potential structured early interventions for Chinese banks, on the 
basis of comparisons of structured early interventions for US, UK, and Chinese banks, 
this thesis argues that the CBIRC should be the primary banking regulator for structured 
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early interventions for Chinese banks. Structured early intervention for banks requires a 
banking regulator to monitor bank financial performance and identify issues associated 
with bank operation at early stages. This means that the banking regulator should be 
capable of accessing and analysing bank operation and performance to achieve effective 
early intervention. In the context of the Chinese banking regulatory framework, the CBIRC 
is an institution-based prudential regulator who conducts on-site and off-site examinations 
of banks. This enables the CBIRC to assess and regularly review bank operation and risk. 
In addition, because of the unclear scope of the deposit insurance mandate, the Chinese 
deposit management agency has an undefined status, in particular, its authority in relation 
to early intervention.  
In relation to triggering events of structured early interventions for Chinese banks, 
the thesis argues that a series of objective standards should be considered as triggering 
events for the following reasons. First, objective standards can provide timely data on the 
financial conditions of banks and reduce the potential impact of regulatory forbearance. 
Second, NPACR can be an effective objective standard in relation to its predictive feature 
and timeliness. Third, NPACR considers both the capital adequacy and asset quality of 
banks within one ratio, which is compatible with the Chinese problems of nonperforming 
loans. Triggering events of structured early interventions for Chinese banks should be 
organised as a formal set of requirements for adherence to in addition to normal banking 
regulatory requirements. A formal set of objective requirements would provide clear 
instructions and guidance for banking regulators to take respective corrective actions. 
Moreover, the formal set of triggering events would be more effective in relation to division 
of banking regulators’ responsibilities, objectives of early intervention and the long-term 
effect on troubled banks. 
In relation to corrective measures of structured early interventions for Chinese 
banks, this thesis argues that recovery and resolution plans should be considered as 
important parts of early interventions for banks because the plans would enable banking 
regulators to access more information about troubled banks’ operation and performance 
and provide a sense of certainty for both banks and banking regulators when dealing with 
an uncertain scenario of a potential bank failure. This thesis also argues that corrective 
measures at  the minor, moderate, and severe stages represent a progressive level of 
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intervention of troubled banks. These corrective measures have an impact on bank 
business, asset growth, and management, with an increased intensity of supervision 
brought to bear as bank financial conditions continue to deteriorate. 
 
II. Main Findings of the Thesis 
 
In relation to the design of structured early intervention for banks, the primary 
banking regulator, triggering events and corrective measures are the three main aspects 
of early intervention mechanism. Based on the comparison of US, UK and Chinese 
structured early intervention for banks, all three countries have incorporated the three 
aspects in their current structured early intervention for banks.  
From the perspective of the primary banking regulator in relation to structured early 
intervention for banks, US and UK primary banking regulators have a specific scope of 
authority and responsibilities which differentiate from other banking regulators in dealing 
with troubled banks. The current primary banking regulator for structured early 
intervention for banks in China is arguable, because the understanding of ‘bank resolution’ 
can be interpreted in two ways and the Chinese deposit insurance has an undefined legal 
status and mandates in the current regulatory framework. This cause overlaps of early 
intervention authority between the CBIRC as the prudential regulator and the deposit 
management agency. 
From the perspective of triggering events, objective standards and subjective 
standards form the basis of US, UK and Chinese triggering events, particularly capital 
ratios and supervisory assessment. Capital ratios and supervisory assessment as 
triggering events both have advantages and disadvantages, as summarised in the 
previous section. In order to identify risk and issues existed in banks’ business and 
performance, triggering events of structured early intervention for banks needs to be 
predictive. However, capital ratios that are based on banks’ book values tend to be a 
lagging indicator of banks’ actual performance. Similarly, supervisory assessment that is 
based on previously collected data from banks may not be a sufficiently predictive 
triggering events. NPACR, as a type of objective standards, can be an alternative to 
trigger structured early intervention for banks, because the ratio assesses bank capital 
and asset quality in one ratio, reduces incentives for banks and banking regulators to 
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cover capital deficiencies and performs better in predicting potential bank failures than 
common capital ratios.843 
From the perspective of corrective measures, US, UK and Chinese corrective 
measures have few similarities. US, UK and Chinese corrective measures share the 
theme of an increased level of intervention as the financial performance of troubled banks 
deteriorate. Specifically, US and UK corrective measures have the progressive feature 
and this feature demonstrates the intervention by banking regulations from mild corrective 
measures to intrusive corrective measures while the level of intervention by Chinese 
corrective measures increases sharply from general to strict corrective measures. US, 
UK and Chinese corrective measures differ greatly and all three countries have distinctive 
categories and designs. In addition, banking regulators in the three countries have 
different level of discretion in relation to deciding which corrective measures would be 
applied to troubled banks. 
In relation to the current Chinese structured early intervention for banks, the 
primary banking regulator, triggering events and corrective measures are in need of 
further improvements. The primary banking regulatory for early intervention has not been 
confirmed and overlaps of two banking regulators’ authorities exist. The current triggering 
events that are based on both capital ratios and supervisory assessment may cause 
inconsistency and overlaps in initiating corrective measures. The current corrective 
measures lacks recovery and resolution planning and a set of progressive intervention 
measures. 
 
III. The Potential Reform of Chinese Structured Early Intervention for Banks 
 
In relation to establishing a comprehensive structured early intervention for banks 
in China, many changes seem necessary to the current Chinese early intervention 
mechanism. Considering the following aspects of structured early intervention for banks 
may be useful to develop a suitable Chinese structured early intervention for banks. 
First, from the perspective of Chinese banking regulatory framework, a consistent 
understanding of early intervention and a formal early intervention mechanism should be 
considered and incorporated into the framework. The understanding of ‘structured early 
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intervention for banks’ in the current Chinese legislation seems unclear. In the Chinese 
legislation, the current understanding of early intervention is closely associated with bank 
resolution where a bank is legally insolvent. This differs from the understanding of early 
intervention of troubled banks at pre-insolvency level where banks are economically 
insolvent. A clear definition and consistent understanding of ‘structured early intervention 
for banks’ is the foundation for establishing an effective regulatory framework. Moreover, 
a formal and explicit early intervention mechanism for troubled banks would be more 
effective than the current mechanism where rules for early intervention for troubled banks 
overlap. A formal structured early intervention for banks would set the scope of banking 
regulators’ authority in relation to structured early intervention for banks and provide the 
primary banking regulator with a set of triggering events and sufficient corrective 
measures. This has been demonstrated by both PCA and PIF which provide guidance for 
competent banking regulators to manage troubled banks better than before US and UK 
reforms in early intervention mechanisms for troubled banks. 
Second, incorporating a predictive and timely indicator as triggering events of 
structured early intervention for banks would be essential to identifying issues and risk 
existed in bank operation and business. As discussed in the thesis, capital ratios and 
supervisory assessment to some extent enable banks and banking regulators to mask 
the actual financial performance of banks. Neither capital ratios nor supervisory 
assessment is predictive and timely enough to identify bank risks at an early stage. Both 
capital ratios and supervisory assessment. Therefore, when designing triggering events 
of structured early intervention for banks in China, alternative triggering events that has 
the predictive feature should be considered, such as NPACR and some multi-variable 
triggers.  
Third, incorporating recovery and resolution plan into corrective measures in minor, 
moderate and severe stage would contribute to the process of managing troubled banks. 
Structured early intervention for banks is the in-between phase of regulating and 
supervising banks from regulation to resolution. Recovery and resolution plan could 
enable both the primary banking regulator in relation to early intervention and banks to 
consider potential distressed conditions before the actual event and allow the regulator 
to access more information. Early preparation of the distressed situation by multiple 
272 
banking regulators, including the deposit insurance agency and bank resolution authority, 
as discussed in the elements of recovery and resolution plan, could help both banks and 
the regulators to focus on critical weakness of the banks and provide some level of 
certainty in managing the distressed situation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The thesis discussed the current structured early intervention for banks in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and China, explored the three main aspects of the 
mechanism, the primary banking regulator, triggering events and corrective measures, 
and discussed a potential suitable structured early intervention for banks in China. As the 
current structured early intervention for banks in China is at a basic level, many changes 
to the main aspects and a more comprehensive consideration of the current mechanism 
are needed. Some questions that are relevant to the topic but not discussed in the thesis 
may need further research, particularly in relation to how national banking regulators work 
with and distribute responsibilities in the context of managing cross-border banks with 
troubled financial performance and operation. 
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